German Sonar on Italian Vessels – Pt. 3

In the third and, for the moment, final part of this mini series on the use of German S-Geraet sonar on Italian vessels, here is a list of the vessels which had it installed, or were scheduled for installation, as of 28 February 1942. The list excludes Antonio da Mosto, which had been sunk by that date (see this link and this link and this link).

The list is fairly self-explanatory. I am using the Italian abbreviations, so ‘Ct’ stands for Cacciatorpediniere – Destroyer, and ‘Tp’ for Torpediniere, Escort Destroyer or Torpedo Boat. The destroyers listed are an interesting mix, and five were going to be assigned to the Italian fleet following the installation of the S-Geraet. They included the older Navigatori class, of the late 1920s, and the most modern fleet destroyers of the Soldati class.

The Torpediniere are also a bit of a mix, primarily Spica class, but with two older vessels included, the San Martino and the Calatafimi, both of which dated back to WW I destroyer designs and had only recently been downgraded to Torpediniere status. Unlike the destroyers, most of the Torpediniere were going to be assigned to specific stations, Sicily (4), Libya (3), Greece (2), Rhodes (2), Naples (1), and the escort group (1).

A number of destroyers and Torpediniere have no destination allocated to them.

In the table, ‘DC’ stands for depth charge. For Italian depth charges installed, where it reads ‘0 16/50 12/100’, this means ‘no depth charge launcher, 16x50kg depth charges and 12x 100kg depth charges’. For background on the Italian depth charges, please see this link. I am not certain the information in the report is fully correct, but it is given as is.

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Destroyers Usodimare and da Noli in port, late 1930s. The picture shows well the range finder, rounded bridge house, and the twin-turret with its 4.75” (12cm) guns. Courtesy Wikipedia.


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San Martino entering a port. Courtesy Wikipedia

Apart from the naval vessels, some auxiliaries were also equipped with the S-Geraet, for harbour defense in La Spezia and Taranto, and two motor sailing vessels (Motoveliere) for serving with the submarine defense school at La Spezia, to train new personnel. The only vessel where the future port of service isn’t given is the Cyprus.

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Use of German Sonar on Italian vessels – Pt. 2

In a previous post (at this link) I had written about the use of German sonar (S-Geraet) and depth charges by the Italian navy, the Regia Marina. This commenced at the end of 1941, and gave the Regia Marina an important new capability in providing convoy defense on the North Africa route, which led to some quick successes, such as the sinking of HMS P-38 (see also this link). A technical description of the history and functioning of the S-Geraet can be found at this link.

In the post below, I have translated a report of the Special Command of the German navy, the Kriegsmarine, which was charged with the task of overseeing the operation of the German equipment on the Italian vessels. The document is from the war diary of the German Liaison Staff at the Admiralty of the Royal Italian Navy, and can be found in NARA under T-1022 Roll 2481.

Overview of the Activity Carried Out Thus Far by the Special Command for the Installation and Deployment of German S-Geraete on Units of the Royal Italian Navy

(Commenced 17 November 1941)

1.) Introduction followed proposals made by Chief Naval Liaison Command to Italian Navy during July 1941.

2.) Exectution

a) Personnel:

1 Officer (Commander Ahrens)

1 Chief Petty Officer[1]

3 Non-Commissioned Officers from the Submarine Defense School Gotenhafen[2]

Furthermore listening crew (from destroyer Lody, strength 1/4[3] from beginning November to mid-December on Torpedo Boat (Torpediniera) Castore, and
listening crew strength 1/4 on destroyer Da Mosto from beginning November to 1 December. 3 other ranks were killed when the boat was sunk. The NCO and one man remain at the disposal of the Special Command.

b) Activity:

At the start of the activity:

Clearance of specific questions of detail concerning submarine defense with the relevant Italian offices, especially Admirals Strazzari and Da Zara. Determination of equipping Italian vessels with S-Geraet installed with German depth charges and depth charge throwers.

Instruction of Italian crew and shore personnel in various naval stations about installation and maintenance of the German depth charges.

Schooling of listening and depth charge crews on the units with S-Geraet installed. Carried out trials.

Instruction of all captains in all questions relating to submarine defense, especially about the method of attack. Participation in combat missions.

c) Successes of Italian vessels equipped with S-Geraet up to 28 February 1942.

1.) Torpedo boat Castore near Gaeta on 24 November 1941: based on S-Geraet location report evaded two torpedo trails. Carried out attack with 36 depth charges. Destruction of submarine possible.[4]
German listening crew.

2.) Destroyer Da Mosto, southern tip of Sicily, 27 November 1941: location of an unknown minefield.
German listening crew.

3.) Torpedo boat Lince, Gulf of Taranto, early December, attack on located submarine with Italian depth charges. Success questionable.
Italian listening crew and Construction Advisor Morgenstern.[5]

4.) Torpedo Boat Orsa, 115 Degrees, 63 nautical miles off Sfax on 7 January 1942. Attack on located submarine with 30 German depth charges. Success: initially strong aural location ceases; location continues to show in large oil slick. Location of attack had to be left early to ensure protection of the escorted steamer.[6]
Italian and German listening crew, directed by Commander Ahrens.

5.)  Torpedo boat Sagittario at Cape Ducato on 8 February 1942. Evaded torpedo. Enemy submarine rammed, has to be considered destroyed. Torpedo boat heavy damage on the bow.
German and Italian listening crew.[7]

6.) Torpedo boat Circe on 13 February 1942: located enemy submarine was fixed for six hours. Submarine surfaces after 3 attacks with German depth charges; 23 prisoners made. Attempt to bring her in fails, boat sinks. English submarine “Tempest”.
German and Italian listening crew.

7.) Torpedo boat Pallade at Capo dell’Armi on 16 November 1942. Located submarine attacked in three runs with 45 German depth charges. At water depth of 1,600m signal ceases after final attack. Oil slick of 1,000 x 2,000 m.
German and Italian listening crew, directed by Commander Ahrens.

8.) Torpedo boat Circe at Ras Hallab on 23 February 1942. During escort of convoy attacking submarine is located and periscope is sighted. 10 depth charges dropped on diving location. Submarine surfaces briefly, twice, and finally sinks. Bag with flags, parts of interior (door of cupboard, tabletop), cans of biscuits and cigarettes as well as human body parts come up. Large oil slick. Continuous rising of air bubbles.
German and Italian listening crew.

d) Intended equipping of Italian naval and merchant units

Delivered:

1.) 29 S-Geraete of which one fixed in Spezia. One further S-Geraet lost when destroyer da Mosto was sunk.

2.) 40 depth charge throwers, 72 reloading installations, 20 depth charge rails, 60 single depth charge holders.

3.) 4,000 depth charges Type Dora

2,000 depth charges Type Fritz

1,500 stamps and cartridges for depth charges WB D60m and WB F40m.

By 28 February 1942, 10 Italian torpedo boats and 1 destroyer as well as 9 auxiliary vessels have been equipped with the S-Geraet.

For equipping further Italian naval units with S-Geraet, see attached list, Appendix 17.[8]

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R.N. Pallade, a Spica-class, Alcione sub-class Torpedo Boat, photographed pre-war. Courtesy of Wikipedia.

[1] Oberfeldwebel

[2] Ubootabwehrschule (UAS)

[3]1 NCO, 4 other ranks

[4] There is no submarine loss recorded for this day, and no attack in the region of Gaeta either. I used the ASA database at this link for checks.

[5] Baurat, a German civil servant grade. I have not verified this attack.

[6] This was not actually a successful attack – see this link, in particular comments below.

[7] The submarine was HM/Sub Proteus (N29), and while she was damaged, it appears she came off better than Sagittario. Details from the crew of HM/Sub Proteus can be found at this link.

[8] This will follow in another post.

The History and Operations of F-Lighters during CRUSADER

Background

In the spring of 1941, the German navy in the Mediterranean considered the expansion of its capabilities by adding a new type of vessel to support coastal traffic in North Africa, in particular for supply of smaller harbours such as Derna and Bardia, which could not be reached with large merchant vessels. The type of vessel was called a Marinefaehrprahm (MFP), or Naval Ferry Lighter. Because of their ‘F’ class designation, they became known as ‘F-Lighters’ to the Royal Navy. 

MFPs were originally designed after the experience with make-shift landing vessels in the preparations for the invasion of the UK in 1940 had shown that a specialist type was needed. The MFPs had a carrying capacity of 70/100 tons in adverse/good weather conditions, or three tanks, and displaced about 200 – 220 tons. They had broad front doors to unload through the bow, and were powered by diesel engines. The initially planned range of 120 nautical miles was quickly seen to be insufficient, and the design range grew to be sufficient to make the 420 nautical mile leg Tripoli – Benghazi without refuelling. The crew consisted of 14 men.

The planned use of the MFP was i) as transports, and ii) as escorts for other slow and unprotected transports. Thus even freight MFPs were reasonably well armed with light AA, captured 7.5cm guns, and depth charges to combat submarines.

2. L-Flottille, a cover name meaning 2. Lehr-Flottille (2nd Instruction Flotilla) instead of 2. Landings-Flottille (2nd Landing Flotilla), was to become the main Kriegsmarine unit under which the MFPs operated in the Mediterranean. It was ordered to be established in mid-August 1941, with a first HQ at Palermo, where the MFPs were laid down at Cantieri Rinuniti Navale, and then Tripoli in Libya, as ordered on 9 October 1941, with a view to having it operate in the Tripoli-Benghazi zone. A total of 30 MFPs were foreseen at this time, in two lots of 15, of which 22 were to be built in Palermo, and eight in Varna, Bulgaria. 15 of these vessels had been ordered in April 1941, to be built in Italy. In October the Italian order was expanded by another 15, and in December another 20 were planned to be built. The intent was to grow the fleet to about 100 vessels.

The first ten MFPs were commissioned in Palermo in November 1941, MFPs F146 to F154 and F160. In the first half of December the remaining five of the first order, F155, to F159 commissioned. The latter two showed how quickly these boats could enter service. They were launched on 6 December, and commissioned on 10 December. 

Operations

Below are two pictures I came across in NARA a number of years ago. Apologies for the bad quality, the pictures were taken off a microfiche reader screen. They show the first MFP convoy to North Africa, which arrived in Tripoli on 5 December 1941. It consisted of four MFPs, F146, F148, F150, and F160. The four lighters had left Palermo on 22 November 41 to move to Trapani, where I presume they were loaded up. They then went to North Africa escorted by the torpedo boat Perseo. The load carried consisted of 800 barrels of fuel, 20 tons Italian cement, Draeger diving gear, 132 tons of equipment, and 20 tons of rations.

These four MFP went across without their 7.5cm guns, which only arrived in Palermo on 2 December 1941. They were subsequently equipped with these I presume. They were also expecting a 2cm AA gun each, from stocks in Benghazi.

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First MFP convoy on the way to North Africa. Escort is the Spica-class Perseo

MFP160

3 December 1941, MFP160 sinking with 400 barrels of fuel and 10 tons of cement and the diving gear, after the front loading doors gave way to wave action. Perseo is taking over the crew.

After the arrival of this convoy, the three survivors underwent repairs, and were then employed on coastal supply duties. E.g. F150 was sent to Bardia in mid-December to pick up tank engines, and F146 was sent to beleaguered Bardia on 20 December, with 70 tons food, 20 tons ammunition and 2 tons mail. This must have been a somewhat harrowing journey, since the Allies at this point controlled the Libyan coast almost up to Benghazi, and were running supply convoys up to Tobruk. F146 was then ordered to remain in Bardia to ensure supply between Bardia and Sollum. It was lost on 24 December to artillery fire, with all of the crew rescued.

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Telegram to Naval Transport Command Italy, with information about the planned trip to Bardia.

The first 15 MFPs quickly diminished in number. Information about their fate during Operation CRUSADER is from the Historisches Marinearchiv at this link:

F160 – sunk due to heavy weather on 3 December 1941

F146 – set on fire and beached due to enemy artillery fire on 24 December 1941

F150 – mined and sunk on 15 January 1942, with a load of 80 tons of gasoline

F151 – heavily damaged and partially submerged while unloading due to heavy weather. Finally destroyed by enemy air attack, 3 January 1942.

Five each were then lost in 1942 and 1943, and the last of this series, F155, ran aground off southern France and became a total loss.

 

Initial Transport of the Afrikakorps to North Africa

While not strictly related to CRUSADER, this information is nevertheless of interest and relevance. This post was born from this discussion thread on the Axis History Forum.

Below the initial transports of Army units covering 5.lei.Division (later to become 21st Panzer) and I./Flak 18, as well as some smaller units I guess. Where available the size of the ship is given when it is first mentioned (thanks to Mescal on AHF for this), and any damage due to enemy action is also mentioned. Luftwaffe transports are not included in this. The organisational unit of were small convoys, termed ‘Staffel’ in German. Attached to these were supply ships which carried purely supply apparently, rather than new units.

1st Staffel 8 Feb 41 (back in Naples 18 Feb, so 10-day roundtrip):
Ankara (4,768 GRT)
Arcturus (2,596 GRT)
Alicante (2,140 GRT)

2nd Staffel 12 Feb 41
Kybfels (7,764 GRT)
Adana (4,205 GRT)
Aegina (2,447 GRT)
Ruhr (5,954 GRT)

3rd Staffel 17 Feb 41
Menes (5,609 GRT – torpedoed and damaged on return journey by HM/Sub Regent, who herself was damaged in the counter attack)
Arta (2,452 GRT)
Maritza (2,910 GRT)
Herakleia (1,927 GRT)

4th Staffel 23 Feb 41:
Ankara
Marburg (7,564 GRT)
Reichenfels (7,744 GRT)
Kybfels

5th Staffel 25 Feb 41:
Leverkusen (7,368 GRT)
Wachtfels (8,467 GRT)
Alicante (2,140 GRT)
Arcturus

6th Staffel 1 Mar 41:
Castellon (2,086 GRT)
Ruhr
Maritza
Amsterdam (8,673 GRT – Italian vessel, not sure whether she carried German load)

7th Staffel
Adana
Aegina
Arta
Herakleia
Sabaudia (1,590 – Italian(?) attached as supply ship)

8th. Staffel 5 Mar 41
Ankara
Marburg
Reichenfels
Kybfels

9th Staffel 7 Mar 41:
Alicante
Arcturus
Wachtfels

10th Staffel 12 Mar 41
Castelleon
Ruhr
Maritza
Leverkusen (this was after the famous fire which caused the loss of 13 tanks, according to WD CO Naval Transport)

11th Staffel 14 Mar 41
Adana
Aegina
Herakleia
Galilea (8,040 GRT)
Arta (supply ship)

12th Staffel 16/17 Mar 41
Marburg (16 March from Naples)
Reichenfels (dto)
Ankara (17 Mar from Palermo, re-directed to pick up 150 urgently needed vehicles)
Kybfels (dto)

13th Staffel 19 Mar 41
Arcturus
Wachtfels
Santa Fe (4,627 GRT?)
Procida (1,842 GRT)

14th Staffel 22 Mar 41:
Alicante
Leverkusen
Castellon
Maritza

15th Staffel 26 Mar 41:
Adana
Herakleia (sunk by submarine HM/Sub Utmost off Tunisian coast, 69 out of 206 soldiers on board lost)
Ruhr (damaged by submarine HMS Utmost off Tunisian coast)
Galilea (damaged by submarine HM/Sub Upright on return journey, beached in Tripoli a few days later)
Samos (2,576 GRT – supply ship)

Also 26 Mar 41, tanker Persiano (2,474 GRT) with fuel for the army from Naples.

16th Staffel – 29/30 Mar 41
Marburg (29 March from Naples)
Kybfels (dto)
Ankara (30 Mar from Palermo)
Reichenfels (dto)

17th Staffel – 2 Apr 41
Maritza
Procida
Alicante
Santa Fe

18th Staffel – 8 Apr 41 (last troops of the original contingent)
Wachtfels
Arcturus
Leverkusen
Castellon

19th Staffel – 11 Apr 41 (last load of original units, possibly first load of 15th Panzer)
Ankara
Marburg
Kybfels
Reichenfels

Various Runs – 10 Apr 41
Persiano (tanker – attacked 40nm north of Tripoli by HM/Sub Tetrach, set on fire and sunk)
1st Supply Runs to Benghazi:
Samos from Tripoli
Ramb III (3,667 GRT, Italian vessel) from Naples, effective loading capacity only 1,100 tons due to ballast
Motor sailing vessels for coastal traffic from Trapani:
Rosina
Giorgina
Unione
Luigi
Frieda

The organisation of the transport had to be made with the consideration of several constraints.

1)  Harbour capacity in Tripoli was restricted by a policy of not unloading at night, to reduce the risk of enemy air attacks disrupting unloading and maybe blocking quays by sinking ships alongside. My guess is that at dusk ships were moved off the quays into more open water. This essentially reduced capacity by about 50%, is my guess. See this older post on port capacity.

2)  Ships were of different sizes and speeds, so slow and fast convoys were organised, and optimisation of unloading was an issue, since ideally convoys were supposed to return together.

3)  Italian reinforcement convoys continued at the same time as the German transports, and convoys were timed to reduce the number of ships in Tripoli harbour at any given time. This also indicates the very heavy call on Italian escort vessels, which would have been in service non-stop.

4)  There was a conflict between the Kriegsmarine and the army (Rommel/Halder, who for a change saw eye to eye on something) about the loading of ships. The navy wanted to send troops and vehicles separately, to presumably reduce risk to losing troops if a slower supply vessel was sunk, while the army wanted them to be sent together, in order to have the units immediately ready for action once they hit the quayside in Tripoli. Following a number of ship losses the navy method was adopted.

5)  There was no capacity at first at the receiving end to handle navy matters, and everything had to be run from Italy. This included coastal convoys in North Africa.

6)  Not all ships were available immediately, and arrived in drips and drops throughout the period. Furthermore, not all ships were protected against magnetic mines from the outset.

7)  The Luftwaffe had to be given space on the ships as well, but it wasn’t fully integrated into the transport system, and there appears to sometimes have been a lack of clarity on when supplies would arrive.

8)  AA armament on the ships had to be organised, and when the Luftwaffe refused to provide it, it had to be borrowed from the Italians. This left vessels relatively weakly equipped for AA defense, and they had to rely on the escorts. Navy AA detachments (Marinebordflakkompanie Sued)only arrived during the period. See this older post for AA equipment about half a year later.

Source for all this: War Diary Naval Transport Command South for 1941, while the identity of the attacking subs is based on Royal Navy Day by Day. Many thanks to Dirk for sending this war diary through!

German AA Armament of Axis Merchant Vessels – 26 Nov. 1941

The table below gives some information on how the German navy equipped merchants on the North Africa run with AA capability, in order to protect them from the roving Blenheims and Swordfish or Albacores operating from Malta. The memo of which the table was part was sent on 26 November 1941. Of note that three of the vessels in the memo had been sunk by then, two of them with all hands, including the AA crews. Also of note that army (Heer) AA guns were shipped in a few cases, in particular on high-value merchants such as Ankara and Monginevro. Why they were put on the old and rather small steamer Procida is a mystery to me though.

In any case, I hope this is of interest to some, and I would be interested to see how this compared to e.g. the armament on British merchants.

No

Ship Name

Weapons

 

2 cm AA

AA MG[2]

Notes

Single

(Navy crews)[1]

Quad

(Army Crews)

C/30

C/38

C/38

C/13

C/34

 

1

Ankara

2

1

1

 

 

 

2

Almena

 

2

 

 

 

 

3

Brook

 

2

 

 

 

 

4

Bellona

 

2

 

2

 

 

5

Maritza

 

2

 

2

 

Sunk 24-11-41

6

Max Berendt

 

2

 

 

 

Salvage Tug

7

Monginevro

 

 

1

 

 

No Naval AA Crews, Italian vessel which was being loaded with substantial German cargo at the time.

8

Nirvo

 

1

 

2

 

 

9

Procida

 

 

2

2

 

Sunk 24-11-41

10

Tinos

2

 

 

2

 

Sunk 22-11-41 in Benghazi harbour

11

Trapani

2

 

 

 

 

 

12

Santa Fe

 

2

 

 

 

 

13

Savona

 

2

 

2

 

 

14

Spezia

2

 

 

2

 

 

15

Achaia

          Not re-armed yet

16

Cuma

          Not armed yet

17

Menes

          Not re-armed yet

18

Ossag

          Not re-armed yet

19

Reichenfels

          Not re-armed yet

20

Wachtfels

          Not re-armed yet

21

Sturla

          Not armed yet

22

Cagliari

          Not armed yet

Source: NARA, Documents of Marineoberkommando Sued PG45144

[1] C/30 = Standard 20mm light AA gun of the German navy, superseded by the C/38 20 mm gun which was copied from the German army 2cm Flak 38. C/38 = Standard 20mm light AA gun of the German army, adopted by the navy due to its higher reliability. A quadruple mount was available, but not in service with the German navy.

[2] C/13 = Naval version of the MG13 light machine gun, introduced in 1930, and superseded by the MG34. Calibre 7.9mm. C/34 = Naval version of the standard light machine gun of the early war years. High rate of fire. Calibre 7.9mm.

Submarine Supplies to North Africa – May to November 1941

Submarines played a minor but interesting role in the supply of Axis forces in North Africa, even before the Regia Marina’s emergency programme of November. Throughout the campaign they delivered fuel, ammunition, and rations. When Bardia was invested in November 1941 during the early phase of CRUSADER, they were used to evacuate officer prisoners of war, such as Brigadier Hargest, commander of 5 New Zealand Brigade, who was captured on 27 November 1941 when his Brigade HQ was overrun, and high-ranking Italian officers who were evacuated to serve again when it became clear that Bardia was a lost cause. Submarines had the advantage of stealth, and they were small enough to use the smaller harbours along the coast, such as Derna, thereby reducing the need to spend fuel on forward transport, or to slot into capacity-constrained harbours such as Benghazi with additional supplies. Two submarines were lost on re-supply missions during CRUSADER, Carraciolo (sunk on 11 December by depth charges from Hunt-class destroyer HMS Farndale after a failed attack on a Tobruk convoy) and Saint Bon (sunk on 5 January by HM/Sub Upholder south of Sicily). Both of them were large ocean-going submarines of the Cagni class. The small amounts of fuel supplied by the submarines were nevertheless valuable. For example, a single run by a Cagni class submarine could supply sufficient aerial fuel to keep the Luftwaffe planes in North Africa flying for one day.

ON 21 November the German Navy Command (Seekriegsleitung) in Berlin requested from the Commander Naval Transport Italy (Seetransportchef Italien)an overview of German army supplies transported by submarine to North Africa. On 28 November the Seetransportchef responded with an overview that unfortunately does not contain dates, and for most of the missions fails to name the submarine. It is nevertheless of interest. On 6 February 1942 an update was provided which gave additional information. It is important to note that Italian supplies are not included in these volumes, and neither are those of the Luftwaffe.

The documents are translated below.

Berlin W 35 the 21 November 1941

Tirpitzufer 72-76

Fast Memo (Schnellkurzbrief)

To

Seetransportchef Italien

Rome

For the submarine transports carried out until now a list has to be supplied immediately, including the names, dates of leaving and entering harbor, and the type and volume of goods transported.

[…]

High Command of the Navy

Skl Qu.A. Via 10419/41 geh.

SECRET!

Quartermaster Rome                                        28 November 1941

(Army)

No. 6466/41 geh.

To

Seetransportchef

Rome

Referring to the meeting of Oberlt. Vogel and Lt. Kostas, Qu Rom sends the attached list of submarine transports thus far.

1 Attachment                                            The Quartermaster

Signed

SECRET!

Quartermaster Rome

(Army)

Supply Runs with Submarines thus far with supply for the Army (starting in May [1941])

No

Fuel

Ammunition

1

75

2

72.2

3

75

4

67.1

5

78.9

6

43

7

68.6

8

88.4

9

33.7

10

53

11

53.5

12

55

13

58

14

47

15

Zoea

56.3

16

Corridoni

17.6

65.7

17

Atropo

59.4

18

Saint Bon

140

19

Cagni

140.2

20

Atropo

56.8

21

Atropo

57

22

Saint Bon

133

5

23

Cagni

139

5

24

Millo

134

6.8

25

Micca

26

Saint Bon

137

2.3

1,014

1,009.5

Seetransportchef Italien Rome, 6 February 1942

B.Nr. Geh. 841/1942

To

German Navy Command Italy

Attn. Lt.Commander Stock

Attached we submit an overview of submarine transports during the year 1941.

Submarine Transports

Total supply since start (10 May 41 to 31 December 41):

1,086 tons fuel

1,072 tons ammunition

203 tons rations

No supplies were shipped in the month of September.

From 20 November to 30 December the following were shipped in 8 voyages:

675 tons fuel

9 tons ammunition

203 tons rations

Italian submarines transported until July only ammunition for the army (about 1,000 tons), from August to end of November fuel and a small volume of ammunition (900 tons fuel and 20 tons ammunition).

During December primarily Italian rations were transported, and at the end of December 4 voyages brought:

139 tons fuel

203 tons rations

for the German Afrikakorps.

To get an overall idea of the volume of submarine supplies compared to other measures, it is useful to look at the files of a single harbour loading unit. In this case the Seetransportstelle Brindisi, reporting on traffic ex-Taranto for the month of December.

Total supply was 12,116.6 tons, in the following categories:

259 men

100 vehicles

6 motor cycles

1,326 tons for the German army

359.5 tons for the German navy

10,431.1 tons for the German air force

Seven submarines were loaded for a total of 440 tons of army supply. By comparison, the cruiser Cadorna brought 233 tons and 88 men in one voyage, while 6 destroyers brought 49 men and 315.9 tons of supplies.

This article at Regiamarina.net gives a nice overview of Italian transport submarines.

Small naval unit losses and damage

Update:  08-03-14. Lorenzo Colombo kindly alerted me to an error, which I have now corrected. ORP Sokol did not damage Aviere in Navarino harbour.

Update: on 21-6-09 I completed a full trawl of Naval History Net and now have considerably more confidence in the completeness of this list.

The constant convoy battles either on the Italy/Greece to Libya or the Alexandria to Tobruk routes took a severe toll on smaller units on both sides. This list is probably not complete – I have tried to ignore losses in the western Med, and in Greek waters, since these would not have been directly relevant to the North African convoy battle. I will eventually also add merchant shipping losses for the period. Sources are the two excellent sites Naval History Net and the Chronik Seekrieg site at the Landesbibliothek Stuttgart.

I think that these losses show quite clearly the commitment that the Regia Marina had to the convoys and the supply of Axis forces in North Africa. Something that is often not appreciated by those who think that the Italians were not pulling their weight. Also note that any aerial torpedo losses or damage to Royal Navy vessels are almost certainly due to Italian aircraft.

The list does not include very minor damage that did not take ships out of commission, or damage/sinkings caused by collisions with friendly ships.

Italian Regia Marina/German Kriegsmarine

Destroyer

  • Fulmine (lost, surface engagement, 8/9 Nov 41)*
  • Libecco (lost, sub torpedo, 9 Nov 41)*
  • Euro (damaged, surface engagement, 8/9 Nov 41)*
  • Grecale (damaged, surface engagement, 8/9 Nov 41)*
  • Aviere (damaged, submarine torpedo, 19 Nov 41)**
  • Alvise da Mosto (lost, surface engagement, 1 Dec 41)***
  • Corazziere (heavily damaged, collision with Granatiere, 18 Dec 41)****
  • Granatiere (heavily damaged, collision with Corraziere, 18 Dec 41)

Escort Destroyer/Torpedo Boat

  • Alcione (total constructive loss after beaching, following damage by sub torpedo, 11 Dec 41)

Mine Hunter/Mine Layer

  • Zirona (damaged/beached, air attack, 25 Nov 41)

Submarines

  • Saint Bon (lost, sub torpedo, 4 Jan 42)*****
  • Caracciolo (lost, depth charges, 11 Dec 41)******
  • U557 (lost, rammed in error by Italian escort destroyer, 16 Dec 41)*******
  • U451 (lost,sunk by aircraft depth charge off Tangiers, 21 Dec 41)
  • U79 (lost, depth charges, 23 Dec 41)
  • U75 (lost, depth charges, 28 Dec 41)
  • U374 (lost, sub torpedo, 12 Jan 42)********
  • U577 (lost, aircraft depth charge, 15 Jan 41 off Mersa Matruh)*********

Auxiliary Warships

  • Adriatico (lost, surface engagement with Force K, 1 Dec 41)
  • Cittá di Palermo (lost, sub torpedo, 5 Jan 42)

* All four destroyers lost/damaged during the battle of the Duisburg convoy, by Force K operating out of Malta.

**The attack was carried out by Polish sub ORP Sokol while Aviere lay in the harbour of Navarino. Aviere probably did not suffer too much damage.

*** Sunk by Force K while attempting to defend her charge, the large tanker Iridio Mantovani. Her commander received the Gold Medal of Military Valour for this action.

**** This collision occurred at high speed around 6 am on 18 Dec after the first battle of Sirte. Both destroyers had their bows sheared off and up to 20 members of their crews were killed. One of them was towed to Greece by German tug Max Behrens, and Granatiere was under repair until September 1942, while Corazziere could return in May 1942.

***** Sunk on a supply mission to North Africa.

****** Sunk on return from a supply mission to Bardia.

******* On return from the attack that sank HMS Galatea.

******** She was first depth-charged on 10 January by HMS Legion and HMNS Isaac Sweers, and damaged to an extent that did not allow her to dive anymore. In this condition she ran into HMS Unbeaten, which sank her two days later.

********* The successful attack was made by a Swordfish of 815 Squadron FAA operating from a shore base in Egypt. It was previously thought that a Sunderland of RAF 230 Squadron sank her on 9 Jan. Instead, this attack hit U568 causing only minor damage. See here.

Commonwealth/Royal Navy

Destroyer

  • HMS Jackal (severely damaged, aerial torpedo, 30 November 41)
  • HMS Kandahar (lost, mine, 19 Dec 41)*
  • HMS Jervis (damaged, charge placed by frogmen, 19 Dec 41)**
  • HMS Kimberley (severely damaged, sub torpedo, 12 Jan 42)***
  • HMS Ghurka (lost, sub torpedo, 17 Jan 42)****

Sloop

  • HMAS Parramatta (lost, sub torpedo, 27 Nov 41)
  • HMS Flamingo (severely damaged, air attack, 7 Dec 41)*****

Corvette

  • HMS Salvia (K97 – a Flower-class) (lost with all hands and  about 100 passengers which she had rescued before from merchant Shutien while on Tobruk run, sub torpedo from U-568, 24 Dec 41)

Other units/Auxiliaries

  • HMS Chakdina (sunk, aerial torpedo, 5 Dec 41)******
  • HMS Chantala (sunk, mine, 7 Dec 41)
  • HMS Glenroy (damaged, aereal torpedo, 23 Nov 41)*******
  • HMS Sotra (mine-sweeping whaler) (lost with all hands 80m east off Tobruk, sub torpedo from U-431, 29 Jan 41)

Submarines

  • P.31/HMS Uproar (damaged, air attack, 14 Jan 41)
  • N.36/HMS Perseus (lost, mine, 7 Dec 41)********
  • N.18/HMS Triumph (lost, causes unknown, 31 Dec 41)

*Lost in the same minefield as HMS Neptune

**Secondary damage from the explosion of a tanker in Alexandria harbour during the Xa MAS attack.

***Her stern was blown off by the explosion, and she would only return to duty in early 1944.  She was one of only two K-Class destroyers to survive the war.

****This was and L-Class, not a Tribal-class destroyer, she was the second HMS Ghurka during WW2, the first one having been lost on 19 April 1940 off Norway.  She was torpedoed by U133, which was in turn attacked by HMS Maori, but suffered only light damage.

*****She would only return to duty in 1944.

******HMS (or sometimes SS) Chakdina (3,033 GRT) was an armed boarding vessel commandeered by the Royal Navy and acting as a hospital ship (my guess is not as an official hospital ship however). She was sunk shortly after leaving Tobruk by attack from an Italian S.79 torpedo bomber. She carried a large number of wounded and POW, many of whom died when she sank in just three minutes. One of the POWs was German general von Ravenstein, former commander of 21. Panzerdivision. He survived. HMS Chakdina and Chantala belonged to the same owner before the war. You can see a picture of the similar HMS Chakla under air attack in Tobruk harbour at this link. Armed Boarding Vessels were a kind of armed merchant cruiser, usually armed with obsolete guns. In the case of Chakdina, Chantala, and Chakla, they were used for transporting troops and stores in and out of Tobruk, and all of them were lost on the Tobruk Run.

*******HMS Glenroy was a large infantry landing ship, originally a fast freighter belonging to the Glen Line, with a deckload of caiques (traditional trading vessels of the Med) for Tobruk harbour.  She was so severely damaged that she had to be beached for a few days off Mersa Matruh, before it was possible to bring her into Alexandria. You can read a first-hand story of her ordeal at this link.

********HMS Perseus was lost with 59 out of 60 men. The remarkable escape of stoker John Capes, ascending from 52m below the surface of the sea, is retold at this link.