Background
After the failure of the attack on Tobruk on 1 May 1941, Rommel was paid a visit by General Paulus, Chief Quartermaster and the German army high command (OKH), who had the permission to relieve Rommel of his command. He did not do so, but instructed the D.A.K. to construct a line of fortifications leading south-west from Sollum into the open desert, to protect the otherwise exposed southern flank of the Bardia-Sollum sector, and thereby force any advance by the Allied forces out into the open space far to the south-east of Tobruk. This would serve to complicate any advance into the Axis siege position, increasing the logistical challenge of doing so, and providing the Axis command with ample warning. It worked, and the turning movement it forced on any Allied advance was almost certainly instrumental in leading to the failure of Operation BATTLEAXE in mid-June 1941.
German map of movements on 22 November 1941, showing the line of strong-points. Green are Italian positions, blue are German positions, red are Allied forces. Panzergruppe Afrika.
The problem posed by these positions was recognized, and 13 Corps under Lt.Gen. Godwin-Austen was given the task of reducing/masking them. The New Zealand Division was placed in the north, and it quickly took Capuzzo and the escarpment above Sollum, thus driving a wedge into the Axis border position, while 7 Indian Brigade was placed in the south with the task of attacking the positions from the west. The threat posed by this was noted by Rommel, and on 19 November he instructed Kampfgruppe Stephan (reinforced Panzerregiment 5) to deal with it after defeating the tanks of 4 Armoured Brigade at Gabr Saleh, straight to the west. The stand of 8 Hussars, which stopped Stephan in his tracks, prevented this attack, and another attempt, this time including Panzerregiment 8, failed on 20 November.
Thus left unmolested by the German tanks, on 22 November 1941, 7 Indian Brigade began its campaign to reduce the fortified southern line of the Bardia/Halfaya sector, with the support of the Matilda infantry tanks from 42 and 44 R.T.R. The initial attack was carried out against what the British referred to as Sidi Omar Nuovo, the western part of the Sidi Omar position. Two infantry battalions were used, 1 Royal Sussex and 4/16 Punjab Regiment, supported by a mixed battalion of 1 Army Tank Brigade, comprising two companies of Matilda II infantry tanks from 42 R.T.R. and one from 44 R.T.R.
Attack plan and execution on 22 November. War diary, 44 R.T.R.
The Axis defensive arrangements of the position were formidable, in strongpoints Cova (east) and Frongia (west), named after Italian officers who had died in combat in North Africa. It contained three battalions of the Savona Infantry Division, First and Third battalion of Infantry Regiment 16 and Third battalion of Infantry Regiment 15, as well as two companies of German Oasenbatallion z.b.V. 300, infantry units purposefully designed for combat in North Africa, with heavy firepower. These infantry forces were supported by no less than eight heavy 88mm AA guns from Flakregiment 18, reinforced by another six 75mm Italian heavy AA guns. These guns could be used in a dual role, engaging both planes and tanks.
Axis defense arrangements, 16 September 1941. Panzergruppe Afrika.
Faced with these defenses, the attack of 7 Indian Infantry Brigade, conducted over pretty open desert ground into a well-fortified and heavily mined position, suffered great losses. 1 Royal Sussex had 43 killed in action or died of wounds and another 73 men wounded. This is probably not far off a 20% casualty rate. Similarly, tank losses on the minefields and due to fire from heavy anti-air guns (both German 88s and Italian 75s) used in a dual role were crippling to the two British tank battalions that contributed to the attack. The operation was considered important enough to be turned into an Information Bulletin by the US Army, which was issued on 15 April 1942 (see Further Reading below).
Two pictures from the newspaper article, from 1 Royal Sussex War Diary.
News Clipping
In the war diary file of 1 Royal Sussex Regiment, the British infantry battalion in 7 Indian Brigade, a news report from an official Indian Army Observer is held, describing the attack of the battalion. Tom O’Brien was kind enough to transcribe it and let me use it.
Passed by Military Censor 27.11.41.
With the compliments of
INDIAN ARMY PUBLIC RELATIONS
BATTLE IN LIBYA – BRITISH TROOPS’ GALLANTRY.
By an Indian Army Official Observer.
During the last two days of enforced leisure if not peace in SIDI OMAR NUOVO I have been able to gather further details to supplement what I saw myself of the capture of the fortress by an English Southern County Regiment on Friday last. I have also had ample opportunity to study the ground (there is a small piece of slit trench, every stone in the bottom of which I have examined almost microscopically) and the more I think of it I am convinced that even in this tremendous battle this is a feat of arms which will stand out not only in the regimental history but in the story of the campaign as a whole. For the importance of the taking of this immensely strong position is only equalled by the dash and determination with which it was taken.
The attack was put in from North to South through the back door. The tanks were to move to a start line three and a half miles north of SIDI OMAR with the battalion carriers under command. They were to move across the start line twenty minutes before an intensive artillery preparation of ten minutes. The only mistake I made was in saying that the carriers followed the tanks. It was in fact the little Bren carriers which led and the young officer in charge of them, not only brought the monsters up to the first objective in spite of two of his carriers being blown up almost immediately, but then proceeded to lead them on to the second showing the greatest coolness and courage through out. The battalion was to cross the start line in trucks at zero hour and was to debuss some seven hundred yards short of the enemy defences. The plan was to attack two defended localities, A and B, with two Companies each and one Company from the left, two companies were then to go through and take the third objective SIDI OMAR itself, which I must repeat is not a place but the map reference of part of a defensive system. A mortar detachment was to move in carriers in close support of each inner flank Company and an anti-tank troop in the rear of both columns. As the battalion got ready in the assembly area the carriers and tanks could be seen going forward under heavy shell fire and I have already described how we got a full ration ourselves round Brigade Headquarters, a few hundred yards behind the start line. Nevertheless, when the battalion moved up on to the line at 1147 every man was in good heart and high spirits and cheered the Brigadier when he came up to see them off and wish them good luck. In actual fact they debussed only four hundred yards short of the enemy and crossed the line ten minutes after noon. Unfortunately there was an unlocated minefield about eighty feet deep on the line of the advance and although some tanks managed to get through several were blown up. Despite this and the fact that two company Commanders leading the columns were killed and a third wounded, the men, seventy per cent of whom come from the County whose name the Regiment bears, went forward unhesitatingly at times in front of the tanks and no storm troops in the world could have pressed on with greater dash. There was for example a Corporal who continued to lead his section although he had been several times wounded and when too weak from loss of blood to stand, gave covering fire with his Bren gun until an enemy machine-gun post had been silenced. There was an officer,
a Platoon Commander, who hit in both knees, staggered to his feet and went on until he was shot through the head within fifteen yards of the enemy. The men on either side of him were also killed but the trenches ahead were captured by the rest of the platoon. There was a Gunner Major who came up with the battalion Commander instead of sending an F.O.O. and was seen leading Infantry to the attack waving his cap and shouting them on. There was a Private, a number one Bren gunner, who kept his gun in action in spite of the fact that the previous number one had just been killed and that the slightest movement brought down heavy and accurate fire from Heavy and Light Bredas. There was a Corporal in charge of stretcher bearers of a Company, held up on a ridge. He continually exposed himself tending the wounded and when two men were hit by a mortar bomb immediately went forward to their assistance in an area in which the enemy had dropped approximately thirty large mortar bombs. There was a Company Commander who when his company was held up and an attempt to outflank the enemy had failed calmly walked back amidst a hail of bullets found a tank and led it up on foot to deal with the opposition. These are only a few of the stories of individual courage and coolness and as always there were many acts of gallantry which passed unnoticed in the heat of the action. Strong point by strong point the position was cleared with the aid of single tanks and by 2.20, that is to say in just over two hours objective A on the left had been captured while objective B on the right and C in the centre but further on were half taken. At this time only fourteen men of this Company remained unwounded. The position now held by three companies was an isolated hill behind which were some 300 of the enemy with heavy mortars, anti tank guns and machine guns who sere still offering a determined resistance. With the aid of a tank and a three inch mortar rushed up in a carrier this pocket was cleared by 3.30. The number of prisoners taken was 300 and the number of the party which took them was thirty! On the right in front of C Company the enemy continued sniping but a light tank was despatched and this tank and the remaining 14 of the Company rounded up another 300. By darkness the whole of the fortress was in our hands. Fortunately the casualties had not proved nearly as heavy as was at first feared but tragic though it was to work round in the twilight and count our dead it was inspiring to see that every man had died with his face to the enemy and that most of them had died within a few yards of the enemy trenches. One last story which was told to me by the battalion commander is worth repeating. A wounded Corporal was lying in the open during the advance still under heavy fire. As the Colonel passed he raised himself on his hands and pointed to the silent enemy gun. “See that so and so, Sir” he said “I put that blank out with a couple of bombs”. Today in spite of some further experiences which I hope to report in a further dispatch when they are past history and the shells are no longer zooming overhead as they were when I began to write and are likely to do so at any moment the Battalion is in great heart. “Look out, chum, major road ahead” was the last remark I happened to overhear from the slit trench next to mine as someone roaring along in a captured Italian truck with his head turned to observe a nearby shell burst drove into a large shell crater. The British soldier has not changed much since the last war.
First page of the article in the Parade newspaper, from the war diary of 1 Royal Sussex. The picture with the tanks and vehicles shows the reconnaissance regiment of 4 Indian Division, the Central India Horse, on the approach march for CRUSADER, with tanks of 42 or 44 R.T.R. covering them.
Further Reading
Order of battle, Savona Division
The battle for 1 Army Tank Brigade’s Repairshop
The end of the Halfaya Garrison
Bardia, Halfaya and the 1942 Counteroffensive
Personal Diary Major Ling 44 R.T.R.
8 Hussars against Panzerregiment 5
The performance of the Italian army in North Africa
The Battle of the Omars (Information Bulletin No. 11) on Lone Sentry
The Crusader Project 