The Confused Arrival of 22 Armoured Brigade


The repeat delays to the start of CRUSADER was quite unpalatable to Winston Churchill, who had sacked Wavell over his reluctance to move faster as much as over his failure in BATTLEAXE. As has often been pointed out, Churchill had a layman’s appreciation of war, which was largely unbothered by any understanding of logistics and the needs of keeping a 1940s fighting force operational. Partially behind the delay to the start of CRUSADER was a classic case of misunderstanding and miscommunication, relating to the technical state of the new Crusader tanks (Cruiser Mk.V) of 22 Armoured Brigade, as set out in the documents in WO216/15.

Crusader 6

Crusader Mk. I tanks during Operation CRUSADER, end of November 1941. IWM. Given the lack of markings on the tank I suspect however that this is an October picture, prior to operations commencing.

Equipment State

22 Armoured Brigade took 45 tanks which had been used from the UK, 10 for each of the regiments, and another 5 which were transferred to 3 CLY from 1 Amroured Brigade. This indicates that 121 tanks were factory fresh, and as was pointed out to me, it is likely that it was these new tanks  which had arrived in the Middle East with some vital equipment uninstalled, but nevertheless included on the ships they arrived in, in specially marked boxes. In the expectation of the ministry of supply, the complete installation of the equipment in the base workshops should have taken 3-4 days. The missing equipment was:

  • Oil filters (missing on 40 tanks)
  • Track guard inserts (missing on 39 tanks)
  • Modified fuel tank cock (missing on 8 tanks)
  • Gear lever extension (missing on 26 tanks)
  • Fan drive assembly (missing on 86 tanks)

The first items being fixes that could be implemented by the units themselves, while the last one necessitated a trip to the base workshops, of which there were two in Egypt.

Axle Failures

What was not foreseen however was that someone in Egypt had decided that all axles needed to be reinforced, because of some failures that occurred shortly after arrival. This was in fact a known problem in England, and traced back to metal manufacture errors. But it had been decided that since the problem affected not all axles, that strengthening of them as a matter of course was not required. Not knowing this, Middle East Command presumed all axles were faulty, and subjected all tanks to a reinforcement programme, which ate up time.

On top of this, time was required for the desertification not of the tanks, but of the troops. Desert driving and navigation were skills that Middle East Command assumed would take two weeks of training to acquire.

Achieving Readiness

So a simple calculation, from arrival on 2 October, has 22 Armoured Brigade ready by 2 November (two weeks of unloading, two weeks of desert training). The re-fitting of the tanks would not take extra time as it could be done while drivers train. The same for desert tactical training of tank crews. Quicker unloading (the two weeks required brought another rebuke from Churchill complaining about taking this long to unload ‘150 vehicles’) were defended by Middle East Command on the grounds that to unload the large number of wheeled vehicles took the time, not the 166 tanks, and that in any case this was not its responsibility, but that of civilian authorities. Maybe a week could have been gained here – I don’t know enough about the unloading of ships and the harbour facilities in Egypt in late 1941 to make a call either way. So on the outside 2-3 weeks might have been gained by avoiding the axle reinforcement and unloading more quickly.

But it needs to be kept in mind that 22 Armoured Brigade was not the only reason for the delay. 1 SA Division also suffered from shortcomings in desert navigation and tactical/operational training, and based on the semi-official history these were just about made up by 18 November (see Agar-Hamilton ‘The Sidi Rezegh Battles’). But in fairness it never played much of a role in the battle, so it is doubtful if this by itself would have sufficed to hold back the decision to attack. Another reason was a lack of fighter pilots, of which there weren’t enough to man the existing aircraft, and consequently there was also no operational reserve on which to draw (see AIR 20/2109, Tedder’s appreciation of 13 October).

What If?

It is of course interesting to speculate what would have happened, had CRUSADER been launched 2-3 weeks earlier. My guess is that not much would have changed. In fact, the Axis supply situation by mid-November was probably worse than it had been a fortnight before, due to the failure of the Beta convoy to make it across the Med. Also, the fortuitous intervention of the weather Gods in the form of the tempest of 17 November which not only grounded much of the Axis air force but maybe more importantly severely disrupted its communications would not have helped the Commonwealth gain air superiority.

On the other hand, the almost six weeks it took from 18 November to entering Benghazi would (presuming a similar course of the campaign) have led to Commonwealth forces entering the town at or just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, giving Middle East Command a valuable breathing space and maybe the possibility to push on to defeat the remnants of the Axis forces before having to relinquish forces for the Far East and India. It would also have left the Axis forces without the important supply convoys of late December and early January, which replenished German tank strength to a point that the counter-attack of 21 January became possible. Furthermore, two weeks earlier large parts of the German air transport fleet and Luftflotte 2 were still fully engaged in Russia, and would probably not have been able to intervene so quickly.

Finally of course it would have soothed Churchill’s nerves, and who knows what effect that might have had…

7 thoughts on “The Confused Arrival of 22 Armoured Brigade

  1. Pingback: 22 Armoured Brigae's depatch to Egypt 1941 - general question - World War 2 Talk

  2. Andreas,
    The following extract from the war diary of 3 RHA also calls into question what type of training 22 Armd Bde were doing:

    31 October 1941 508892
    22 Armd Bde moved off West for a week’s training, leaving 3/R.H.A., 2 S.G. and R.E. behind.

    Does that mean that the armd regts went off into the blue on their own?




    • That’s what it reads like to me. They probably went out for some proper tank-only training, with no-one getting in the way. In fairness though, there is probably a lot of training where the focus is on tank-tank co-operation, and combined arms is the next level up.


      • 3 RHA go on to record 22 Armd Bde returning on 6 Nov “from scheme”. It would be interesting to know details of this exercise, are they in 22 Armd Bde’s war diary?



      • Well 2 RGH report they had regimental schemes on 28 and 30 October, and a 55-hour Brigade scheme from 2 Nov 0530 to 4 Nov 1330 hours.

        Nothing in the Brigade WD.

        4 CLY notes that the 55-hour exercise mostly concerned itself with refilling in leaguer. In late October they went on firing range training.

        3 CLY describes the late October exercise as range practice, troop firing exercise (2-pdr, BESA, smoke), wireless schemes, night leaguer.


  3. Andreas,

    The first minute from WSC re 22 Armd Bde was:

    Winston S. Churchill to General Auchinleck
    (Churchill Papers, 20/44)

    21 October 1941
    1. Your 1581 Susan. We have no choice but to accept your new proposal. [New date for Crusader] I will not therefore waste further words upon it.
    2. Your paragraph 5. The War Office Movements Branch state that the three MT ships and two out of the three personnel ships arrived on 2nd October, and the remaining personnel ship two days later. We do not understand why, when every day was of measureless consequence, it took nearly a fortnight to unload these 150 vehicles from three separate ships.
    3. Your paragraph 6 raises technical issues upon which War Office are telegraphing separately.

    I’m going to try to track down the Auchinleck “Susan” signals – No 1581 clearly infuriated WSC.




    • And on the same day, now really not happy at all!!

      Winston S. Churchill to Oliver Lyttelton
      (Churchill Papers 20/44)

      21 October 1941
      Personal and Secret

      All here were astonished we were not informed in good time of proposed further delay from which the very greatest dangers may arise. According to War Office and Ministry of Supply the axle story is without substance. The fact that a fortnight was taken to unload the 150 tanks of the 22nd Brigade is a scandal. Tedder’s alarmist figures about our Air inferiority have now been corrected by Freeman, and it is agreed by Tedder that we have a large superiority at present even counting Italians as equals. When did you first learn of the proposed retardation? Are you being kept properly informed? Keep in touch with Freeman. [Footnote 2. After further enquiries, Freeman increased his figures of German air strength substantially, while Tedder lowered his.]


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