Loss of Armando Diaz, 25 February 1941

Loss of Armando Diaz, 25 February 1941

Background

The initial transport of the Afrikakorps (see this link)to North Africa went without any losses on the south-bound route until one of the last convoys saw the German merchant Herakleia sunk at the end of March. Despite this success though, it was not without losses overall.

The most serious strike by the Malta-based submarines happened on 25 February 1941, when a Condottieri-class light cruiser of the early two series of six vessels went down, this time it was the Cadorna sub-class RN Armando Diaz. 

The first loss of a light cruiser of this class had occurred in July 1941 at the Battle of Cape Spada, when RN Bartolomeo Colleoni was sunk by HMAS Sydney.

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RN Armando Diaz at Melbourne in 1934 (Courtesy Wikipedia)

The early Condottieris

By the the start of the war, the early Condottieris could be considered obsolete due to their lack of protection, and their degraded top speed, which for  Armando Diaz seems to have declined from 39 knots when launched in 1932 to 31-32 knots by 1941. They were primarily to be used for convoy escort, mine-laying, and training, or indeed as transports in their own right, although da Giussano did serve in the battle fleet at Punto Stilo in 1940.

These early vessels of the Condottieri  class also had construction weaknesses, and the rapid sinking of Diaz confirmed their low survivability. These light cruisers were built for high speed, with the aim to be able to chase and engage on superior terms the French ‘super- destroyers’ of the Chacal  and  Guepard  classes. The test speed of some of the early vessels was astounding, reaching well over 40 knots (64 km/h).

The design for speed of these six early  Condottieris caused them to suffer from multiple issues however, including strong vibrations, and a lack of stability due to being top-heavy. The latter ultimately required the removal of the original tripod mast behind the bridge, which was present in the first vessels.

On the six vessels of the follow-on sub-classes, a completely new armoured forward structure was introduced, giving the Montecuccoli sub-class it’s very distinctive look, and the final iteration of the two Abruzzi-class light cruisers were in my view two of the finest 6″ cruisers of the war.

Sinking of Armando Diaz

On 25 February 1941, while moving south to reach Tripoli, Armando Diaz was torpedoed off Kerkenah Bank in position 34°33’N, 11°45’E by HM/Sub Upright under command of Lt. Norman, D.S.C. RN, who was on his last patrol with this submarine.

Diaz was acting as distant escort to the German 4th Convoy to Libya, consisting of the German merchants Marburg, AnkaraReichenfels, and Kybfels. On this mission she was part of the 4th Cruiser Squadron, together with the di Giussano sub-class RN Giovanni delle Bande Nere and the modern Soldati-class destroyers  Ascari and Corazziere.

Diaz was hit by two of the four torpedoes that HM/Sub Upright fired at her, resulting in catastrophic explosions in her magazine and boiler rooms, leading to rapid sinking. Over 500 sailors were lost with her, and only 153 men were rescued. Ascari was also near-missed, and she proceeded to attack HM/Sub Upright without results.

Details on the attack can be found at this link, and in Italian at this link

Upright

HM/Sub Upright returning to Holy Loch submarine base, Scotland, 17 April 1942, Lieut J S Wraith, DSO, DSC, RN on the left, her 1st Lieutenant on the right. (IWM A8424)

A full article on the operations and fate of the early Condottieris is under preparation.

David Greentree: British Submarine vs. Italian Torpedo Boat (Osprey Duel 74)

David Greentree: British Submarine vs. Italian Torpedo Boat (Osprey Duel 74)

Four Stars out of Five – Buy

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Torpdiniera Sagittario – a Spica-class, Perseo-sub class torpedo boat equipped with German ASDIC from early 1942. On 8 February 1942 she detected and rammed HM/Sub Proteus, which did however come off the better (see this link). Sagittario  survived the war and continued to serve until 1964 in the Italian navy. (Wikipedia)

Overall

I have to come clean here – there is no way I would not rate a book where my blog is the first item in the bibliography a buy. 🙂 So go out and buy it. I got it in a Kindle sale, and am happy I did.

Considerations

The book covers the period of the Italo-British war from June 1940 to the Italian armistice in September 1943, with a short post-script covering the continued service of the Italian torpedo boats under the Kriegsmarine flag from 1943 to 1945. 

The clear focus of the book is on the engagements between Italian escort torpedo boats and British submarines. The Italian navy, the Regia Marina, is usually dismissed due to the prevalence of a narrative driven by the Royal Navy memoirs which considered them shy adversaries. Anyone who has looked at the performance of the Italian escorts on the North Africa route knows that this is at best a caricature, and at worst an insult, both to the Italian sailors and to the British sailors in submarines and some surface vessels who fell victim to them. 

The author has gone through a range of secondary sources and relies to a large extent on the official Italian history, which is a great service to those who do not speak Italian and/or would struggle to access this rare and expensive work.

The book is well rounded, and provides a very decent overview of tactics, technology, weaponry, and engagement detail for both sides, given its compact size. I consider it an important reference work and very helpful for anyone researching the naval war in the Mediterranean, which was for the most part a convoy war, the few major fleet actions notwithstanding.

Room for Improvement

Some interesting actions are left off, probably because they did not fit the torpedo boat/submarine engagement, but which are clearly relevant, such as the sinking of Destroyer da Mosto, which had a German ASDIC crew on board (see this older post). My guess is that this is because the other relied on secondary sources, rather than the German original sources in NARA, some of which I have.

So yes, this is not the definitive history of fighting the Royal Navy subs in the Mediterranean, but it is definitely a work that whoever is going to write that history cannot ignore.

Production 

The Kindle version is well produced and very readable. There are a few action diagrams which are clear and informative, allowing the reader to follow the sequence of engagements. The book is well illustrated with a wide range of pictures that are relevant to the material presented, many from private collections.

There is a bibliography that is helpful in guiding further research, and more than I would expect in an Osprey work, since these are not normally considered academic works.

Notes

The review is based on the Kindle version of the book. It was not provided for free and I have no commercial interest in the book.

Hms p38 submarine

HMS P.38, sunk with all hands by Torpediniera Circe with the use of German ASDIC on 23 February 1942. The detailed report by Commander Palmas of Circe can be found in this older post. Lest we forget. (Wikipedia)

 

 

German Sonar on Italian Vessels – Pt. 3

German Sonar on Italian Vessels – Pt. 3

In the third and, for the moment, final part of this mini series on the use of German S-Gerät sonar on Italian vessels, here is a list of the vessels which had it installed, or were scheduled for installation, as of 28 February 1942. The list excludes Antonio da Mosto, which had been sunk by that date (see this link and this link and this link).

The list is fairly self-explanatory. I am using the Italian abbreviations, so ‘Ct’ stands for Cacciatorpediniere – Destroyer, and ‘Tp’ for Torpediniere, Escort Destroyer or Torpedo Boat. The destroyers listed are an interesting mix, and five were going to be assigned to the Italian fleet following the installation of the S-Geraet. They included the older Navigatori class, of the late 1920s, and the most modern fleet destroyers of the Soldati class.

The Torpediniere are also a bit of a mix, primarily Spica class, but with two older vessels included, the San Martino and the Calatafimi, both of which dated back to WW I destroyer designs and had only recently been downgraded to Torpediniere status. Unlike the destroyers, most of the Torpediniere were going to be assigned to specific stations, Sicily (4), Libya (3), Greece (2), Rhodes (2), Naples (1), and the escort group (1).

A number of destroyers and Torpediniere have no destination allocated to them.

In the table, ‘DC’ stands for depth charge. For Italian depth charges installed, where it reads ‘0 16/50 12/100’, this means ‘no depth charge launcher, 16x50kg depth charges and 12x 100kg depth charges’. For background on the Italian depth charges, please see this link. I am not certain the information in the report is fully correct, but it is given as is.

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Destroyers Usodimare and da Noli in port, late 1930s. The picture shows well the range finder, rounded bridge house, and the twin-turret with its 4.75” (12cm) guns. Courtesy Wikipedia.

 

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The obsolete destroyer San Martino entering a port. Courtesy Wikipedia

Apart from the naval vessels, some auxiliaries were also equipped with the S-Geraet, for harbour defense in La Spezia and Taranto, and two motor sailing vessels (Motoveliere) for serving with the submarine defense school at La Spezia, to train new personnel. The only vessel where the future port of service isn’t given is the Cyprus.

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Use of German Sonar on Italian vessels – Pt. 2

Use of German Sonar on Italian vessels – Pt. 2

In a previous post (at this link) I had written about the use of German sonar (S-Geraet) and depth charges by the Italian navy, the Regia Marina. This commenced at the end of 1941, and gave the Regia Marina an important new capability in providing convoy defense on the North Africa route, which led to some quick successes, such as the sinking of HMS P-38 (see also this link). A technical description of the history and functioning of the S-Geraet can be found at this link.

In the post below, I have translated a report of the Special Command of the German navy, the Kriegsmarine, which was charged with the task of overseeing the operation of the German equipment on the Italian vessels. The document is from the war diary of the German Liaison Staff at the Admiralty of the Royal Italian Navy, and can be found in NARA under T-1022 Roll 2481.

Overview of the Activity Carried Out Thus Far by the Special Command for the Installation and Deployment of German S-Geraete on Units of the Royal Italian Navy

(Commenced 17 November 1941)

1.) Introduction followed proposals made by Chief Naval Liaison Command to Italian Navy during July 1941.

2.) Exectution

a) Personnel:

1 Officer (Commander Ahrens)

1 Chief Petty Officer[1]

3 Non-Commissioned Officers from the Submarine Defense School Gotenhafen[2]

Furthermore listening crew (from destroyer Lody, strength 1/4[3] from beginning November to mid-December on Torpedo Boat (Torpediniera) Castore, and listening crew strength 1/4 on destroyer Da Mosto from beginning November to 1 December. 3 other ranks were killed when the boat was sunk. The NCO and one man remain at the disposal of the Special Command.

b) Activity:

At the start of the activity:

Clearance of specific questions of detail concerning submarine defense with the relevant Italian offices, especially Admirals Strazzari and Da Zara. Determination of equipping Italian vessels with S-Geraet installed with German depth charges and depth charge throwers.

Instruction of Italian crew and shore personnel in various naval stations about installation and maintenance of the German depth charges.

Schooling of listening and depth charge crews on the units with S-Geraet installed. Carried out trials.

Instruction of all captains in all questions relating to submarine defense, especially about the method of attack. Participation in combat missions.

c) Successes of Italian vessels equipped with S-Geraet up to 28 February 1942.

1.) Torpedo boat Castore near Gaeta on 24 November 1941: based on S-Geraet location report evaded two torpedo trails. Carried out attack with 36 depth charges. Destruction of submarine possible.[4] German listening crew.

2.) Destroyer Da Mosto, southern tip of Sicily, 27 November 1941: location of an unknown minefield. German listening crew.

3.) Torpedo boat Lince, Gulf of Taranto, early December, attack on located submarine with Italian depth charges. Success questionable. Italian listening crew and Construction Advisor Morgenstern.[5]

4.) Torpedo Boat Orsa, 115 Degrees, 63 nautical miles off Sfax on 7 January 1942. Attack on located submarine with 30 German depth charges. Success: initially strong aural location ceases; location continues to show in large oil slick. Location of attack had to be left early to ensure protection of the escorted steamer.[6] Italian and German listening crew, directed by Commander Ahrens.

5.)  Torpedo boat Sagittario at Cape Ducato on 8 February 1942. Evaded torpedo. Enemy submarine rammed, has to be considered destroyed. Torpedo boat heavy damage on the bow. German and Italian listening crew.[7]

6.) Torpedo boat Circe on 13 February 1942: located enemy submarine was fixed for six hours. Submarine surfaces after 3 attacks with German depth charges; 23 prisoners made. Attempt to bring her in fails, boat sinks. English submarine “Tempest”. German and Italian listening crew.

7.) Torpedo boat Pallade at Capo dell’Armi on 16 November 1942. Located submarine attacked in three runs with 45 German depth charges. At water depth of 1,600m signal ceases after final attack. Oil slick of 1,000 x 2,000 m. German and Italian listening crew, directed by Commander Ahrens.

8.) Torpedo boat Circe at Ras Hallab on 23 February 1942. During escort of convoy attacking submarine is located and periscope is sighted. 10 depth charges dropped on diving location. Submarine surfaces briefly, twice, and finally sinks. Bag with flags, parts of interior (door of cupboard, tabletop), cans of biscuits and cigarettes as well as human body parts come up. Large oil slick. Continuous rising of air bubbles. German and Italian listening crew.

d) Intended equipping of Italian naval and merchant units

Delivered:

1.) 29 S-Geraete of which one fixed in Spezia. One further S-Geraet lost when destroyer da Mosto was sunk.

2.) 40 depth charge throwers, 72 reloading installations, 20 depth charge rails, 60 single depth charge holders.

3.) 4,000 depth charges Type Dora

2,000 depth charges Type Fritz

1,500 stamps and cartridges for depth charges WB D60m and WB F40m.

By 28 February 1942, 10 Italian torpedo boats and 1 destroyer as well as 9 auxiliary vessels have been equipped with the S-Geraet.

For equipping further Italian naval units with S-Geraet, see attached list, Appendix 17.[8]

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R.N. Pallade, a Spica-class, Alcione sub-class Torpedo Boat, photographed pre-war. Courtesy of Wikipedia.

[1] Oberfeldwebel

[2] Ubootabwehrschule (UAS)

[3]1 NCO, 4 other ranks

[4] There is no submarine loss recorded for this day, and no attack in the region of Gaeta either. I used the ASA database at this link for checks.

[5] Baurat, a German civil servant grade. I have not verified this attack.

[6] This was not actually a successful attack – see this link, in particular comments below.

[7] The submarine was HM/Sub Proteus (N29), and while she was damaged, it appears she came off better than Sagittario. Details from the crew of HM/Sub Proteus can be found at this link.

[8] This will follow in another post.

The Kriegstransporter Programme

The Kriegstransporter Programme

Background

1941 was not a good year for the German naval supply capacity in the Mediterranean, with many of the vessels that were present at the start of operations in North Africa in February being lost by the end of the year. The tonnage losses amounted to about 70,000 tons lost out of 124,000 tons available at the start of the year, or 57%. It was of course impossible to send major vessels into the Mediterranean to replace these ships.

The shortage was particularly acute when it came to faster vessels, that could make the run to North Africa at higher speed, reducing their vulnerability to interception. Furthermore, there was also a lack of smaller vessels that could use the heavily degraded ports on the North African coast, which were strewn with wrecks from 18 months of warfare.

In reaction to this challenge, and the continuing need to supply German forces in North Africa, an emergency construction programme was established, based on a newly designed standardised type of a relatively small steamship of easy construction, called a Kriegstransporter abbreviated KT (literally: war transport). This programme was in addition to the considerable construction programme of Marinefaehrpraehme, MFP (literally: Navy Ferry Barge – called ‘F-Lighters’ by the Royal Navy), which had commenced at Palermo in September 1941.
 
The Kriegstransporter
Unlike the flat-bottomed MFP, the KT were proper ships with about five times the displacement (1,200 tons fully loaded (I guess) instead of up to 220 tons for version A of the MFP), higher speed (14.5 knots instead of 10.3 knots), and about four times the carrying capacity (400 tons instead of up to 105 tons for Type A of the MFP).  They also had the advantage of running on coal, rather than scarce Diesel or fuel oil, and had considerably more range and were more seaworthy (one of the first MFPs in the Mediterranean sank on its maiden voyage due to constructive weakness). Just like the MFP, the KT were not given names, but were simply numbered, starting with KT1 (KT3 was the type ship, and the only one constructed in Germany).
 
The KT could take as many tanks as the MFP in one load, six, and they had the ability to unload these themselves in harbour, through the use of a 30t crane that was installed amidships. This was sufficient to handle any tank then in the German or Italian arsenal.
 

KT1 after launch, September 1942 at Genoa. Source: Seekrieg WLB

KT1 after launch, September 1942 at Genoa. Source: Seekrieg WLB

 
Defining the Kriegstransporter Programme
The programme was discussed in January 1942 at the offices of the Kriegsmarine naval transport section in Naples, and the entry of its war diary is given below. Despite the ambitious timeline, only two vessels were commissioned before the end of 1942. In other words the programme failed to achieve its ultimate aim, to alleviate the shortage of merchant tonnage on the North Africa route in 1942. 
 

24 January 1942 10.30am

Conference at the Naval Attache concerning the construction of Kriegstransporters, with participation by Captain Kleikamp, Lt.Com. Aust from the German Naval High Command, Director Scholz of Deutsche Werke yard Hamburg and Commander German Naval Transport Italy. Captain Kleikamp informed as follows about the Kriegstransporter:

Length: 62 m

Width: 11 m

Height to main deck: 4.2 m

Draught: 2.9 m

Displacement loaded: 1,200t

Stowage space: 980 cbm

Carrying capacity: 400 tons

Bunker capacity: 160 tons

Range: 1,500 nautical miles

Speed: up to 14.5 knots

Hatch 1: 6.75×5.4 m, space for 2 tanks

Hatch 2: 9.8×7.4 m, space for 4 tanks

Cranes: 1×30 t, 4×5 t or 1×30 t, 1×10 t, 3×5 t

Armament: 1×7.5 cm gun, 1×3.7 cm AA gun single barrel, 2×20 mm guns

All the material for 20 transporters, including engines and secondary engines, will be delivered from Germany. The construction plan foresees the following dates for the first group of four steamers:

Laying down: 15 March 1942

Launch: early June 1942

Commissioning: end of August or early September 1942

Another meeting was held at the Italian naval ministry in Rome on 27 January, with high-level representatives from the four shipyards designated to carry out the programme, and the Italian naval ministry. The conclusion of this was a programme that foresaw materials being delivered from February to May 1942, and for five steamers to be ready by the end of September 1942, with another two coming in October and November each, and another four in December, for a total of 12 being ready by the end of the year, and the remaining eight to be finished by the end of August 1943.

This meeting was followed by another meeting during the morning of 28 January in the Naval Ministry, at which the German side was informed by the Italian navy that because of an intervention by the Italian Minister for Transport, the programme had to be halved, because it otherwise threatened the Italian construction programme. The new programme foresaw five steamers to be ready in September, with the remainder coming in the fourth quarter of 1942.

In the end however it was to take to 3 February 1943 to reach the number of four completed KT from Italian yards. Construction continued until the end of the war, when 40 of the KT had been completed on Italian yards, and another two in a French yard. 30 KT were launched by Ansaldo Genoa alone by the end of the war. KTs were also assembled in the Black Sea. Despite these numbers, I am not aware of a surviving example.

Further Reading

An excellent source for these little-known vessels is Wilhelm Donko, Die Kriegstransporter KT1 – KT62 der Deutsche Kriegsmarine: Konzept, Einsatz und Verbleib

There is a very informative thread including many pictures at this link.

There is a great diver article on the wreck of what is probably KT11 at this link.

The history of KT3 can be read at this link.

British and US tank deliveries to Egypt July 1941 to January 1942

In previous posts I have provided information on German (at this link) and Italian (at this link) tank deliveries to North Africa. At the request of David, here’s an overview of tank reinforcements sent to Egypt. It is broken down by convoy, except for the US deliveries, for which this information is not available. Here instead I have used the closest report to month end (they were issued weekly to the Prime Minister), taken the ‘in theatre’ number for that report, and substracted the ‘in theatre’ number for the previous month-end report. So e.g. for end July 40 M3 Light are reported ‘in theatre’, while for end August 109 are reported. August deliveries are therefore 69. It’s not perfect, but in the absence of convoy information it’s the best I can do. I hope readers find this useful.

What is clear from the table below is that the allied supply chain outdelivered the Axis chain by a very considerable margin during this period. In fact, it delivered more tanks in these six months than the Germans managed in the more than two years they shipped tanks to North Africa! The convoys that did this were the W.S. series (nicknamed ‘Winston Specials’). You can find detailed information about the movements and arrival times at this link or at this link. I noted in particular the delivery of 60 M3 light tanks on W.S.12, the only ones to come to Egypt via the UK. I wonder who decided on that…

What is shocking however is to compare the number of deliveries with the number of tanks operational on 7 February, in this older post, and that is where it becomes clear why this high level of deliveries was desparately needed to stay in the game in North Africa.  With 1,184 tanks delivered, and another 356 on hand, substracting the 100 that had been sent to Burma with 7 Armoured Brigade, but adding another 66 M3 Medium that had arrived in the interim, leaves a total of 1,506. Yet on 7 February only 350 were operational, i.e. less than had been operational on 2 July 1941, while another 893 were estimated to undergo repairs and maintenance, and 36 M3 Light were with 10 Armoured Division in Palestine, making for an estimated total of 1,279. This implies 227 total losses, but this was quickly revised upwards, to an estimate of 390 (180 Crusader (sic!), 130 M3 Light, 80 I-tanks). I believe to these losses have to be added the losses of 7 Armoured Brigade and 1 R.T.R., which were equipped with older Cruiser marks, and this would increase losses by another up to 150. By 9 February GHQ M.E. had decided that older Cruiser marks were no longer considered for the tank strength return, since they had become obsolete and/or so worn out not to matter anymore on the battlefield. Total losses of about 540 cruiser and I-tanks sounds believable to me.

In terms of types, I would guess about half of the UK I-tank deliveries would have been Matilda II, the other half Valentines. For the British cruisers, most if not all of them would have been Crusaders, I would guess.

Convoy

 

Month of Arrival

M3 Light (Medium)

UK Cruiser

I-Tank

Light Tank Mk. VI

Armoured Cars

W.S.8b 07/41 12 14
W.S.8x 07/41 50 50
W.S.9 07/41 20 20 251
US 07/41 402
W.S.10 08/41 21 30 251
US 08/41 69
W.S.10x 09/41 1663
US 09/41 53
W.S.114 10/41 30 60 35 501
US6 10/41 152(2)
W.S.12 11/41 60 124 52 35 831
US6,7 11/41 9(1)
US6 12/41 97(11)
W.S.12z 01/42 55 381
Totals  By type 480(14) 478 226 65 221
Totals 1,184 tanks
227 Light tanks and ACs

1 Humber Armoured Cars (probably Mk. I), could also include a small number of Daimler Armoured Cars

2 Includes 4 M2A4, mentioned here for completeness.

3 22 Armoured Brigade

4  Remainder 1 Armoured Division

5 AA tanks with Besa Quad MG mounts, belonging to 1 Armoured Division, but lent out on arrival to 1 Army Tank Brigade.

6 Number in brackets are M3 Medium tanks received in theatre during the month.

7 8 M3 Light reported as ‘lost at sea’

On a side note, Churchill was not a happy man about the situation with conflicting tank strength reports, as shown by this rather cranky note of his:

Prime Minister’s Personal Minute – Serial No. D223/1

Colonel Jacob.

Where are the 120 odd [tanks] which were to have arrived on the 8th [July], and where are the rest of the first 60 Americans? Why did the Minister of State say the other day “We have only 100 tanks fit for action” when you show 211? Are these figures telegraphed from Cairo, or do you make them up here, or do the War Office.

W.S.C.

23. 7. 41

Colonel Jacob probably thought ‘Ouch!’ when he read this.’ His reply then explained the matter a bit further, and is quite clear in what probably went on regarding the difference, explaining that the difference probably related to tanks unloaded from W.S.8(b) and (x), but not yet received by a depot in the Delta, tanks undergoing minor repairs, and excluding the tanks in Tobruk. Still, poor Colonel Jacob could probably have done without this…

Initial Transport of the Afrikakorps to North Africa

Initial Transport of the Afrikakorps to North Africa

Background

While not strictly related to CRUSADER, this information is nevertheless of interest and relevance. This post was born from this discussion thread on the Axis History Forum.

Below the initial transports of Army units covering 5.lei.Division (later to become 21st Panzer) and I./Flak 18, as well as some smaller units I guess. Where available the size of the ship is given when it is first mentioned (thanks to Mescal on AHF for this), and any damage due to enemy action is also mentioned. Luftwaffe transports are not included in this. The organisational unit of were small convoys, termed ‘Staffel’ in German. Attached to these were supply ships which carried purely supply apparently, rather than new units.

Original Convoys

  • 1st Staffel 8 Feb 41 (back in Naples 18 Feb, so 10-day roundtrip):
    Ankara (4,768 GRT)
    Arcturus (2,596 GRT)
    Alicante (2,140 GRT)
  • 2nd Staffel 12 Feb 41
    Kybfels (7,764 GRT)
    Adana (4,205 GRT)
    Aegina (2,447 GRT)
    Ruhr (5,954 GRT)
  • 3rd Staffel 17 Feb 41
    Menes (5,609 GRT – torpedoed and damaged on return journey by HM/Sub Regent, who herself was damaged in the counter attack), Arta (2,452 GRT) Maritza (2,910 GRT), Herakleia (1,927 GRT)
  • 4th Staffel 23 Feb 41:
    Ankara, Marburg (7,564 GRT), Reichenfels (7,744 GRT), Kybfels
  • 5th Staffel 25 Feb 41:
    Leverkusen (7,368 GRT), Wachtfels (8,467 GRT), Alicante (2,140 GRT), Arcturus
  • 6th Staffel 1 Mar 41:
    Castellon (2,086 GRT), Ruhr, Maritza, Amsterdam (8,673 GRT – Italian vessel, not sure whether she carried German load)
  • 7th Staffel
    Adana, Aegina, Arta, Herakleia, Sabaudia (1,590 – Italian(?) attached as supply ship)
  • 8th. Staffel 5 Mar 41
    Ankara, Marburg, Reichenfels, Kybfels
  • 9th Staffel 7 Mar 41:
    Alicante, Arcturus, Wachtfels
  • 10th Staffel 12 Mar 41
    Castelleon, Ruhr, Maritza, Leverkusen (this was after the famous fire which caused the loss of 13 tanks, according to WD CO Naval Transport)
  • 11th Staffel 14 Mar 41
    Adana, Aegina, Herakleia, Galilea (8,040 GRT), Arta (supply ship)
  • 12th Staffel 16/17 Mar 41
    Marburg (16 March from Naples), Reichenfels (dto), Ankara (17 Mar from Palermo, re-directed to pick up 150 urgently needed vehicles), Kybfels (dto)
  • 13th Staffel 19 Mar 41
    Arcturus, Wachtfels, Santa Fe (4,627 GRT?), Procida (1,842 GRT)
  • 14th Staffel 22 Mar 41:
    Alicante, Leverkusen, Castellon, Maritza
  • 15th Staffel 26 Mar 41:
    Adana, Herakleia (sunk by submarine HM/Sub Utmost off Tunisian coast, 69 out of 206 soldiers on board lost), Ruhr (damaged by submarine HMS Utmost off Tunisian coast), Galilea (damaged by submarine HM/Sub Upright on return journey, beached in Tripoli a few days later), Samos (2,576 GRT – supply ship)
  • 16th Staffel – 29/30 Mar 41
    Marburg (29 March from Naples), Kybfels (dto), Ankara (30 Mar from Palermo), Reichenfels (dto)
  • 17th Staffel – 2 Apr 41
    Maritza, Procida, Alicante, Santa Fe
  • 18th Staffel – 8 Apr 41 (last troops of the original contingent)
    Wachtfels, Arcturus, Leverkusen, Castellon
  • 19th Staffel – 11 Apr 41 (last load of original units, possibly first load of 15th Panzer) Ankara, Marburg, Kybfels, Reichenfels

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A leichter Befehlswagen (command tank on Panzer I chassis) of Panzerregiment 5 being unloaded in Tripoli, Feb/Mar 1941. Rommelsriposte.com Collection.

Various Runs

  • 26 Mar 41, Italian tanker Persiano (2,474 GRT) with fuel for the army from Naples.
  • 10 Apr 41
    Persiano with fuel Naples to Tripoli, (attacked 40nm north of Tripoli by HM/Sub Tetrach, set on fire and sunk)
  • 1st Supply Runs to Benghazi: Samos from Tripoli Ramb III (3,667 GRT, Italian vessel) from Naples, effective loading capacity only 1,100 tons due to ballast issues)
  • Motor sailing vessels for coastal traffic from Trapani: Rosina, Giorgina, Unione, Luigi, Frieda

The organisation of the transport had to be made with the consideration of several constraints.

1)  Harbour capacity in Tripoli was restricted by a policy of not unloading at night, to reduce the risk of enemy air attacks disrupting unloading and maybe blocking quays by sinking ships alongside. My guess is that at dusk ships were moved off the quays into more open water. This essentially reduced capacity by about 50%, is my guess. See this older post on port capacity.

2)  Ships were of different sizes and speeds, so slow and fast convoys were organised, and optimisation of unloading was an issue, since ideally convoys were supposed to return together.

3)  Italian reinforcement convoys continued at the same time as the German transports, and convoys were timed to reduce the number of ships in Tripoli harbour at any given time. This also indicates the very heavy call on Italian escort vessels, which would have been in service non-stop.

4)  There was a conflict between the Kriegsmarine and the army (Rommel/Halder, who for a change saw eye to eye on something) about the loading of ships. The navy wanted to send troops and vehicles separately, to presumably reduce risk to losing troops if a slower supply vessel was sunk, while the army wanted them to be sent together, in order to have the units immediately ready for action once they hit the quayside in Tripoli. Following a number of ship losses the navy method was adopted.

5)  There was no capacity at first at the receiving end to handle navy matters, and everything had to be run from Italy. This included coastal convoys in North Africa.

6)  Not all ships were available immediately, and arrived in drips and drops throughout the period. Furthermore, not all ships were protected against magnetic mines from the outset.

7)  The Luftwaffe had to be given space on the ships as well, but it wasn’t fully integrated into the transport system, and there appears to sometimes have been a lack of clarity on when supplies would arrive.

8)  AA armament on the ships had to be organised, and when the Luftwaffe refused to provide it, it had to be borrowed from the Italians. This left vessels relatively weakly equipped for AA defense, and they had to rely on the escorts. Navy AA detachments (Marinebordflakkompanie Sued)only arrived during the period. See this older post for AA equipment about half a year later.

Source

War Diary Naval Transport Command South for 1941, while the identity of the attacking subs is based on Royal Navy Day by Day. Many thanks to Dirk for sending this war diary through!