Brandenburger Special Forces in North Africa 1941

The Brandenburger[1] were a special forces unit of the German army, initially under control of the Abwehr[2], the German army’s secret service, and from 1943 slowly moving to normal control channels. They started out as a relatively small, highly specialist unit, and by the end of the war had grown to the size of a regular field division. By that time, they had become more like British Commandos, or US Rangers. They were very active in the Aegean, and participated in the reconquest of Kos and Leros in October 1943, Operation Eisbaer (Polar Bear), which is best described in Anthony Rogers’ excellent book Churchill’s Folly.

A very good and succinct description is available in German at this link. This includes a list of commanders, sub-ordinations, and other information, including a discussion of the role of the Brandenburgers in the context of the laws of war.

In the context of Operation CRUSADER, the Brandenburger played a small role. I have been able to piece much of it together by the use of ULTRA intercepts and with the help of posters on the Axis History Forum. They had been requested to support the planned attack on Tobruk, possibly by a seaborne landing. A relatively small force[3] was sent under Oberleutnant von Koehnen. This was from 13./Lehrregiment 800 Brandenburg z.b.V.[4], and had been sent directly from Catania in Italy by plane on 14/15 November. The remainder of this company stayed in Italy, and was ready to be moved at the request of the Panzergruppe, although there are indications that this was not going to be possible before February 1942, maybe due to the transport situation following the destruction of the Beta/Duisburg convoy on 8/9 November 1941. The strength of this detachment was likely 1 Officer, 11 non-commissioned officers, and 70 men.

It appears that this detachment was then rushed to Benghazi to shore up the defenses there, and maybe split up on the way, with part of it remaining in Agedabia under the command of an men called Doehring, maybe a senior non-commissioned officer. On 29 November, von Koehnen was in Benghazi with 1 officer, an unknown number of non-commissioned officers, and 31 men. The remainder of the company was at the time in Italy, with a strength of 3 officers, 31 non-commissioned officers, 159 men, and with 17 lorries, 8 cars, and 3 tractors.

It is possible that another company (11./LR 800) arrived in Benghazi as part of Sonderverband 288 (see this older post).

During the main battle these units seem not to have been engaged. They were basically immobile, and had little or no heavy weapons. It appears that they conducted an operation on 22 January 42 during the counter-offensive. My guess is this would have been a small operation, maybe using English-speaking soldiers wearing Commonwealth uniforms to confuse the Commonwealth forces by giving wrong traffic directions (always a favourite) or impersonating officers to give false orders.

[1] lit. ‘men from Brandenburg’, the region outside Berlin
[2] lit. avoid/defend
[3] A ‘Halbkompanie’, half company – not a formation existing anywhere else in the Wehrmacht to my knowledge.
[4]13th Company, Special Purpose Instruction Regiment 800

BenCol: Advance on Benghazi I – Planning

BenCol (Benghazi Column) was an evolving concept during Operation CRUSADER. The aim was clear – envelop the southern flank of the Axis forces, push a sufficiently large force onto Benghazi, and thereby cut the Axis forces in eastern Cyrenaica off their lifeline, by taking out the only harbour worth mentioning, and cutting the coast road, as well as taking out the Benina and Barce airfields, which were important bases for the Axis air forces.

Had the operation been carried out, it would almost certainly have been written about and heralded as a daring  example of command. Combining two smallish, highly mobile forces, with their own air support,  supplied over a sea controlled by enemy air forces, a dashing paratroop special forces raid thrown in, to reach far into the rear of the enemy. The Germans at least were extremely concerned about it, and strengthened their defenses in western Cyrenaica. Over the course of CRUSADER however, with increasing losses and uncertainty in the key battle around Tobruk, the ambitious plans had to be scaled back, and finally abandoned when the battle had moved beyond it.

The distance of advance from Tobruk to Benghazi, using the best possible route, was 350 miles.

The information is from WO201/635 – Bencol Advance on Benghazi.

1. 7 Armoured Division to March West

In an undated document from November the idea was for a mixed Army/RAF force, led by 7th Armoured Division HQ, to carry out this operation once the battle around Tobruk had advanced to a point where command could be certain that the force (then called ‘Column “F”) could carry out its mission, advancing either via Antelat, or Er Regima in the north, although it was pointed out that no fighter cover could be guaranteed on the northern route.

At this point in time the strength of the force was foreseen to be substantial – and interestingly quite close in balance to a late-war armoured division (although much weaker in artillery):

HQ 7 Armoured Division (General Gott commanding)

4 Armoured Brigade

Composite Brigade Group comprising:

Elements of Support Group 7 Armoured Division

22 Guards Brigade w/3 infantry battalions

One 25-pdr Field Regiment

C.R.E. (Commander Royal Engineers) 7 Armoured Division & 3 Field Squadron RE

Det. 142 Field Park Sqdrn.

One A/Tk battery

One Lt. AA Rgt.

One Armd. Car Rgt.

Supply Column

It was supposed to meet with Brigadier Reid’s ‘Force “E”‘ at Antelat, south-west of Benghazi, with Reid’s men advancing from the south towards the coast at Agedabia, taking the airfield there, and cutting the coastal road. Before arriving there, a party of parachutists under Captain Stirling was supposed to jump onto the airfield, destroying all the airplanes there.

The RAF element consisted of six fighter squadrons, with one of these permanently based on L.G.125, deep in the desert south-west of Tobruk.

The time to get to Benghasi was estimated at 3.5 days. The original vehicle requirement of the column was ca. 2,200 organic vehicles, and another 2,000 for supplies, but this was not seen to be possible, and instead the column was expected to carry five days of supplies, and should then be supplied by (truck?) convoys.

The latest documents I can find refering to this are dated 30 November.

2. Scaling Down – Bencol is born

When the battle around Tobruk made it impossible to send anything from 7 Armoured Division, a scaled-down version of the plan was introduced, and the name “Bencol” introduced. First orders seem to have come out on 1 December. The new order of battle for Bencol simply removed all elements from 7 Armoured Division, i.e. HQ, 4 Armoured Brigade,  engineers, and elements of Support Group. Command of the advance would be exercised by Brigadier Marriott, Commander of 22 Guards Brigade.

Strength is given as follows:

22 Guards Brigade HQ (102 men, 23 trucks, 9 motorcycles)

Spec. Signals Section (85men, 8 trucks, 14 motorcycles)

3 infantry battalions with LADs (2 Scots Guards, 3 Coldstream Guards, 1 Worcesters) (2,376 men, 459 trucks, 36 motorcycles, 132 carriers)

One Armd. Car Rgt. (11 Hussars)  (582 men, 91 trucks, 7 motorcycles, 58 armoured cars)

One 25-pdr Field Regiment (51 Fd Rgt) (24×25-pdr) (697 men, 145 trucks, 6 motorcycles)

One A/Tk battery (73 A/Tk Bty) (123 men, 39 trucks, 8 motorcycles)

One Lt. AA Rgt. (1 LAA Rgt) (12 40mm guns) (281 men, 57 trucks, 8 motorcycles)

Bde. Coy RASC (400 men, 189 trucks)

Supply Column (5.5 motor transport companies, 2 water tank companies) (1,575 men, 919 trucks & 428 men, 158 tankers)

Total: 6,649 men, 2,088 trucks, 88 motor cycles, 132 carriers, 58 armoured cars, with weekly supply requirements of about 1,000 tons. Additionally, RAF strength had increased to 12 Squadrons, and was expected to be 4,500 men and 500 trucks, with supply requirements of 500 tons (this was a guesstimate).

To ensure supply once Benghazi had been taken, the Royal Navy was requested to send a ship to Benghazi to land supplies not before 12 December, especially fuel and ammunition, once the port had been taken. This would presumably have been one of the more interesting assignments on offer at the time.

By 9 December planning had changed slightly, adding back CRE 2 Armoured Division, 3 Fd. Coy RE, 142 Fd Pk Det., a squadron of M3 Stuart tanks, and reducing infantry to two battalions and the LAA Rgt. to a single battery.

The RAF component was to be under the command of Adv. HQ No. 258 Wing and was called ‘Whitforce’. It consisted of No. 2 (SAAF), No.4 (SAAF) (both Curtiss Tomahawks), No.33 (ground attack Hurricanes) and No.250 Squadrons (Curtiss Tomahawks), as well as of light and heavy AA, No. 2 Armoured Car Regiment, and various maintenance and supply units.

On 17 December, following a few bloody days on the Gazala line, the operation order was given to Bencol.

3. Not enough trucks – and Benghazi is no longer the objective

In the period 9 to 20 December the availability of trucks exercised the mind of planners. In the meantime, on 18 December the Axis forces retreated from the Gazala line, and 13 Corps opened the pursuit, making the original role of Bencol surplus to requirements, and more importantly requiring so many trucks that it was no longer practicable to operate Bencol independently. The truck allotment was consequently reduced again, and Bencol was ordered to move straight west, towards Msus, and thence drawing on 13 Corps supplies.