The strategic impact of the counteroffensive

The strategic impact of the counteroffensive

In “Decisive Battles of World War II – The German View”, the former head of Operations in OKW, General Walter Warlimont wrote about the North African campaign in 1942 as one of these decisive battles under the title “Decision in the Mediterranean”. He traces the revival of the strategic consideration of a move into Egypt back to the successful counter-offensive by the Axis forces at the end of the winter battle. This offensive, prepared in total secrecy and successfully carried out started on 21 January 1942 swiped away the inexperienced and understrength British 1st Armoured Division in the desert, and almost trapped and annihilated the 4th Indian Infantry Division in the Djebel on the northern coast of Cyrenaica, around Benghazi and Barce.  In the view of Warlimont:

[…]this tremendous offensive drive […] encouraged German leaders to revert to their ambitious project of the previous year, linking it this time with plans for a further offensive in the Caucasus.

25 jan 42

D.A.K. situation map, 25 Jan 1942. collection

The inherent weakness of this development, in which strategic considerations limped along in the rear of tactical success, was glossed over by Rommel’s brilliant victory in the desert, and it was optimistically assumed that Rommel’s tremendous reputation and his undoubted skill as a leader in the field would more than compensate for the steady increase of enemy strengths which was to be expected.

A few comments on this:

  • There are shades of the June 1942 attack into Egypt after the fall of Tobruk here, where strategic considerations (this time the capture of Malta) again ‘limped’ along in the wake of the capture of Tobruk.
  • Warlimont completely ignores in this analysis the fact that the Axis forces, which not three months before, on 21 November 1941 were supposed to seize the Tobruk fortress and then prepare to break across the frontier into Egypt had barely escaped with the hides on their back from Auchinleck’s offensive.  Rommel was in my opinion outgeneralled in November and December 1941, and quite badly and soundly beaten outside Tobruk, the obvious successes, such as the destruction of 5th South African Brigade and the near destruction of the New Zealand Division notwithstanding. But somehow this near desaster was forgotten by a fast drive across a mostly empty desert and the pushing back of the enemy halfway to Tobruk.
  • So while I agree that the counter-offensive was a tactical (and in fact a strategic success), I hesitate to subscribe to the view that either it or indeed the whole winter battle was a ‘brilliant victory’, despite the fact that the Axis side did not hesitate to slap itself on the back over just escaping total ruin in North Africa.
11th Indian Brigade in Crusader

11th Indian Brigade in Crusader


The Brigade had a short but interesting history during Operation CRUSADER, and served well. In a letter written to a senior officer in India by Major-General Tuker, GOC 4th Indian, following the loss of the Brigade at Tobruk in June 1942, he refers to 11 Indian Brigade as the finest fighting formation in the desert.

11 Indian Brigade was one of three in the “Red Eagle” division (nicknamed after its shoulder patch), 4 Indian Infantry, together with 5 and 7 Indian Brigades.  At the outset of Operation CRUSADER, only 7 Brigade was in active operations, with 11 Brigade guarding the coast east of Sollum/Halfaya, and 5 Brigade acting as a reserve. 11 Indian Brigade at that time consisted of the 2/5 Mahratta Light Infantry, 2nd Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders and 1/6 Rajputana Rifles, under the command of Brigadier Anderson.  

Following two weeks of quiet on the eastern front of the border fortifications, the Brigade crossed the wire at the border to Libya on 1 December 1941, to support the operations of 13 Corps, and quickly became engaged.


An Indian soldier guards a group of Italian prisoners near El Adem aerodrome, during the pursuit of Axis forces westwards after the relief of Tobruk. (IWM E7180)

Bir el Gobi

The Brigade was not involved in the battle of the Omars on the Egyptian frontier, and only entered battle attacking the Italian strongpoint at Bir el Gobi on the desert track south of Tobruk.  The attack was badly prepapred due to a lack of time (faulty intelligence, and no communication with the supporting artillery) and this, together with the heroic resistance by the Giovanni Fascisti (Young fascists), led to very high losses of the attacking units of the 11th Brigade, in particular 2nd Cameronians on the first day. While it was believed that the objective of the 2/5 Mahrattas was strongly held, while the objective of the Cameron Highlanders was lightly held, in reality it appears to have been vice versa.

As a consequence of this erroneous assessment, the available 12 Valentine Tanks were split into two groups, 9 for the Mahrattas and 3 for the Cameron Highlanders. The Mahrattas captured their objective in a bayonet charge, taking 250 Italian prisoners and capturing 50,000 gallons  (about 2,000 tons) of fuel. After this success, the Mahrattas tried to support the Cameron Highlanders, in two further attacks but even this did not help to dislodge the defenders. The next morning, 5th December, a silent attack was tried, but again to no avail.

At Bir el Gobi on 5 December, the battalion lost its commanding officer, Lt.Col. Butler O.B.E. killed, together with 13 men, British 2/Lt. Wilson, and Vice Roy Commissioned Officer Jemadar Maida Ram of B Company, and 48 wounded, including two British officers and two VCOs, with one soldier dying of wounds on 20 December. A Sepoy (private) in 2/5 Mahrattas was awarded the Indian Order of Merit medal for his actions during  one of these attack, a decoration available only to Indian soldiers, and ranking one or two classes under the Victoria Cross. The history (probably working from the citation) reads:

Notable devotion to duty for which he deservedly won the posthumous award of the I.O.M. was displayed by Sepoy Babaji Desai who, when his section commander had been killed, took command and used his Bren gun very effectively in assisting the advance of the company against heavy  enemy machine-gun fire.  Later the Sepoy was ordered to remain in position covering the withdrawal of his company and carried out his task so well that the company suffered few casualties from the fire of the enemy’s machine-guns on its immediate front.  Sepoy Babaji Desai and the two men with him were killed before they could themselves withdraw.

After abandoning the attack, 11th Brigade leaguered in the desert west of el Gobi when 2/5 Mahrattas were attacked and overrun by the tanks of the Afrika Korps.  The history of the Mahratta Light Infantry states:

The 2nd Battalion was again heavily engaged in the action at Bir el Gobi on 4th/6th December 1941, when during a powerful enemy counter-attack two companies were overrun by a concentration of German tanks losing in casualties 3 British officers, 5 Indian officers, and 240 other ranks.

What happened was an attack of about 25 tanks, according to ‘The Tiger Kills’, with supporting infantry.  They overran A and C companies of the Mahrattas, but in the process were delayed and engaged sufficiently to allow the remainder of the battalion to withdraw. 


A Matilda tank supporting Indian troops, 24 December 1940. (IWM E3870E)

The Djebel

In fact, 11th Brigade had been mauled so badly in the three days it was in action that it was withdrawn into Tobruk, out of line for the pursuit of the Axis forces to the Gazala line. It also lacked transport to participate in a more mobile battle. 5 and 7 Brigades continued the pursuit, first to the Gazala line, where 5 Brigade was mauled on 13 December, and then on to Benghazi.

11 Brigade only re-entered the winter campaign at a later stage, when it occupied part of the Djebel on the coast between Benghazi and Ain el Gazala and became embroiled in the German counteroffensive.  One of its battalions (1/6 Rajputana Rifles) was detached as security detail for the HQ of 13 Corps in the Msus/Antelat area, leaving 2/5 Mahrattas and 2 Camerons, which had been reinforced by ‘E’ Force, a raiding force based on 29 Indian Brigade’s 3/2 Punjab Regiment. One of the 1/6 Rajputana companies was overrun by German tanks during the retreat, while the remainder of the battalion had a close shave due to lack of transport (and at one time refuelled at one end of a dump while the Germans were using the other end) but managed to escape.

11th Brigade as a whole was cut off in the Barce area with the rest of the division following the loss of Benghazi to the Axis counter-stroke on 21st January. During a brilliantly executed retreat, it managed to disengage and cause heavy damage to the Axis forces. The defensive action of the Brigade was instrumental in allowing the remainder of the division to escape the trap it found in, relatively unscathed, and it sufficiently delayed the advance of German combat groups through the Djebel to prevent them from bouncing the Gazala Line towards Tobruk.

In the brief history of the division printed shortly after the war, this engagement of the 11th Brigade is described as “[…]perhaps the most brilliant defensive engagement in divisional history.” The battalion commander of the 2/5 Mahrattas, Lieutenant-Colonel M.P.Lancaster, was awarded the DSO for his “[…]able handling of the battalion in successive rearguard actions covering the withdrawal of 11th Brigade from the Barce-Benghazi area from 24th January to 4th February.”


When 4th Indian Division came into the Gazala line, it was immediately split up, and its brigades distributed all across the Mediterranean for several months. 11 Brigade eventually ended up defending the eastern sector of Tobruk during the gazala battles, and was destroyed when Tobruk fell, with Brigadier Anderson becoming a prisoner of war.  At that time, the Brigade was pretty much left alone in the face of the German assault, and could not withstand it due to its over-extended frontline.  

Featured picture showing men of probably 7 Indian Brigade. Men of the 4th Indian Division with a captured German flag at Sidi Omar, North Africa. (E6940)

Some views on the Matilda II

The Matilda II was the iconic early-war tank of the British Army. When it was first encountered by the Germans in France, and the Italians in North Africa, it was very bad news to them, since none of their standard AT guns did a good job at dealing with it.  By the time of Operation CRUSADER however, it had gone past its heyday in fighting the Germans, and it was about to be replaced by the Valentine, which continued to serve in Europe until the end of the war if not as a main-line battle tank then as a chassis for specialised conversions, such as bridgelayer.  The Matilda II however served as a main battle tank in the Pacific until the end of the war. Nevertheless, even in November 1941  in the desert the Matilda was still potent enough to be a real headache for Axis infantry and tankers, as one can see in this prior post, and it was arguably the Matildas of the Royal Tank Regiment that helped the infantry win the battle in December, while their cruiser colleagues were licking their wounds in the desert, a point well made by Bryan Perett.

The views below come from the late Major Alexander McGinlay MC and Bar (see this post about how he got his first MC), a Matilda commander in 7 RTR and while not representative, are certainly quite interesting. I would like to thank his family for allowing me to auote them here.  Then Lieutenant McGinlay arrived in Egypt in time for Wavell’s (really O’Connor’s) counteroffensive against the Italians in late 1940, and commanded the first tank into Tobruk.  He then served in the area until the fall of Tobruk in 1942, when he was injured and captured, and again at the end of the war in a Churchill in Italy, after his escape.  In the course of his service he gained the MC and bar, one during the breakout from Tobruk in November 1941, the second during the battle for Rigel Ridge.

Some of the points made:

  • The Matilda had a high quality of workmanship going into it, the case in point here being that all tanks of the regiment started up without problems after their 5-week sea voyage to Egypt.
  • The armour protection was very good, with the officer in question surviving a direct hit at short-range by a 105mm field gun, with the armour only splitting open at the welding seam.
  • Until the introduction of a “new”  50mm solid shot round by the Germans, the Matilda crews seem to have been relatively unbothered by this gun. (maybe a reference to the introduction of sub-calibre rounds with higher penetration, or maybe the officer is referrring to the first encounters with the more capable 50L60 anti-tank/tank gun). In one incident a 50mm round partially penetrates the tank, cutting the hydraulics of the power traverse on the turret, leading to the crew being well covered in hot oil.
  • The only drawback is seen in the 2-pdr gun which is giving the Germans a big advantage
  • Crews had practiced and executed fire on the move tactics, which the officer sees as an advantage compared to the German tactic of firing only when stopped (see below)
  • The most surprising statement is that on arrival in Egypt in 1940 the tanks had some high-explosive (HE) rounds available.  It is generally accepted that no 2-pdr HE made it to the desert.  (I have followed this up with David Fletcher from the Bovington RAC Tank Museum, who suspects that maybe it was an error in remembering – there is no evidence for 2-pdr HE being delivered in the desert, but the stowage  diagrams show only AT supposed to be in the tank)

Below an interesting excerpt from the papers on how the German gun advantage was overcome by the British tankers:

The enemy had the gun advantage, but things were evened up a bit by the fact that we were better trained, in that we could, and did, fire our main gun on the move.  They had to stop.  So, by putting down smoke, either ourselves, or our back-up artillery, we could use the smoke to cut down the distance between them and us.  When the smoke cleared, we were in among them, firing on the move.  They did not like it. Our lighter armoured divisions especially took good advantage of this tactic.

A few comments on this very interesting passage:

  • German tactics were very different, and trained the tankers to stop before firing the main gun. This was seen to improve effectiveness by the Germans. The main issue with firing on the move is keeping the gun on target – with lighter guns, provided a shoulder mount was installed (as it was in the Matilda)
  • Smoke from the supporting artillery depended on good co-operation between the tanks and the guns.  Not something the Commonwealth forces were proficient in until much later in the desert war, although it appears that the Tobruk fortress forces did very well in this regard.
  • Smoke from tanks could be provided by the close-support tanks of which two were on strength in every squadron, normally attached to Squadron HQ. These tanks were equipped with 76mm howitzers instead of 2-pdr guns, and carried almost entirely smoke rounds.

A fine book on the Matilda is Bryan Perett’s “The Matilda Tank”.  Good luck getting a copy at a reasonable price – I failed and paid a lot.

Air Transport to North Africa

Crusader and the associated naval activity by the Commonwealth led to a severe supply crisis for the Axis forces.  This is reflected in the sudden increase in air-transported materials and men throughout the months of October to December.

The data below comes from Santoro again, L’Aeronautica Italiana Nella II Guerra Mondiale, p. 130


Men 9,032

Material 321 tons


Men 3,728

Material 234 tons


Men 1,170

Material 836 tons

The numbers indicate that 79% of personnel and 68% of material flown in between February and December 1941 were flown in during the fourth quarter, with December alone accounting for 38% of the material flown in during the year from February. I suspect a lot of the supply was either fuel, or specialty ammunition of which the Axis forces were running low.

While the numbers are low, compared to total needs of Panzerarmee Afrika, one needs to keep in mind that seaborne supply had collapsed in late November and December except for emergency runs of naval units, and that these had very low capacity.  For example, when the large ocean-going submarine Carraciolo was sunk by HMS Upholder off Sicily in early January, she carried only about 160 tons of supplies on board.

Italian air force frontline strength throughout Crusader

The following information is similar to that provided for the German side in this post and is based on Santoro’s not particularly satisfying L’Aeronautica Italiana Nella II Guerra Mondiale published in the 1950s. Unfortunately the Aeronautica Militare Italiana’s historical office is busy churning out pretty coloured books with aircraft drawings instead of getting on with a proper operational study of the Regia Aeronautica in World War II. But hey, a man’s gotta work with what he has got, so here it goes.

At the end of the 1941 section of this book, Santoro has inserted some data which is very interesting.  Unfortunately he does not provide loss data for the period by month, but only in total between 7 February and 31 December, so I won’t bother with that here.  For the table below, which shows average effective (serviceable) frontline strength, I have included September as starting date since it was fully outside the Crusader air offensive.

The list is quite interesting, in that it gives a nice overview of the high variety of types present with the Regia Aeronautica, and the relative weight.  It is also interesting to note that average frontline strength did not drop very much in November compared to October, but crashed in December. This was probably related to the loss of landing grounds east of El Agheila.

Of particular interest is the reduction of 50% of the availability of G.50 fighter planes, indicating either a withdrawal (which I think unlikely), or the complete inferiority of the type (which I think is more likely) and high losses in escort and ground attack operations.  On the other hand, the introduction of the very fine M.C.202 in November must have come as a shock to the Commonwealth fighter pilots.

The biplane Cr.42 is quite an interesting one – apparently it was used as escort (which appears madness to me) for Ju 87 dive-bombers (saner explanation – they were coming along as ground attack planes to give the attack more weight), and (far more sensible) for convoys for which it was quite well suited, because of its ability to keep a low speed and the good visibility provided by the open cockpit (thanks to Jonas for those points).

Average Monthly Frontline Strength Sept - Dec 41

Average Monthly Frontline Strength Sept - Dec 41

History of 4th Armoured Brigade

I am not in any way linked to the publisher of this, except that I have in the past made an order with them.  Merriam has for years now provided a very good service to researchers by making available (at low cost) material that otherwise would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to get, and require mortgaging your house or selling off your first-born to pay for it, such as original unit histories written shortly after the war, or post-war studies done by German generals for the Allies.

Today I came across this one on Google books:

4th Armoured Brigade History – with the chapter on the relief of Tobruk available as a free read.

To order it go here – it is available very cheaply if you are happy with the PDF. If you wanted to purchase the original now, presuming you could find it, it’ll probably set you back by about 100 dollars.

The impact of air operations

The impact of air operations


A discussion on the AHF (linked here) allows us to track individual unit strength of Luftwaffe (GAF) units during the campaign.  This is based on three snapshots, on 11 October (before Coningham’s air campaign in support of Crusader started), on 27 November (from an ULTRA intercept, after more than a week of operations), and on 27 December, after the retreat from Tobruk and the fall of Benghazi.


German Ju 87 Stukas being readied for an operation, date, location, and unit unknown. Probably early 1941. Collection.


There are some important observations to be made.  First of all, despite a major effort by the Allies, neither availability nor serviciability of the major types dropped significantly (with the exception of the Ju 88).  This is likely because of a major effort in reinforcement, bringing in additional flights and squadrons, especially of dive bombers and destroyers. For the Italian air force, I have some data, which will be posted in a separate post.

On 27 December the longer range strike planes had disappeared – this is a reflection of the fuel situation and the retreat, which made it pointless to keep planes based in North Africa that could operate towards key targets such as Tobruk from Greece and Crete. It also reflected the difficulty of keeping the strike force operational in a remote theatre.

It is very interesting to see the effect of reinforcement on the destroyer availability.  This is likely because these planes were used to protect convoys against air- and/or seaborne attack (with mixed results, one might add). 


Overall these numbers tell an interesting story, but it may not be the one usually told. What they miss are the temporary reinforcements that came and went in the period. While the initial reaction by the Luftwaffe was to immediately reinforce North Africa with large numbers of all types of planes, within two weeks it had become clear that the fuel and overall supply situation did not allow this reinforced contingent to be maintained, and many of the planes were withdrawn again to Italy or Greece. Ju 88 could more easily strike targets operating from their base in Tatoi, Athens, with Heraklion on Crete as a jumping off point for refueling, while fighters were needed to escort the strike forces attacking Malta from Sicily.

Unit Overview

The list is by unit, with the first number indicating planes present with the unit, and the second serviceable.

Tactical Reconnaissance

2. (H) 14 (specialised short-range reconnaissance)

  • 11 Oct 21/6 Bf 110C-4 and Hs 126
  • 27 Nov (data not available due to communications breakdown)
  • 27 December 20/12 Bf 110C-4 and Hs 126

Single-Engine Fighters

I./JG 27 (single-engined fighters)

  • 11 Oct 31/17 Bf 109E-7 Trop (about to be phased out)
  • 27 Nov unchanged from day before (which is not available)
  • 27 December 24/10 Bf 109F-4 (these were a substantial upgrade in terms of capability)

II./JG 27 (single-engined fighters) minus 6./JG27

  • 11 Oct 28/13 Bf 109F-4 Trop
  • 27 Nov 19/12 Bf 109 F-4 Trop
  • 27 December 24/10 Bf 109F-4 Trop

Heavy Fighters

Staff ZG 26 (twin-engined destroyers)

  • 11 Oct (unit was not in theatre)
  • 27 Nov 2/2 Bf 110C
  • 27 December (unit was not in theatre)

7./ZG 26 (twin-engined destroyers)

  • 11 Oct (unit was not in theatre)
  • 27 Nov 9/8 Bf 110C
  • 27 December (unit was not in theatre)

8./ZG 26 (twin-engined destroyers)

  • 11 Oct 12/8 Bf 110D-3
  • 27 Nov 7/5 Bf 110C
  • 27 December (not available, unit may have been withdrawn at this point)

9./ZG 26 (twin-engined destroyers)

  • 11 Oct (not available – unit may not have been in theatre)
  • 27 Nov 5/4 Bf 110 C
  • 27 December (unit was not in theatre)

Medium Bombers

III./LG 1 (twin-engined medium bombers )

  • 11 Oct 31/15 Ju 88 A-4 Trop
  • 27 Nov 27/2 Ju 88 (with 3 more aircraft in Derna after diverting)
  • 27 December (not available – unit withdrawn from theatre)

Dive Bombers

I./StG 1 (single-engined Stukas)

  • 11 Oct 39/26 Ju 87 B-1
  • 27 Nov 27/18 Ju 87 + 1 Cant. 445
  • 27 December 32/17 Ju 87 B-1

II./StG 1 (single-engined Stukas)

  • 11 Oct 31/26 Ju 87 B-1
  • 27 Nov 26/17 Ju 87 R-2/4
  • 27 December  (not available – unit may not have been in theatre)

Staff StG 3 (single-engined Stukas)

  • 11 Oct 7/2 Ju 87 B-1 and He 111 (twin-engined medium bomber acting as courier plane)
  • 27 Nov 3/? Ju 87 R2/4 + 3/? Bf 110C + 4/? He 111 H5/6 + 1/? Bf 108 (liaison)
  • 27 December  9/5 Ju 87 B-1 and He 111 

I./StG 3 (single-engined Stukas)

  • 11 Oct (not available – unit was not in theatre)
  • 27 Nov 26/23 Ju 87 R2/4
  • 27 December 30/18 Ju 87


Additional information for 27 November:


10 KG zbV 1 (Transport)

  • Ju 52 12/0 with 4 aircraft on operations

Liaison Flight JG27(?)

  • No information

Staff flight Fliegerführer

  • Me 110C 1/0


  • Ju 52 1/0
  • C 445 9/0
  • FH 104 1/0
  • Me 108 1/0
  • Fi 156 1/0

Desert Rescue Squadron

  • Fi 156 8/4 of which 1 in Benina, 3 in Derna

Tabular Overview

The table below is based on the numbers above, but is not 100% accurate.  I calculated this myself. Note that the 27 November number for the Bf 109 type is understating the issue, since the data was missing from the ULTRA intercept. Also note that qualitatively the Bf 109 underwent an improvement during the battle, with the I./JG27 reporting 31 ‘Emils’, an earlier type of the Bf109, while by 27 December they reported 24 BF 109F, a much improved type, which was superior to anything the Commonwealth forces fielded in the North African theatre at the time. This of course depends on the 11 October type info being correct, something which I am having serious doubts about (it is apparently from RIng & Shore “Fighters over the Desert”.


Availability chart for major types in Africa during Crusader

Availability chart for major types in Africa during Crusader.