The End Outside Tobruk – 4 December 1941

The End Outside Tobruk – 4 December 1941


After two weeks of hard fighting, and two mistaken expectations of victory (see here), 4 December 1941 was the day Panzergruppe packed it in outside Tobruk. The war diary of 90.lei. Afrika-Div. notes how the division, together with the equally hard-hit Italian Bologna division[1] was expected to undertake another attack to clean the remaining enemy pockets of the Belhamed height and re-establish the siege ring. This led to a “dramatic exchange of words” between the GOC of the division and General Crüwell of the Afrikakorps at lunch time. In the end however, General Sümmermann got his way partially and obtained a delay of the attack from 1400 hours to 1600 hours. It never took place. At 1500 hours the order to retreat came and the battle outside Tobruk was lost.


Unknown Command Post during the battle for the salient. Rommelsriposte Collection.

15.00 hours General Crüwell passes on order from General Rommel as follows:

The armoured corps retreats west into the area 30km west of el Adem. 90.lei.Div. holds its position and continues to close of Fortress Tobruk from the east and south-east. In this regard the division takes command of the Belhamed and from 19.00 hours Ed Duda. In this regard Gruppe Mickl is subordinated. 21.Pz.Div. takes care of establishing communications Mickl to Sümmermann. In the rear the division will be covered by Mot. Korps Gambarra in the area of Sidi Rezegh. This creates a corridor. Through this corridor, on the night 4 to 5 December, the whole of the artillery of the division will be moved to el Adem. Prime movers will be allocated. 

Following receipt of this order the intended attack is no longer considered[…]

22.15 hours a new order from Pz.Gr. that apart from small rear guards also the division will be pulled out of its prior positions. Positions Belhamed, ed Duda, to be held and later to pull pack on El Adem. To the south stands Mot. Korps Gambarra and protects against attacks from the right flank. This order is immediately transmitted to the troops.

Lt. Hollmann became the leader of the rear guards, which consisted of one section per company. These were to hold until dawn, feint occupation of the position, and then in the late morning hours retreat as well.[2]

Underscoring further the deflation of the day is the report by Artillerie Regiment 33, which participated in the second attempt to reach Bardia.

Advance on Sidi Azeiz and Rearward March via el Adem on 4.12.41

On 4.12. 15.Pz.Div. advanced from the area Zaafran on Sidi Azeiz.

Order of march (large units)

Tank battalion Ramsauer



The march was at first disturbed by artillery fire from the south, but from Gasr el Arid went without any noticeable events.At Sidi Azeiz the tanks in the van met weak enemy who retreated immediately. The II. and III./A.R.33 went into firing position immediately and took the fleeing enemy as well as the abandoned leaguer under ricochet fire.[3] An enemy battery returned fire but without major effects.

During the afternoon the rear march commenced, at first into the area of Zaafran. During the night it became known that the enemy had managed to connect with Tobruk. The division united with its supply columns in the area of the junction with the Zaafran track on the Trigh Capuzzo and at 02.00 hours on 5.12. broke through to the west. The artillery marched in the group of 15. Schtz.Brigade.[4] Apart from attacks by enemy bombers no special events.

What had happened was that the advance guard of 15.Pz. had run into 31 Field Regiment of 4 Indian Division, who were in no mood to entertain them. Their diary describes the inconclusive action.

4 December

Enemy reported clear of SIDI AZEIZ at first light and our O.P.s felt their way forward, finding no opposition. At mid-day 14 enemy tanks with guns and lorried infantry observed approaching SIDI AZEIZ. Tanks in close formation. C.O. ordered fire to be held which appeared to make the enemy uneasy. No doubt he wanted to confirm where our gun positions were. Tanks appeared to split up and attempt reconnaissance. Some spasmodic shelling. We engaged enemy A/Tk guns observed being toward across skyline and they withdrew. Finally enemy column and tanks withdrew, admitting defeat and apparently with nothing accomplished.



[1]Bologna reported a strength of 3 rifle companies, 1 machine-gun company, and two artillery batteries on this day. 
[2] You can read about how this went at this link.
[3]In this mode rounds would ricochet off the ground, and generate airbursts.
[4]The infantry of the division.

Was Rommel right to advance on the Egyptian frontier in April 1941?

Was Rommel right to advance on the Egyptian frontier in April 1941?

Bundesarchiv Bild 146 1985 013 07 Erwin Rommel 2

Porträt Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel mit Ritterkreuz und Orden Pour le Mérite (BAMA via Wikimedia)


One of the enduring images of the desert war is that of the rapidly advancing Afrikakorps sweeping all before it. This is certainly what happened in April 1941 during the re-conquest of the Cyrenaica and Marmarica provinces of Libya. It led to considerable gains of terrain for the Axis, and losses in men and equipment for the Empire forces. The offensive culminated in the siege of Tobruk. This advance was against clear orders given to Rommel, namely to await the arrival of 15. Panzerdivision in May 1941 before commencing operations. This was of course of major propaganda value, and it has shaped the image we have of Rommel today, with a victorious German force (the Italians are normally overlooked) advancing rapidly, encircling and defeating all before them.

Raids however (the Wehrmacht used the same term) were allowed, as long as they did not end with the occupation of terrain. These were presumably considered useful in that they would keep the Empire forces off balance, and would deny them peace and quiet during which to prepare for their planned advance on Tripoli. Rommel commenced his raid on Agedabia, and when testing the Empire defenses found them weak. He then took the opportunity to unleash his forces for a deep penetration into Cyrenaica, with the aim to completely defeat the enemy in the western desert.

At the end of April, Rommel found himself in a tricky situation, far away from his supply sources, with dispersed and weakened forces, and exposed to Empire counter attacks on the line of the frontier between Libya and Egypt. What rescued his force at this point was the thundering defeat that had been suffered by the Empire forces in Greece, which prevented Middle East Command from taking advantage of this weakness. By the time sufficient forces could be scrounged together in Egypt, the moment had passed, with the arrival of the first elements of 15. Panzerdivision in the area of operations. The first co-ordinated Empire counter-offensive, BREVITY, came about two weeks too late, and the desert war settled into a pattern of periodic offensives and counteroffensives for half a year.

The outcome of this initial offensive was that the Axis forces in North Africa were strung out, at the end of a precarious supply line, and highly exposed. This had been foreseen in Berlin, but not appreciated by Rommel, who did not have much interest in the question of logistics. The modern assessment of this initial offensive is that it ultimately doomed the Axis effort in North Africa. This article sets this out in more detail, drawing on period documents and participant views.

Bundesarchiv Bild 101I 783 0109 11 Nordafrika Panzer III in FahrtNordafrika.- Panzer III in Fahrt durch die Wüste (Panzer III on the march in the desert); PK “Afrika” April 1941 (BAMA via Wikipedia) 

The Situation in Berlin and Planning for North Africa – March/April 1941[1]

On 1 March, Generaloberst Halder, Chief of the Staff of the Army High Command, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) noted that Rommel’s operational intentions needed a sound basis, and should be reviewed based on what was practically possible. Halder that day held a conference with Oberquartiermeister I (Senior General Staff Deputy Logistics) Paulus[2], who also was the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the Leiter Operationsabteilung (Chief of the Operations Department) General Heusinger[3], discussing the situation in Libya, and Rommel’s preparations for the forthcoming attack. These men were the top trio of the German army’s operational planning. Later that day Major Ehlert, the designated Ia (chief operations officer) of the Afrikakorps reported in, and was briefed on the ideas of the army leadership regarding offensive operations in North Africa.

On 3 March, a discussion was held between Halder with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch[4] regarding the offensive possibilities in the short and longer term, when it was expected that troops could be released from Barbarossa.

On 7 March Kapitän (or army Captain) von Both, who had been on an inspection tour to Libya, reported back to the OKH. He noted that supply services should be centralized, and that the supply route to Libya, via Rome and Naples, had room for improvement.

On 10 March, another conference with von Brauchitsch was held in which General Heusinger noted that Rommel had been instructed not to advance his front too far ahead before the arrival of 5. lei. Div., and sufficient Italian forces.

On 12 March, the following offensive options were set out for North Africa by the Generalquartiermeister (Quartermaster General), Gen. Wagner[5]:

a) Mounting a major offensive from Agedabia with the main thrust on Tobruk.

b) Starting several minor offensives in sectors along the coast.

Wagner assessed that the first option would require four supply column battalions in addition to the four already in Libya, while the second option was possible with the four that were already sent, but would lead to a loss of time and lower striking power. A memorandum to OKW was requested. This needs to be seen in the context that the Afrikakorps already had substantially better supply capacity than the Army Groups tasked for Operation Barbarossa, far in excess of the divisional slices allocated to these.[6]

0025 Lage NA 30 Apr 1942

German Map of North African Theatre, showing situation on 30 April 1942. Collection.

On 14 March Halder notes that there were difficulties with the Italian commander in North Africa, General Graziani, who was soon to be relieved by General Gariboldi. Also, a report was made by Oberquartiermeister IV[7], which estimated that fifteen British divisions, including two armoured, were in North Africa, of which four to eight, including the armoured divisions, were in Libya. This was a considerable over estimate of the British forces then available, and also did not seem to consider the demand of the Greek expedition.

On 17 March a general staff conference was held with Hitler, where he agreed to a forward shift of the defensive line in North Africa, and that preparations should be made to allow an offensive once a favorable force balance had been attained. He did however decline the sending of further troops, as well as the conduct of a landing operation in Tunisia, which had been the wish of the Italians.

On 20 March Rommel presented his plans to the OKH in person, on his overall impression of the situation, the operational situation, and what was possible in terms of operations with the forces available. The two leaders of the supply department of the German Army, the Oberquartiermeister I and the Generalquartiermeister, then conferred with Rommel, and he was tasked to present an estimate of what could be achieved with the available forces prior to the onset of the hot season.

According to Halder, the assessment by Rommel was that the British were passive, and focused on defense, treating the area around Agedabia as no-man’s land. It was expected that their defense would focus on the Jebel Akhdar area to the north of Cyrenaica. This was considered to eliminate the possibility of an attack on Tobruk via Msus, on the direct line through the desert, until the British forces in the Jebel were beaten. This was a task the Afrikakorps was not considered to be capable of at this stage, and consideration was instead given to occupying the area around Agedabia, and to prepare for a drive on Tobruk in fall 1941.

In the afternoon of the same day Paulus reported back to Halder on his meeting with Rommel, in line with the situation as set out above. This discussion led to the issuance of an order from von Brauchitsch to Rommel, as below. It sets out the tasks of the Afrikakorps. These are to work with the Italians to ensure the defense of Tripolitania, and to prepare for offensive operations to recapture Cyrenaica. The first step for this was to take the area around Agedabia, after the arrival of the whole of 15. Panzerdivision in the middle of May 1941. A further advance on Tobruk was then dependent on whether the battle of Agedabia would lead to a decisive defeat of the British armoured forces. 

Screen Shot 2020 03 30 at 4 21 16 PM

ObdH Order to Rommel, 21 March 1941. NARA T-78 R324

Rommel in the Rommel Papers recalls from the meeting that he was not happy at what he saw as efforts by von Brauchitsch and Halder to keep down the numbers of troops sent to Africa, since this in his view left the future of the campaign there to chance. He also considered that the in his view momentary British weakness in North Africa should have been exploited energetically, in order to gain the initiative once and for all for ourselves.

Following this visit by Rommel, there is little consideration for North Africa in the war diary of Halder, since the rapidly escalating situation in Yugoslavia and the Greece demanded the full attention of the OKH until the end of April. Thus Libya took a backseat, other than an observation by Gen. Wagner, based on the report by one of his officers, on 1 April that Rommel showed no interest in supply, and that supply vehicles remained idle in Naples, rather than being shipped.

On 3 April then the report arrived in Berlin that Agedabia has been taken. This brought North Africa back up the agenda, and it lead to a direct order from Hitler through the Armed Forces High Command channel (the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – OKW) that first congratulated the Afrikakorps, but then made it clear that there was no room for recklessness, no Italian reinforcements could be expected, and Luftwaffe assets were soon to be withdrawn for the campaign in the Balkans. Any further advance was only authorized if it was clear that Empire tank forces had been withdrawn. For some reason, this order was interpreted by Rommel as giving him “complete freedom of action” (see the war diary entry at this link and also The Rommel Papers).

On the same day, Rommel writes to his wife (emphasis by me):

We’ve been attacking since the 31st with dazzling success. There’ll be consternation amongst our masters in Tripoli and Rome, perhaps in Berlin too. I took the risk against all orders and instructions because the opportunity seemed favourable. No doubt it will all be pronounced good later and they’ll all say they’d have done exactly the same in my place. We’ve already reached our first objective, which we weren’t supposed tc get to until the end of May. The British are falling over each other to get away. Our casualties small.[…]

On 11 April, Halder notes Wagner’s comment that Rommel was now making “preposterous” demands that could only be satisfied as long as the preparations for Barbarossa were not affected.

On 13 April, Halder notes that Hitler was considering adding a motorised infantry regiment to North Africa, which had previously been refused by the OKH, on the following grounds:

a) Matter had been considered for a long time

b) No spare troops considering need for task Barbarossa

c) No shipping available until May when all units of 15. Panzer had reached North Africa.

d) Impracticable given lack of transport and fuel.

e) Lack of air support made embarking on large-scale operations unwise.

f) Getting closer to Egypt, British resistance would stiffen.

On the same day Paulus received a “colossal request” from Rommel via the liaison office in Rome, but again notes that Barbarossa has precedence.

On 14 April, two days after he has been heavily defeated at Tobruk in the Easter Battle, Rommel makes a formal request to advance to the Suez Canal, which Göring is willing to support. A discussion between Halder and Jodl (OKW) notes that this is only possible as a raid, since there were neither troops nor supply facilities available to hold Suez. Hitler then makes the final decision that the prime objective is to establish a frontline along the border from Sollum to Siwa Oasis inclusive, and apart from that only raids were to be conducted.

On 15 April, von Brauchitsch is looking for ways to support Rommel, by adding German submarines and sending the airborne division to North Africa. Halder disagrees, noting that submarines should be Italian, and also that once in North Africa, the airborne troops would be footboard. On the same day, a report from Rommel arrives, admitting that he is in trouble, and that he now requires support from two Italian divisions to shore up his position. Halder gleefully notes that “at last he is constrained to state that this forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take advantage of the “unique opportunities” afforded to him by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for some time over here.”

The next day, 16 April, Gen. Wagner, following a discussion with Halder, makes reinforcements available to the Afrikakorps, to address the crisis situation. These consist of four infantry battalions, the Engineer Training Battalion (Pionierlehrbatallion, renamed Pionierbatallion 900 z.b.V.) equipped as an assault engineer battalion, and two coastal artillery battalions, H.K.A.A. 523 and H.K.A.A. 533, equipped with the powerful French 15cm GPF guns captured in 1940. Wagner noted that day that a crisis point had been reached, although not at Tobruk but at Sollum, and that this was expected to last for about 10 days, by when 15. Panzer should arrive. Wagner expected a high likelihood of Rommel being beaten at Sollum. The OKH leadership agreed that nothing could be done about this.

That same day a telegram from Rommel arrived reporting increasing pressure at Bardia, and a telegram went out to him telling him that he was on his own for the time being. Nevertheless, the transport of men to North Africa was accelerated, and on 27 April, a wave of 46 airplanes landed one rifle battalion and two rifle companies of 15. Panzer. These air transports, while not considered satisfactory, since the men would lack any equipment other than small arms, was to continue the next day.

On 5 May, Kapitän zur See Loyke reported from Libya with the insight that as long as Malta was held by the British, no offensive east was possible for Rommel.

Screen Shot 2020 03 30 at 3 39 37 PM


Halder War Diary Entry, 23 April 1941, famous for calling Rommel ‘this soldier gone stark mad, and rather belying Rommels expectation in his letter of 3 April that all would be pronounced good.


A Counterfactual Approach

Modern historiography has not been kind about Rommel’s rash advance in defiance of orders from Berlin, and the general view today is that Rommel was out of his depth and never really got to grips with the logistical challenges his theatre forced him to confront. This is discussed in detail in the official German History, Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg Vol. IV. which considers this advance the original sin that ultimately made victory in North Africa less likely, since it put the Axis forces into a logistically impossible situation from which they never recovered. The critical failure was that the advance failed to achieve a decisive outcome when the assaults on Tobruk in April and May failed. It is hard to disagree with this view, once one reads the Panzergruppe war diary appendices, which are a long story of supply concerns through all of 1941.

My view is that modern historiography is correct, and that the move towards the east and the conquest of Cyrenaica and Marmarica did fatally damage the ability of the Axis to sustain its campaign in North Africa. The terrain gained was worthless without Tobruk and while the losses inflicted were heavy, they were far from fatal, and both tanks and men could be replaced on the Empire side, while the drain on the Axis supply chain was permanent.


The Counterfactual Consideration

There are a few instances in the campaign in North Africa that warrant an analysis of the counterfactual, and this is one of them. What could have happened, had the advance not taken place and Rommel had stuck to the plan and his orders of 21 March? This article will provide some thoughts on the matter, based on the following assumptions:

1) The campaigns in Yugoslavia, Greece, Syria, Iraq and Abyssinia proceed unchanged.

2) There is no change to the speed of the force build-up.

3) There is no change to the force allocations on both sides.

4) The strength of the tank force on both sides is the decisive factor in the timing and outcome of any major operation.

5) Light tanks such as the Italian L3 series, the German Panzer I, and the British Vickers Mk. VI are irrelevant to combat operations.

6) Only raids are undertaken by both sides, and neither is trying to advance in strength with the intent to hold territory; any tank losses from these raids are temporary or replaced.

6) The exact numbers of the tanks available on each side don’t matter as much as long as the ball park estimate is correct. In particular for the Empire side, getting to the right numbers is very difficult, as they did not know themselves how many tanks they had available for much of the first half of 1941.

7) Both sides have logistical challenges that prevent them from concentrating fully on North Africa until the end of June 1941, in the form of other active campaigns in the Middle East, the Balkans and Greece, and East Africa. These effects cancel each other out.

Taking the above, the counterfactual will therefore focus on the tank balance, and consider when an ideal moment for battle would have come for the Axis. It is understood that this is simplistic, but it is also considered helpful to focus on the decisive element.


The North African Tank Balance to Autumn 1941

First, without the Axis advance taking place, the forces facing each other in Cyrenaica are reasonably well balanced at the end of March and early April. Including some replacements for ten tanks lost in the fire on the SS Leverkusen, by mid-April the Axis can field 75 Panzer III, 20 Panzer IV, 45 Panzer II, and 32 Panzerjaeger I, and two battalions of Italian M13/41 medium tanks, with about 100 M13/40 tanks between them. This is a total of 272 combat capable vehicles, facing 112 British cruisers[8], 60 captured Italian M tanks, and 40 I tanks, for a total of 212 tanks, of varying reliability. It is clear that this force balance does not allow the Empire forces to consider a successful offensive, and that they need to await a substantial force build-up. As the historical record shows, the balance did allow the Axis a successful, but not a decisive campaign.



By early May, the Axis will receive the full force of Panzerregiment 8 as well as the other divisional units of 15. Panzerdivision in the operational zone, with the last of the tanks reaching Tripoli in the first days of May. The Axis tank force now numbers 91 Panzer II, 153 Panzer III, and 40 Panzer IV, as well as 32 Panzerjaeger I and the 100 Italian Mediums, for a total of 416 main combat vehicles. 

At the same time, the Empire forces also receive reinforcements by tanks being returned from workshops, and the Tiger convoy arriving in mid-May shortly after, which enabled operation BATTLEAXE to proceed. On 7 May, prior to the arrival of the Tiger convoy, the Empire tank force, assuming the April battles did not take place, numbers 115 cruisers, 59 I-tanks, and 60 captured Italian M tanks, for a total of 234 vehicles, meaning that the Axis now has a substantial, almost 2:1 superiority in tanks fielded in North Africa. Furthermore, the Empire tank force relies still on tanks with high mileage, and a large number of captured tanks of dubious combat value.

By the end of June the picture does change, turning against the Axis. While the Italian tank force is reinforced by another battalion, bringing the total to 138 M13/40 tanks, no more German tanks are received  and the Axis total rises only slightly to 454. The main additions to the Axis are now infantry formations and heavy artillery, sent in response to the failure at Tobruk. On the Empire side, further returns from workshops as well as convoy arrivals, especially the Tiger convoy, add large numbers of cruiser tanks, bringing the total to 303 available[9], and the number of I-tanks rises to 201, to bring the total to 563 tanks if we continue to include the 60 captured Italian tanks. Still in this case, over half of the Empire margin of superiority of 109 tanks is accounted for by the captured Italian tanks, and as noted it is unlikely these would have had much value in battle, given the situation with spares and ammunition. Again, in my view this makes any major Empire offensive before the end of June unlikely, and a successful one practically impossible. This is before considering the pressures of having to deal with the desaster in Greece, the campaigns in Syria and Iraq, and the need to eliminate the remaining Italian resistance in East Africa.

The tank balance only shifts decisively later in the summer, with the arrival of the WS9a and b convoys, and most importantly the arrival of the first M3 Stuart tanks directly from the US (detailed at this link). By September, there are 100 operational M3s in theatre, and 298 British cruisers[10], together with 298 I-tanks[11], and most importantly crews and support units had time to familiarise themselves with the new vehicle. Assuming the captured Italian tanks are now retired, the Empire tank force now numbers almost 700 vehicles, giving the Middle East Command a substantial tank margin, with which to plan and execute a substantial attack would be possible, for the first time. This would become Operation CRUSADER in the original time line.


The SS ATHLONE CASTLE transporting troops. Convoy WS19 (IWM A10610)[12]

Other considerations

Both sides benefit and suffer from the Axis not advancing to the Egyptian border. The Empire forces continue to hold Benghazi and the airfields of northern Cyrenaica, forcing Italian convoys to take the westerly route via Tunisia, where they can more easily be intercepted. They do not need to supply a besieged Tobruk, and they do not suffer the substantial distraction of an Axis force on the border during the rout in Greece and Crete. It is however unlikely that the RAF could have done much to protect the forward area and the port of Benghazi during this period, given its commitment to and losses in Greece. 

On the downside therefore, Benghazi is exposed to air attack, making it an unsatisfactory port for building up an army level offensive. It needs to be kept in mind that the supply of Tobruk worked because it was for an overstrength division that was not expected to be mobile. So while the pressure on naval assets is reduced, the Empire coastal convoys are now taking a more exposed and longer route to Benghazi, and need to deliver substantially more supplies. 

Given the above, it is likely that overland supply would have been key to building up for an offensive and keeping the force in western Cyrenaica supplied. The overland route from Tobruk, which would have been the safest harbour, to Mechili and west of it is hundreds of miles. Apart from the lack of tanks, the need for trucks to cover this adds substantially to the supply difficulties for a further advance. Even to support a Brigade-size forces that far west of the railhead was estimated to have taken 2,000 trucks shuttling back and forth (see this earlier entry on the planning for the BENCOL advance during CRUSADER, at this link). I consider it likely that the Egyptian railway would have been extended to Tobruk in this scenario, at least easing the supply concerns by reducing the dependence on shipping. Overall this adds to the pressure on the RAF, which is at the same time heavily committed in Greece and which poses a significant challenge to building up and maintaining a large force forward of Tobruk.

On the Axis side, conversely, the supply situation is substantially eased. The distances over which supplies are carried are much shorter, coastal convoying is possible to Sirt, and a very good main road is available. It is thus likely that the building up of supplies can be accelerated considerably.

In terms of operational opportunities, the relatively open terrain south of Agedabia allows deep raids into the Empire rear that are hard to defend against. Vehicles and men can be trained thus, while not using them up too much. The Sommernachtstraum raid of 14/15 September is an example of what would have been possible. An outflanking move into the desert, a quick hit on the Empire rear, chaos, confusion, and then retreat behind the Marada – Agheila line.

In terms of defense, the position from Marada north is relatively strong, and harder to flank due to the presence of salt marshes. An attack in the centre is possible, but would channel the attacking force considerably and expose it to hits from the north and south, similar to what happened to 22 Armoured Brigade at the end of December 1941 at Wadi el Faregh (see this link). A defense in depth, with infantry in the line, and tank forces to the rear to back them up, would have the potential to savage any attacker.

Bundesarchiv Bild 101I 783 0150 28 Nordafrika Panzer III

Nordafrika.- Panzer III bei Fahrt durch die Wüste, im Hintergrund brennender Lastkraftwagen (LKW); (Panzer III on march through desert, in the back burning truck) PK “Afrika” April 1941 (BAMA via Wikipedia)


The Empire forces were in no position to attack at Agheila or Marada prior to the end of June, simply based on tank numbers, before even getting into considerations of supply, where the need to build up substantial supplies to support not just the initial attack but an advance on Tripoli, several hundred kilometers to the west, would have taken time. From early May to the end of June the Axis tank forces and supply position would have been far superior to that of the Empire forces, inviting an attack by the Axis. No large scale operations were considered possible in the hot season from July to September.

If Rommel had waited and stuck to his orders as issued on 21 March, he would have kept the initiative until the beginning of summer at least, and would have been able to choose where and how to attack. The Axis force build-up was considerably faster than that of the Empire forces during this period, and shortening the supply lines by hundreds of kilometers, as well as not wasting precious fuel and ammunition as well as spares on the initial advance in April and the failed attempts at Tobruk would have given the Axis ample reserves to conduct a successful offensive. 

An Axis attack out of the Agheila – Marada position before the end of May, with the full force of three armored divisions and substantial logistical preparation, and a substantial superiority in tanks would have promised much greater success than the lightweight attack at the end of March, and could easily have carried the Axis forces through into Egypt. This could have been planned to co-incide with the invasion of Crete, thus forcing the Empire to look into two vastly different directions at once. The planning in Berlin for an attack in mid-May was therefore clearly the right approach, since it would have maximized tank superiority, even though this was not known to the OKH planners.

Moving from a raid towards Agedabia to the full blown conquest of Cyrenaica and Marmarica in early April was was therefore a missed opportunity, lost due to the impatience and insubordination of Rommel.

Bundesarchiv Bild 101I 782 0009 01A Nordafrika Panzer III

Nordafrika.- Kolonne von Panzer III passieren großes Tor, (Column of Panzer III pass large gate (Arco dei Fileni)) März-Mai 1941; PK Prop.Zg. Afrika (BAMA via Wikimedia)

Featured Image: Nordafrika.- Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel im leichten Schützenpanzer Sd.Kfz. 250/3 “Greif” (Field Marshal Rommel in the light armoured personnel carrier ‘Griffon’); PK “Afrika” (BAMA via Wikimedia).


[1] This is based on Halder’s war diary.

[2] General Paulus, later commander of 6th Army at Stalingrad.

[3] Heusinger survived the war, and became one of the fathers of the Bundeswehr.

[4] Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was the commander of the German Army (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres). He was sacked by Hitler in December 1941, and survived the war.

[5] General Wagner, respectively later one of the co-conspirators of 20 July 1944. He committed suicide rather than letting himself be arrested. 

[7] Also of interest is an overview of transport capacity allocated to army groups and theatres on 26 April. It notes that North Africa had 2,190 tons of transport capacity, compared to e.g. 25,020 tons for Army Group Centre. In North Africa, this had to sustain 2.5 German divisions, once 15. Panzer arrived. In Army Group centre, it had to sustain 42.5 German divisions.So for about 17 times as many divisions, Army Group Centre had only 11.4 times the transport capacity, or 50% more. This likely understates the advantage given to North Africa, which had a smaller division (5. lei.), and a smaller slice of army troops.

[7] The Deputy Chief of Intelligence, General Gerhard Matzky. Under him were two departments, Foreign Armies East, and Foreign Armies West. 

[8] This is assuming the 72 tanks lost by 2 Armoured Brigade during Rommel’s advance, together with the 60 captured Italian tanks which were also lost, remain present.

[9] Assuming the five tanks lost during BREVITY remain on strength as well.

[10] Assuming the 30 cruisers lost in BATTLEAXE remain on strength.

[11] Assuming the 98 I-tanks lost in BATTLEAXE remain on strength.

[12] SS Athlone Castle was a regular on the WS route and participated also in WS9b.


  • Bechthold, M. Flying to Victory
  • Halder, War Diary
  • Munro, A. The Winston Specials.
  • Parri, M. Storia dei Carristi 
  • Rommel, E. The Rommel Papers
  • Rommel’s Riposte: NARA Loading lists for German convoys to North Africa. See this post.
  • Rommel’s Riposte: Equipping a New Army
  • Schreiber & Stegmann Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg Bd. 3
  • UK TNA CAB120/253 for Empire tank numbers.
  • US National Archives, Captured Documents Section, T-78 R-324, Sonnenblume OKH files.
Equipping a new army – M3 Stuart Tank Deliveries up to CRUSADER

Equipping a new army – M3 Stuart Tank Deliveries up to CRUSADER

Operation CRUSADER saw the first use of an American-designed tank in battle, the M3 Stuart tank[1]. I have written about the experience with this tank in prior posts, at this link, and this link. This short article provides an insight into the building up of 4 Armoured Brigade as a fighting formation with the new US-built tanks.

Background – Design and Delivery of the M3 Stuart

In terms of overall design, the M3 Stuart was a very fast tank, compact, if with a slightly high profile, and had relatively weak armour, compared to other contemporary tanks[2]. A major drawback was the short range of the very thirsty aero engines which drove it. The Stuart would continue to serve until the end of the war as both a frontline tank in a reconnaissance role, and in various support versions, including as an armoured personnel carrier. In 1941 the M3 was considered a cruiser tank by the British army, designed for mobile warfare. The tank was equipped with an M5 37mm gun, a reasonably well-designed piece for its calibre. It was about equal to the British 2-pdr gun[3], but the US tanks had been provided with HE shell and possibly also cannister anti-personnel rounds in addition to the AP shot, and thus had additional capabilities compared to the British tanks which relied on their Besa machine guns for infantry/anti-tank gun defense.

The first production version of the M3 Stuart was ready in March 1941, and from July to the end of October 1941, over 300 M3 Stuarts, including four predecessor M2 models, had arrived in Egypt under the lend-lease arrangements between the UK and the US. Four convoys had come directly from the United States between July and October, bringing 36, 69, 52, and 154 M3 tanks respectively, including the four M2A4 light tanks in the first, and also two M3 Medium Grant or Lee in the last. By the end of October, other than the 188 tanks issued to 4 Armoured Brigade, 90 M3 tanks were with ‘B.O.W.’ ‘Board of Ordnance Works’, i.e. undergoing modifications at central workshops in the Nile Delta region. Most of these were probably tanks that had come off the October convoy being made fit for the desert. Four more M3 tanks were held with 4 Hussars in the Delta, used for training crews[4], and 16 with school/training units, for a total of 315 tanks[5].


R.T.R. tank crews being introduced to the new American M3 Stuart tank at a training depot in Egypt, 17 August 1941. Note the Matilda in the background and the A9 Cruiser in the foreground, still sporting a machine gun in the secondary turret. IWM Collection E3438E.

4 Armoured Brigade Converts

As part of 30 Corps’ 7 Armoured Division, 4 Armoured Brigade at the start of Operation CRUSADER fought exclusively in the M3 Stuart. Substantial desert testing had occurred over the summer, leading to some modifications to the vehicles. Training on the new tanks continued throughout the summer, while the regiments were brought up to strength in other articles, such as trucks, and absorbed replacements.  Overall the crews considered the tank a good, very reliable machine, earning it the nickname ‘Honey’, and the experience with the tank in Operation CRUSADER seemed to bear that out. 

Bringing 4 Armoured Brigade to operational readiness in the space of four months from July to October 1941 was a remarkably fast build-up by all standards, since it included the rapid conversion from British to US cruiser tanks for the three regiments to which the M3s were issued, 3 and 5 R.T.R.[6] and the 8 Hussars. The fact that all three regiments had been in operations since the beginning of the war against Italy in 1940 almost certainly helped with the speed of the conversion. The pictures below show 8 Hussars putting their new mounts through their paces.

Hussars august

The 8th Hussars testing their new American M3 Stuart tanks in the Western Desert, 28 August 1941. (IWM Collections E5065)


The 8th Hussars testing their new American M3 Stuart tanks in the Western Desert, 28 August 1941. This picture nicely shows the attached kit, including the .30 Browning anti-aircraft MG, and the US tank helmets worn by the crew. The officer signaling is probably a commander. Flag signals were widely used – one advantage being that they could not be intercepted. (IWM Collections E5085)

Running Short of Tanks

Despite the undoubted qualities of the M3 Stuart, combat experience quickly showed the need to provide for substantial reserves of both tanks, but also ammunition, a particular challenge when the ammunition used in a tank is not the same standard as that used on all the other tanks in an army. Thus, while the availability of 188 tanks for a 156-tank Armoured Brigade may seem a generous number of tanks, at the end of the first two days of battling Panzerregiment 5 on 19/20 November 1941, 4 Armoured Brigade had completely utilized the Brigade’s M3 Stuart tank reserve of 30 tanks and had also experienced very heavy ammunition expenditure[7]. This prompted a set of phone conversations given below.



Record of telephone conversation with Lt-Col BELCHEM, G1, S.D. HQ Eighth Army, at 2300 hrs, 20 November 1941

Eighth Army require as many M3 American tanks as possible on top priority. That is to say, this type of tank is required more urgently than other types, as the reserve held by Eighth Army is all gone.

Eighth Army require to be informed how many M3 American tanks can be sent as a result of this request and when they may be expected.

Further stocks of ammunition for the weapons mounted in M3 American tanks are urgently wanted. It was understood that this request referred to 37mm rather than .300”. Lt-Col Belchem said that a quantity of this ammunition was being held at Alexandria for onward despatch, and that if this reserve was already on its way forward well and good; if not he recommended that as large a quantity as possible should be flown up. 

The above demands have already been referred to the D.D.S.D.[8]

The following day, the rather scarce transport plane capacity of Middle East Command was put at 8 Army’s disposal to service this request, and the Bristol Bombays of No. 215 Squadron flew ten tons of ammunition up to L.G. 122 for 4 Armoured Brigade, ‘at short notice’ as the RAF report noted.

Two days later, on 22 November another phone conversation, this time between Brigadier Galloway, the B.G.S.[9] of 8 Army, and Lt.Col. Jennings, discussed the matter of American tanks.

6. They require every American tank we can send up as well as every reinforcement capable of driving the American tank. (Note – Suggest we should examine whether the ammunition situation warrants our sending up many tanks. I understand that ammunition for< American tanks is becoming exhausted.)

Following this, on 24 November, Lt.Col. Jennings noted for the war diary the following:

2. Forty American M3 tanks now en cas mobile are to be ordered forward immediately. DAFV[10] is to arrange 40 drivers from 4 Hussars for ferrying them ahead of R.H.[11]


The featured picture shows an M3 being hoisted out of a ship onto the quayside at Alexandria, 19 July 1941. IWM Collection E4310

[1] Nicknamed ‘Honey’ by the crews because of the smooth and untroubled ride they provided. The nickname is sometimes used in war diaries and reports.

[2] In fairness though, given the overall combination of weight, size, gun equipment, and armour, Stuart’s may have had one of the best gun/armour/weight combinations in the Western Desert at this stage.  Older German Panzer IIIG models without uparmouring could not compete. The more recent H version or the uparmoured G were better however, at least over the frontal arc.

[3] A 40mm gun with reasonable performance in 1940, but rapidly approaching obsolescence. Unlike the M3 Stuart’s 37mm M3 gun, no HE rounds were provided to British tanks with the 2-pdr at this stage of the war.

[4] The regiment was used to train replacement crews and to act as T.D.S. (Tank Delivery Squadron), whence fighting regiments could draw new crews and tanks ready for battle.

[5] WO169/952, 11 November 1941 tank statement – note that this is one more than the 314 M2/M3 that came off the convoys

[6] Royal Tank Regiment

[7] An officer in 5 R.T.R. claimed that on 20 November the tanks of A Squadron 5 R.T.R. went through 250 rounds of 37mm ammunition each. If the number is correct, this would equal more than two complete loads, and be almost equal to the whole supply per tank that was available in North Africa at the time, 260 rounds according to Niall Barr in ‘Yanks and Limeys’

[8] Deputy Director Supply Department (or Division)

[9] Brigadier General Staff – essentially the Chief of Staff. Brigadier Galloway of the Cameronians was a well-regarded staff officer, who rose to command 1 Armoured Division in 1943, although illness meant he never led it in battle.

[10] Director, Armoured Fighting Vehicles

[11] Railhead

War Pictorial News 26

The IWM holds the newsreels. No sound, but in a way that’s not so unfortunate if you know what you’re looking at, because it takes away the pathos and the received pronounciation.

This one shows quite a few interesting things. ‘Bush’ artillery (captured Italian guns) being fired; a quite comprehensively destroyed Panzer IV; the bombed out wreck of the Italian navy’s obsolete armoured cruiser San Giorgio, amongst others.

Well worth your time!

Wochschau footage from Crusader

Wochschau footage from Crusader

The Wochenschau was the weekly propaganda news reel of the 3rd Reich. As a boy I watched it’s re-runs, mesmerised. They ran every evening on regional TV stations.

The linked episode has North African footage from minute 24 onwards, including a Stuka divebombing attack, a short episode on female Red Cross nurses in a field hospital, and a fighter battle with Me 109s taking apart some Hurricanes.

Please keep in mind that this was propaganda aimed to manipulate as well as inform. The segments would be cleverly cut, and the messaging adjusted to suit a criminal regime and support a criminal cause.

German tank flag signals

This document is from the war diary of the H.Q. of 7 Armoured Division, December 1941. It’s the first time I have seen this, and it is unusual in that it is in colour. Very few documents are. Signalling in a tank battle was of course a challenge with the means of communication available in 1941, and so even though German tanks were equipped with radio sets, these were not always reliable due to atmospheric conditions, they could be jammed (something the Empire forces attempted through the use of some specially equipped Vickers Wellingtons during CRUSADER), and networks could be overloaded. Flags were therefore a low-tech fallback, but of course suffered from their own issues – difficult to use in failing light, impossible in the dark, and affected by ground conditions, e.g. when lots of dust was thrown up.

Usual health warning applies: this is a wartime document based on intelligence assessments. It may well be wrong, and the Germans only had flags in their tanks so they could engage in a Maibaumtanz.

German Flags

Video: Inside the Chieftain’s Hatch – the A10 Cruiser

For the armourati, here is one of the Chieftain’s tank videos, this one featuring the A10 cruiser, which operated in CRUSADER with 7 Armoured Brigade’s 7 Hussars, part of 7 Armoured Brigade, 7 Armoured Division, and 1 R.T.R., 32 Army Tank Brigade, Tobruk Fortress. Some also served as HQ tanks.

The A10 were remnant tanks which had been delivered to Egypt quite a while before the operation, and were not considered up to current standards anymore. They went into action because of a lack of numbers. Their deficiency in every material aspect is demonstrated by the fact that the one squadron operating with 7 Hussars was lifted to the jumping off position on D-1 on transporters, while the A13 and A15 went on tracks. Moreover, the A10 was too slow to bring German tanks to battle, which means that they (being also outgunned) could not serve a conceivable purpose on the battlefield.

Episode I:

Episode II: