Order of Battle of 7 Armoured Brigade for Operation CRUSADER

Order of Battle of 7 Armoured Brigade for Operation CRUSADER

7 Armoured Brigade

The Brigade had a short and exciting (in the Chinese curse sense of the word) Operation CRUSADER. Mauled at Sidi Rezegh just days after the operation started, it was withdrawn from battle and returned to the Delta, except for some smaller composite units that remained engaged in the battle for another fortnight, such as composite squadron NEMO of 2 RTR.

A10

A10 Cruiser tanks in the Western Desert, 1 November 1940.(IWM E1001) By 1941 these tanks were obsolete and worn out, but continued to serve as command tanks at Brigade and Division level, and as frontline tanks in 7 Armoured Brigade and TobFort.

From the report written after the battle, here is some information that may be of use to wargamers. This OOB differs from Nafziger’s OOB for the battle which can be found at this link. The most important difference is the absence of the Northumberland Hussars (102 AT Rgt. RA) from this OOB. Maybe someone can comment on that.

Order of Battle – 7th Armoured Brigade 18 November 1941

(based on WO201/514)

Unit Commander Equipment
Brigade HQ Brigadier Davey Cruiser Mk.II (A10) tanks
3 Squadron 7 Armoured Division Signals Major H.W.C. Stethem  
7 Hussars Lt.Colonel F.W. Byass DSO MC (killed at Sidi Rezegh) Cruiser Mk.II (A10 – one squadron), Mk.IV and maybe Mk.V tanks
2 Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) Lt.Colonel R.F.E. Chute Cruiser tanks (mix of Mk.IV and Mk.V)
6 RTR Lt.Colonel M.D.B. Lister (killed at Sidi Rezegh) Cruiser tanks (no confirmation, probably Mk.V)
LRS (Light Recovery Section?) Cpt. N. Barnes  
OFP (Supply??) Cpt. C.C. Lambert  
Reconnaissance Section Capt. T. Ward  
‘A’ & ‘B’ Sections 13 Light Field Ambulance Capts. Hick and Williamson  
4 Royal Horse Artillery (less one battery) Lt. Col. J. Curry  
F Battery RHA Major F. Withers MC 8 25-pdr
DD Battery RHA Major O’Brien.Butler 8 25-pdr
‘A’ Company 2
Rifle Brigade
Major C. Sinclair MC  
Det. 4 Field Sqdn Royal Engineers Corporal Lee (sic!)  
‘A’ & ‘B’ Troops 1 Lt. AA battery 1 Lt. AA Regiment Royal Artillery Major Edmeads Bofors 40mm light anti-aircraft guns

The total number of tanks on this day was 129, consisting of a mix of various cruiser marks. While difficult to disentangle, it appears that 26 Cruiser Mk. II (A 10) which formed one squadron in 7 Hussars and equipped Brigade HQ, and at least 16 Mk.IV (A13 Mk.II), which seem to have been primarily in 2 R.T.R., 16 of which had been issued as replacements for 16 Mk. IV tanks which had to be sent to base workshop in October, and were reported ‘unfit for action’ by the commander of 2 RTR, because they were missing essential kit, but they were nevertheless taken along. Other shortages reported were wireless (throughout the Brigade) and Bren guns (particular in 6 RTR which had issued theirs to the Polish units going to Tobruk in October). Mechanical reliability seems to have been a serious issue – on 19 November 7 Armoured Brigade was down to 123 tanks, and on 20 November to 115, without really having seen much combat.

Training state was reported good except in Squadron and Troop maneuver, which was restricted by mileage restrictions and the wireless silence before the operation.

Any comments on the above, in particular relating to the tank composition, would be very much welcome. Note there are discrepancies between the original report and various information found on the web.

Operational Report 7th Queen’s Own Hussars December 1941

Operational Report 7th Queen’s Own Hussars December 1941

Background

The 7 Queen’s Own Hussars were one of the cruiser-equipped armoured regiments in 7 Armoured Brigad, 7 Armoured Division, the famous “Desert Rats”, under 30 Corps, Eighth Army.  The regiment did not have a happy operation, and by 27th November was moved to the Left Out of Battle (L.O.B.) camp near Bir Telata, after the last three tanks had been evacuated.  It then formed a composite squadron of Stuart tanks, which was instructed by US soldiers.

The action on 21st November referred to in the report below left the regiment with only 12 to 20 tanks (instead of a normal state of close to 60 – only 1 tank had been lost until then), and the regimental commander Lt.Col. Byass DSO MC was killed. 

I will post further information on this engagement another day.

After these few days of battle, the regiment did not return to the desert for a while, and was instead fully re-equipped with US-built M3 Stuart tanks, and sent to Burma, to hold the Japanese assault in South Asia.It then returned to Europe and saw the end of the war in Italy. Together with 2 R.T.R. is thus one of the few tank regiments to have fought in North Africa, Burma, and Europe.

Crusader

Crusader tanks moving to forward positions in the Western Desert, unknown unit, 26 November 1941. IWM Photo No.: E 6724[1]

OPERATIONAL REPORT, 7th QUEEN’S OWN HUSSARS DECEMBER, 1941.

Reference the attached report of Operations carried out by this Regiment between November 18th, and November 29th, 1941, I append a few remarks in amplification of the report.

(1) German methods of tank warfare.

In the initial stages the enemy appeared to move his tank force in a concentrated mass. The column which attacked 7th Hussars on November 21st was a densely packed tank force numbering some 150 tanks. (N.B. These were actually counted approximately and this figure does not include tanks out of sight.) A/Tank and/or field guns appeared to be up with the tanks. Thus the full weight of attack of what may have been over half the total enemy tank strength descended on one British Regiment. Had close artillery support, i.e. 25 – pounder guns up in line with the 7th Hussars been available at the commencement of the engagement, very heavy destruction of enemy tanks must have resulted owing to their close formation. The enemy opened fire at long range and several tanks of the 7’h Hussars were destroyed before they could close to effective 2 – pounder range. The enemy appeared to fire three distinct types of ammunition.

(a) An ordinary H.E. shell – either from guns mounted in tanks or from artillery up with the tanks.

(b) An A/Tank armour-piercing shot, varying in destructive power, probably from different types of gun.

(c) An incendiary shell which on explosion generated terrific heat and caused our tanks to catch fire, even though the shell hit the front of the turret.

After 21st November, the German tank force appeared to split up into smaller columns which on the following days engaged unprotected M.T. Echelons and was a source of danger to our communications and higher headquarters.

(2) A separate report has been rendered regarding certain technical difficulties experienced with the A 15 Cruiser tanks.

(3) It is suggested that the following lessons were brought out during the operations:

(a) The importance of keeping sufficiently concentrated to maintain numerical superiority in the initial engagement against the enemy’s main force.

(b) The necessity for early information regarding the enemy’s movements – in particular those of his main force. Information on November 21 S` arrived too late for 7th Armoured Brigade to concentrate.

(c) Unless and until we have a tank gun which can equal that of the most modern German tanks opposed to us, 25 – pounder support under direct control of Regimental Commanders is essential. At 2,000 yards over open sights the 25 – pounder is a good A/Tank weapon, (vide subsequent action of the 4th Indian Division, R.A., which destroyed some 17 enemy tanks for the loss of only four guns). Desultory shelling at long range by 25 – pounders against enemy A.F.V.s is of little or no value.

(d) Tanks of a Regiment should be all of the same type. 7th Hussars went into action with a mixture of A 15, A 13, and A 10 Cruiser tanks. Even the A 15 tanks were of different makes and certain gun spares were non-interchangeable.

(e) A Echelons should be reduced to the minimum required for immediate replenishment, medical services and repairs to tanks. A Echelons are very vulnerable and, being close up behind the A.F.V.s are liable to be cut off by enemy columns. A small A Echelon can escape more easily than a large one.

(f) All B vehicles not with the A Echelons should be with Brigade B Echelons. Intermediate Echelons are not practicable and merely constitute further vulnerable bodies of M.T. liable to become cut off and lost.

(g) In open desert warfare, B Echelons will frequently, once the main tank forces have joined in battle, not be able to replenish units at night. Indication of leaguer location by firing verey lights is dangerous.

ABBASSIA, December, 1941.

(Signed) Major Commanding 7th Queen’s Own Hussars.

[1]I am not convinced that this picture is correctly dated, since the tanks do not show the CRUSADER operational white/red/white stripe marking that was to be prominently displayed.

Jock Campbell’s VC

Jock Campbell’s VC

Background

In the initial stage of the Sidi Rezegh battles on 21/22 November 1941, Brigadier Jock Campbell, commanding 7th Support Group, the non-armoured element of 7th Armoured Division, won his Victoria Cross for his brave and energetic leadership of the defense forces on Sidi Rezegh airfield against the German assault. The best online account of the battles I am aware of can be found at this link.

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‘The Battle at Sidi Resegh, Libya, 1941’
Watercolour, pen and ink by Eric ‘Jack’ Dawson, formerly 2nd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, 2007. (Courtesy UK National Army Museum)[1]

Bob Crisp memorably describes the action in ‘Brazen Chariots’, and I think Cyril Joly in ‘Take these Men’ also describes it.

When I started my research into the Operation, I came across a very dramatic drawing that encapsulates it very well, and I contacted the National Archives to have it properly identified, which they did very quickly, but unfortunately then changed back to the old text again after a while. Probably too speculative for them. I think it’s a shame, since the drawing would properly belong into their ‘Valour’ colleciton.

 
INF3_1562.jpg
 

Unidentified brigadier leading tanks onto the battlefield. National Army Museum.

Here is the citation of Campbell’s VC, from the 2nd Supplement to the London Gazette of 30 January 1942:

War Office
23rd February. 1942.

The KING has been graciously pleased to approve the award of the VICTORIA CROSS to Brigadier (acting) John Charles Campbell, D S O, MC (13594), Royal Horse Artillery, in recognition of most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Sidi Rezegh on the 21st and 22nd November, 1941.

On the 21st November Brigadier Campbell was commanding the troops, including one regiment of tanks, in the area of Sidi Rezegh ridge and the aerodrome His small force holding this important ground was repeatedly attacked by large numbers of tanks and infantry. Wherever the situation was most difficult and the fighting hardest he was to be seen with his forward troops, either on his feet or in his open car In this car he carried out several reconnaissances for counter-attacks by his tanks, whose senior officers had all become casualties early in the day Standing in his car with a blue flag, this officer personally formed up tanks under close and intense fire from all natures of enemy weapons.

On the following day the enemy attacks were intensified and again Brigadier Campbell was always in the forefront of the heaviest fighting, encouraging his troops, staging counter-attacks with his remaining tanks and personally controlling the fire of his guns On two occasions he himself manned a gun to replace casualties During the final enemy attack on the 22nd November he was wounded, but continued most actively in the fore-most positions, controlling the fire of batteries which inflicted heavy losses on enemy tanks at point blank range, and finally acted as loader to one of the guns himself.

Throughout these two days his magnificent example and his utter disregard of personal danger were an inspiration to his men and to all who saw him. His brilliant leadership was the direct cause of the very heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy In spite of his wound he refused to be evacuated and remained with his command, where his outstanding bravery and consistent determination had a marked effect in maintaining the splendid fighting spirit of those under him.

Jock Campbell rose to Major General and GOC 7th Armoured Division, but tragically died in a car accident at Halfaya Pass just a few weeks after taking over his new command, on 26 February 1942.

Brigadier John Charles Jock Campbell, VC. CO 7th Support Group, 1894 - 1942 Brigadier John Charles ‘Jock’ Campbell, VC. CO 7th Support Group, 1894 – 1942 (Courtesy Wikimedia)

 

[1]2 Rifle Brigade was at Sidi Rezegh.