I have previously written about the experience of 6 New Zealand Brigade on Totensonntag, Sunday 23 November 1941 (see this link), the day that 5 South African Brigade was annihilated by the Axis forces on the airfield of Sidi Rezegh. I have also written about the Italian Ariete armoured division’s fight on the day, at this link.
The entry below is dealing with the experience of the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Tank Regiment (3.R.T.R.), two officers of which left excellent literary testimony (see also this older entry). While their accounts are more entertaining to read, I still believe in having a look into the primary sources, also because they help clear things up in terms of what happened and what the intent was. When I went through this one, I was quite astonished by the detail, and in particular the riveting story of A Squadron’s day, and how it was rescued by Lt. Johnson.
What is interesting about this is the severe petrol problem faced by the high-consuming, but low tank-volume US-built M3 Stuart tanks, who essentially seem to have been good for a day’s fighting, but then had to be refilled.
Below, the original diary is in the left and centre column, while my comments and analysis based on researching other sources are to the right.
In the Field
Ref. Map 1/250,000 SALUM – TOBRUK
|Day 6, 23 November||B Echelon|
|0700||Moved to area 446368. Shelled near 446375, no casualties.||NW of Gabr Saleh|
|A and B1 Echelons||This covers only HQ, B and C Squadrons. For A Sqdrn. see below.|
|0530||Ten tanks then with Bn HQ moved on bearing 210 until reaching right flank of a S. African Bde in area HAAREIFAT EN NBEIDAT 435399||Location is just south of the airfield. This was 5 S.A. Bde., and is the first time it appears in the War Diary.|
|0745||Following orders, moved to join 4 A.B. in area HAGFET EL ZGHEMIL EL GARBIA 432392||About 8km south of Sidi Rezegh, so away from the battle. It is not clear who gave these orders. Orders to 4 Armoured Brigade were to guard the right flank of the force of Sidi Rezegh. 4 Armoured Brigade War Diary doesmention 3 R.T.R. was ordered to protect the leaguer of 7 Support Group, which was located at 428393. This appears to be close enough.|
|0800||While passing through S.African column were suddenly confronted with mass rush N.W. of our own troops and found ourselves in action against large enemy tank force, at least 50 in number. Engaged with assistance of artillery and A/T guns and found that 2 i/c 3 R.T.R. had joined us with a few tanks.||This battle was fought with 15. Panzerdivision. It is possiblethat the CO of the 1st Battalion Panzerregiment 8, Major Fenski, died in this fight.|
|1130||Enemy driven off – much jubilation – our total force was ten tanks – only 8 “runners” and ammunition and petrol very low. Filled up partially with Grade III petrol. Kept constant watch during rest of morning and early afternoon. Support Group came through – intermittent shelling on both sides.||There is nothing on this fight in the combat reports of the Germans, but the war diary entry of 15. Panzerdivision indicates that this wasn’t an easy fight.
Grade III petrol was the one with the lowest octane number, while the M3 tank required avgas for its aero engine.
|1600||Large enemy column observed approaching from S.W. at least 100 tanks.||This was the main body of the D.A.K. and the Ariete Division attacking from the south.|
|1630||3 R.T.R. engaged until ammunition ran out – little heavy fire from enemy.|
|1700||We withdrew East and contacted New Zealand Bde. where we spent the night. ATLAS was endeavouring to replenish us on orders from General Gott. Approx. location 443400 – South of CARMUSET EN NEBIDAT.||About 10km east of Sidi Rezegh. Probably 6 N.Z. Brigade, but nothing about this in its records.|
|In the field|
|23 November||Report by O.C. “A” Squadron – separated from Bn. on 22 Nov.|
|Only about 10 miles of petrol left at dawn. Formed a composite Sqn. with five of my Sqn. tanks and five of 5 R.T.R. Moved to take up a position right of 4 R.H.A. at about 0700 hrs. Very large column of tanks and guns seen on right flank, ordered to stop lead of column, shelled heavily and accurately. Column after running half a mile had a further line of half a mile running at 90 degrees to the right. Turned right to stop lead. Still shelled. Informed our “A.15” Sqn. of cavalry on the way of the position, who said they would help. This never happened. Engaged enemy tanks on their left flank but was shelled out of it, had to withdraw. Now only about 4 miles of petrol left. Then chased by 12 to 15 German Mk. IV tanks and shelled heavily from three sides. Withdrew being shelled and chased. At this stage four of my tanks (5 R.T.R.) did not follow. Was joined by some tanks of Major Witheridge’s (“C” Sqn.) composite Sqn. Three tanks fell out with no petrol. As soon as the enemy tanks stopped, two more tanks ran out of petrol, came on a “B” Sqn. tank with Sgt. Blackwell (“B” Sqn.) badly wounded inside it.||The C.O. of this Squadron was Major Wilson. The tank commanders of 6 5 R.T.R. tanks presumed to be with 3 R.T.R. were:
Capt. S.J. Hennings
Only Sgt. Meyler was lost on the day, two of the tanks returned (Hennings and Hall), the remaining three crews returned without their tanks.
|approx. 1045||Stopped the party – found all tanks had only about 1 to 2 miles of petrol in them – total strength of tanks was 8. I decided that as we were completely surrounded and had no petrol and only a stumped (?) amount of ammunition to try and save the tanks and personnel if possible. Plan was to leave the tanks to look like derelicts and the crews to lie down about 800 yds. from their tanks and to remain still. This was done. The Germans then sent up an armoured O.P. which came within 300 yds. and we were very heavily shelled, but no damage was done. Shelled again in about 3/4 of an hour – no damage. Lay still until dark. German patrols and artillery were within 800 yds. of us all day, but must have considered tanks derelict. At darkness called up Bn. on the wireless and eventually got a reply from Sgt. Ward, Bn. Signal Sgt. I told him I wanted petrol and talked to Lt. Johnson. He brought it to us arriving at about 0115 hours having come through enemy territory and travelled 25 miles being guided by very lights fired by me and talking on the wireless. We filled up and left at 0300 hours 24 Nov. (see D.7 24 Nov.).|
|In the field|
|23 November||B Echelon|
|Remained in area 446368|
|Report by Lt. Johnson B. Echelon|
|During the morning I was sent by Cmdr. B Echelon with a replenishing party for the 3 R.T.R. in a northerly direction towards Sidi Rezegh area. After travelling about three quarters of the distance I was unable to proceed further owing to the battle situation. I could not find HQ 4 A.B., but contacted HQ 7 A.B. who gave me the general direction of where 4 A.B. might be found. I eventually found Bde. H.Q. but they did not know where 3 R.T.R. were. At that moment some German tanks attempted to break through and I was instructed to commend all the replenishing vehicles that were there ( 3 R.T.R., 5 R.T.R., detached (?) Scots Gds and R.A.M.C.) and to stay there until an escort of tanks arrived to stay there to guard me. The tanks never arrived. When darkness fell I formed a close leaguer and posted sentries. Meanwhile I had instructed Sgt. Ward (R.C. of Signals) who was in my party to try and contact Bn. H.Q. on the wireless. At 1900 hrs. he made contact with A Sqn. and after establishing an identity we learnt that they were stranded with eight tanks without petrol and had been like that all day. They did not know their position, but by means of a fire which we both could see I was able to take bearings and roughly estimate their position which from our calculations was about twelve miles away and near Sidi REZEGH aerodrome. I started out at 2030 hrs. with 2/Lt. G.H. Barker (whom I had picked up earlier in the day) as my wireless operator and Sgt. Ward as driver of the wireless truck and one ammunition and one petrol lorry. I left the remainder of the vehicles under command of an officer of the Scots Guards. I reached the first objective (the fire) after travelling about 10 miles and then I asked “A” Sqn. for a verey light so as to get a bearing on their position. We saw the flare a very long way away so we continued on our course. We had to deviate from our course several times so as to avoid passing through enemy leaguers and tanks. After we had crossed a landing ground we asked for another verey light and while waiting for it I found that we had stopped within 75 yds. of two German tanks with what appeared to be the crews sleeping by them. I debated whether or not to shoot the crews, but decided it would make too much noise and attract attention, this lessening my chances of getting “A” Sqn. out of their position. I finally located “A” Sqn. at midnight after travelling twenty five miles and found Major Wilson, Major Witheridge, Lt. Denning, 2/Lt. Deer, and S.S.M. Dean with eight tanks and crews and badly wounded Sgt. Blackwell who had a fractured skull.|