Supreme Sacrifice – the loss of HMS Kandahar

Supreme Sacrifice – the loss of HMS Kandahar


HMS Kandahar, a K-class destroyer, was one of two ships lost on the night of 18/19 December 1941, when Force K ran into the Italian ’T’ minefield north of Tripoli, trying to intercept the M.42 convoy from Naples, carrying urgently needed tanks and supplies to Axis forces in North Africa. Having come to the aid of the stricken HMS Neptune, a light cruiser that first hit a mine at 0106 hours on 19 December, HMS Kandahar herself was mined at 0318 hours that same morning. The mine blew off her bow, and she drifted, without power or steering, slowly in an East-South-Easterly direction.

The light cruiser HMS Penelope and the destroyer HMS Jaguar had stayed with the stricken ships. HMS Jaguar then sought out the drifting HMS Kandahar, but it took until the next morning before she found her. The idea was to either attempt to take her in tow or take off survivors. Either was a perilous business, just about 15 miles off the North African coast, and with daylight coming up, but she managed to do this undetected. 

HMS Jaguar dropping depth charges 1940 IWM A868

HMS Jaguar Dropping Depth Charges, 1942. Wikipedia.


The superbly executed rescue work earned her captain, Lieutenant Commander  Lionel Rupert Knyvet Tyrwhitt D.S.C., the Distinguished Service Order, even though he disobeyed the order to return to Malta if he had not found HMS Kandahar by 0300. He found her at 0420 on 20 December 1941 and remained with her until 0620, when she was sunk by HMS Jaguar with a torpedo.

This officer was in command of H.M.S. Jaguar when she came to the assistance of H.M.S. Kandahar.

His instructions were that if he had not found Kandahar by 0300/20 he was to return to Malta. He had not found the ship by this time, but he was so certain that she was in the vicinity that he persevered and made contact at 0420. His ship handling when bringing Jaguar alongside in bad weather conditions was perfect. The weather, however, was too bad and Jaguar was ordered to lie off and pick survivors after Kandahar had abandoned ship, and to leave not later than 0530. Again Lieutenant Commander Tyrwhitt’s ship handling was excellent and expedited the recovery of survivors. Nevertheless this was not completed by 0530, and Jaguar remained till 0620 within 15 miles of the enemy coast until the job was completed.

Lieutenant Commander Tyrwhitt’s perseverance and determination was responsible for the recovery of so many survivors.

Lt.Cdr. Trywhitt died when HMS Jaguar was attacked by German submarine U-652 off Sidi Barrani on 26 March 1942. Two of four torpedoes struck her, setting her on fire and causing her to sink quickly, taking with her almost 200 men including her captain.

Apart from the DSO for the captain, the Admiralty recognized the service and sacrifice of both crews, by awarding a total of two OBEs, two Albert Medals, three British Empire Medals, one Posthumous Mention in Despatches, and six Mention in Despatches.

The two medals that stand out are the Albert Medals. Both were posthumous awards, and they are the highest award for gallantry displayed in saving lives at sea. Admiral Pridham-Wippell then ‘strongly recommended’ the award of the Albert Medal for both ratings.


Vice-Admiral Pridham Wippell, 2 i/c Mediterranean Fleet, May 1942, Alexandria. IWM A8850 

More detail is provided in the letter from the Admiralty to the Home Office, which requested the award of the Albert Medal.

We recommend the Posthumous Award of the Albert Medal to Acting Yeoman of Signals George Patrick McDowell, D/JX.143268 and Leading Seaman Cyril Hambly, D/JX.133146 for gallantry in saving life at sea.

When H.M.S. Jaguar succeeded in finding H.M.S. Kandahar, which had struck a mine and was sinking, the weather too bad for her to be able to take off survivors by going alongside, and she was ordered to lie off and pick up survivors after Kandahar had abandoned ship. Nets were hung over her side to help men who had swam over, or come over on rafts, to climb on board.

Acting Yeoman of Signals George Patrick McDowell, D/JX.143268 and Leading Seaman Cyril Hambly, D/JX.133146 both showed the most self-sacrificing gallantry.

They had swum over to Jaguar, but to climb the side of the ship plunging in the heavy seas was not easy, and though they could have climbed on board themselves, they stayed in the water helping others who could not, until they lost all strength and were drowned.

Both men were young, McDowell only 22, and Hambly 28. The request for an immediate award read as follows.

HMS Nile

This rating lost his life helping other men to board H.M.S. Jaguar.

Having swum over to “Jaguar” instead of heaving himself inboard, McDowell/Hambly stayed in the water helping others up the net until he lost strength and was drowned. 

I consider his conduct deserving of the highest award for gallantry and self sacrifice.

Captain (D) 14th Destroyer Flotilla

14 January 1942

Unfortunately I do not know who the officer signing the recommendation was, he appears to have been the Commander in charge of HMS Nile. Maybe someone can help?


The award was recommended to the King on 11 May 1942 by Home Secretary Morrison, and so approved, as can be seen below.



Adm 1/12294 H.M.S. Kandahar

The loss of HMS Barham

The loss of HMS Barham

On 25 November 1941 one of the heaviest losses of life, and the only loss of a Royal Navy battleship to a submarine at sea, occurred off Bardia, when HMS Barham was torpedoed at extremely short range by U-331, and sank within four minutes. 862 men went down with her, and her end was filmed by a war correspondent on board one of the escorting destroyers. The footage is at the end of this post.


HMS Barham underway off Devonport in WW2. IWM FL1472

HMS Barham was at the time engaged in an operation to engage potential enemy convoys, together with the other two battleships of the Mediterranean Fleet, HMS Queen Elizabeth (flag) and HMS Valiant, escorted by nine destroyers. The battleships were providing distant cover to the light cruisers of Force B[1], engaged in searching for the German merchants Maritza and Procida (see also this link and this link). Once the news had come through around 1630 hours that Force K out of Malta had sunk these, the battleships turned for Alexandria.

Her complete service history can be found at this link.The BdU (Commander Submarines) noted in his war diary the rather jubilant:

U331 – 1 battleship torpedoed in the Mediterranean. A new beautiful success.

Hans Dietrich von Tiesenhausen


Kapitaenleutnant Freiherr von Tiesenhausen, who did a radio broadcast on this attack in December 1941. Wikipedia.


Shipping losses: HMS BARHAM listing to port after being torpedoed by U 331. HMS VALIANT is in the background. Photograph taken from HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH. IWM AX64B

Further Reading

The translated detailed report of the attack by U-331 can be found at this link.

A very detailed account by a surviving officer of her loss is at this link.

The interrogation report following the sinking of U-331 in late 1942 give further detail of the sinking of HMS Barham at this link.

The loss of HMS Barham contributed to the very high number of losses at sea suffered by the Royal Navy in the period of Operation CRUSADER, about which I have written at this link.

The video of HMS Barham’s loss can seen here, in the context of the overall newsreel. The list of men lost is at this link.

[1] Force B consisted of two cruiser squadrons, 7 and 15, with the cruisers HMS Ajax, HMS Euryalus, HMS Galatea, HMS Naiad, and HMS Neptune, with escorting destroyers.

HM Submarine Urge has now been found

HM Submarine Urge has now been found

HMS Urge

HM/Sub Urge underway – official Admiralty picture from the IWM Website

The Loss and Finding of HM/Sub Urge

Please see this earlier post for a false report of finding HM/Sub Urge, coming out in 2017, which is now corrected.

Reuters reports the finding at this link, while this German article has many good quality sonar pictures of the wreck, and the Royal Navy has good information here.

Now that it is confirmed that she is found, hopefully the relatives will then have some more knowledge on what happened to the crew. 

The History of HM/Sub Urge

HM/Sub Urge was, as the name indicates, a U-Class submarine, and a highly decorated one at that. Her very active wartime history is very well set out on U-Boat Net at this linkUrge was lost with 44 men on board, carrying 12 passengers apart from her complement of 32. The crew and passengers were very highly decorated, between them accounting for:

1x D.S.O. and bar

1x D.S.C. and bar

2x D.S.C.

1x D.S.M. and bar, twice Mentioned in Despatches

10x D.S.M.

4x Mentioned in Despatches

Operations and Successes

HM/Sub Urge conducted all bar one of her patrols in the Mediterranean. Of these, Urge conducted four patrols during Operation CRUSADER, on its 14th patrol damaging the modern Italian Littorio-class battleship Vittorio Veneto in an attack that led to the cancellation of the critical convoy operation M.41 in mid-December 1941, where Veneto was part of the distant escort, guarding the convoy from attack by Force K (see this earlier post).



Vittorio Veneto firing a salvo of its 381mm guns (Source: Marina Militare)

While this attack by HM/Sub Urge was quite a success, it appears that the Admiralty was not too happy that Urge’s commander did not try to sink her, even if it would have been suicidal to do so. Nevertheless, Veneto returned to port without great difficulty, but would not undertake another mission for exactly six months, when she sortied on 14 June 1942.

Urge also carried out two failed attacks on merchants in this period.

Urge  02  Alongside at Malta with Upholder outboard  Neg 5804 Resize

HM/Sub Urge alongside in Malta, with HM/Sub Upholder outboard – HM/Sub Upholder was lost less than two weeks before Urge, also in inconclusive circumstances (Source: Royal Navy)

1 April 1942 – HM/Sub Urge’s Biggest Success

Urge’s most famous victim was the Italian light cruiser Giovanni delle Bande Nere, a Condottieri-class light cruiser from 1930. She was lost with about half her crew when Urge put a torpedo into her 11 miles south off the island of Stromboli on 1 April 1942. She was the last survivor of her sub-class (Giussano) of four light cruisers. Somewhat confirming that the class was very vulnerable, she broke in two after being hit centrally by two torpedoes, and quickly sank.

The exact location of her sinking and two pictures can be found at this link. Delle Bande Nere took 381 of her over strength crew of 772 with her when she broke up and sank rapidly, having been hit while underway 11 miles south of the island of Stromboli, off Sicily. A very good account of her sinking can be found on Lorenzo Colombo’s blog at this link.


Giovanni delle Bande Nere at anchor, probably pre-war. (Source: Wikipedia)

154850907 21940941 e63a 4993 8ee9 eeef2a70447b

Giovanni delle Bande Nere broken in two and sinking. (unknown source, probably taken from one of the escorts)

Loss of HM/Sub Urge

The loss for HM/Sub Urge now appears to be confirmed as mining, when she was just out of Malta on 27 April 1942.  HM/Sub Urge was being transferred out of Malta, together with the remainder of 10th Submarine Flotilla, for its new home of Alexandria. Malta had come under increasing pressure in the early months of 1942, and was no longer considered a viable naval base due to constant air attacks, which forced submarines to spend the day at the bottom of the harbour to evade bombardments.

HM/Sub Urge was sent to Alex with its full crew of 32, 11 additional naval personnel, and 1 war correspondent. Just a short distance outside La Valetta, she hit a mine on a newly laid, thus unknown barrier bow-on, and with her bow blown off plunged into the deep out of control and with no chance of survival for anyone on board. 

The German 3. S-Flottille (E-Boats) had dropped a new mine barrier (MT13) across the path she took to Alexandria just an hour before she left Malta on the last journey, and it is now confirmed that this barrier caused the loss of HM/Sub Urge.


S-33 Krebs going at speed, showing her unusual camouflage. From the highly recommended Seekrieg site.


Lost with HM/Sub Urge (from Naval History Net – the date of death is the date she was declared overdue)


DAY FREDERICK 21   06-05-42   Able Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/SSX 20578’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 53, 3. SON OF ANNIE DAY.


DAVISON ROBERT 21   06-05-42   Able Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/JX 190316’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 64, Column 3. SON OF ROBERT JAMES DAVISON AND AGNES DAVISON, OF NORTH WALSHAM, NORFOLK.

GOSS RONALD HENRY 22   06-05-42   Able Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/SSX 20989’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 65, Column 1. SON OF SAMUEL AND DAISY GOSS, OF CWMBRAN MONMOUTHSHIRE.

WILDMAN RICHARD 22   06-05-42   Able Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/JX 204322’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 67. Column 1. SON OF RICHARD JOHN AND MARY ALICE WILDMAN, OF LANCASTER.

O’NEILL JOHN 22 Mentioned in Despatches 06-05-42   Able Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘P/JX 217252’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 64, Column 3. SON OF WILLIAM JOHN AND ANNIE O’NEILL, OF HUCKNALL, NOTTINGHAMSHIRE.

TOMS CHARLES HERBERT 38 D S M 06-05-42   Chief Engine Room Artificer Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/M 35358’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 3. SON OF HERBERT AND ALICE TOMS; HUSBAND OF VERA MURIEL TOMS, OF GOSPORT, HAMPSHIRE.

JACKMAN CHARLEY JOHN 33 D S M and Bar, Twice Mentioned in Despatches 06-05-42  Chief Petty Officer  Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘P/J 110919’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 62, Column 2. SON OF GLOSTER AND CATHERINE ARABELLA JACKMAN; HUSBAND OF ELSIE ROSALIE JACKMAN, OF BROCKENHURST, HAMPSHIRE.

Urge  10 CPO C J Jackman formal studio portrait resize

Chief Petty Officer J.C. Jackman, 2x MiD (Source: Royal Navy)

Urge  CPO Jackman son with medals

Chief Petty Officer J.C. Jackmans young son (Source: Royal Navy)


RUTTER RONALD FREDERICK 24   06-05-42   Electrical Artificer 4th Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/MX 59915’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 63, 3. SON OF WILLIAM THOMAS AND ELLEN LOUISA RUTTER, OF UXBRIDGE, MIDDLESEX.

HELLYER REGINALD 28 D S M 06-05-42   Engine Room Artificer 2nd Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/MX 47775’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 60, 2. SON OF ERNEST AND OLIVE HELLYER; HUSBAND OF VERONICA ANN HELLYER.

VARLEY ERIC 28 Mentioned in Despatches 06-05-42   Engine Room Artificer 3rd Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/MX 52497’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 69, Column 1. SON OF JOHN AND HANNAH EDDEN VARLEY, OF HORDEN, CO. DURHAM.

WHITE WILLIAM PETER 21   06-05-42   Engine Room Artificer 4th Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/MX 76840’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 60, 2. SON OF GEORGE VICTOR AND CHARLOTTE LEASK WHITE, OF EAST HAM, ESSEX.

HARMAN STANLEY GORDON     06-05-42   Engine Room Artificer 4th Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/MX 76070’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 60, 2.  

NORRIS JESSE   D S M 06-05-42   Leading Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/JX 142500’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 52, 2. SON OF JESSE AND MINNIE NORRIS, OF ROCHESTER, KENT.



MORRIS FREDERICK HAROLD 22   06-05-42   Leading Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘P/JX 145545’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 63, Column 1.

LAW ERIC CHARLES 22 Mentioned in Despatches 06-05-42   Leading Signalman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/JX 145120’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 58, 2. SON OF CHARLES FREDERICK AND LOUISA ALICE LAW.

WILKES SAMUEL CORNELIUS     06-05-42   Leading Stoker Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/KX 81223’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 61, 3.  

WOOLRICH JOHN EDWARD 24   06-05-42   Leading Stoker Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘P/KX 90716’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 2. SON OF WILLIAM AND EDITH WOOLRICH, OF CHELL, STAFFORDSHIRE.

ASHFORD HAROLD GEORGE 32   06-05-42   Leading Telegraphist Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/JX 127562’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 1. SON OF GEORGE AND ESTHER D. ASHFORD, OF FROME, SOMERSET.

ROGERS ROY WILLIAM GEORGE 22 D S M 06-05-42   Leading Telegraphist Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/SS 26082’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 1. SON OF GEORGE WILLIAM AND EDITH LOUISA ROGERS, OF WHITSTABLE,


Urge  04  Lt Cdr Edward P Tomkinson DSO  Neg 0331

Lt.Cdr. E.P. Tomkinson D.S.O. and Bar (Source: Royal Navy)

ALLEN DAVID BENNETT   D S C 06-05-42   Lieutenant Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 61, Column 3.



BOTTING HENRY JOHN     06-05-42   Petty Officer Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘C/JX 137747’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 51, 3.  



WISEMAN PETER DUGDALE 27 Mentioned in Despatches 06-05-42   Petty Officer Telegraphist Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/JX 134000’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 1. SON OF THOMAS AND JANE WISEMAN, OF BLYTH, NORTHUMBERLAND.

STANGER MARCUS 26   06-05-42   Stoker 1st Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/KX 90258’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 70, Column 3. HUSBAND OF GEORGINA ALEXANDRA STANGER, OF PLYMOUTH.

McMILLAN JOSEPH CRESSWELL DIXON 21   06-05-42   Stoker 1st Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/SSX. 32970’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 70, Column 2. SON OF ROBERT AND MARY A. MCMILLAN, OF FAULDHOUSE, WEST LOTHIAN.

TWIST HENRY ERNEST   D S M 06-05-42   Telegraphist Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge United Kingdom ‘D/JX 225829’ PLYMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 2.

BAXTER LESLIE GORDON     06-05-42   Able Seaman Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘C/LD/X 3971’ CHATHAM NAVAL MEMORIAL 66, 2.  

McDIARMID FRED 21   06-05-42   Able Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘P/SSX 32644’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 64, Column 2. SON OF GEORGE AND ELIZABETH B. MCDIARMID, OF GLOSSOP, DERBYSHIRE.

CHAMBERLAIN SIDNEY WILLIAM 22   06-05-42   Leading Seaman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘P/SSX 22878’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 62, Column 3. SON OF ERNEST WILLIAM AND EMILY CHAMBERLAIN, OF BRIGHTON.

LEEKE RONALD WILLIAM 20   06-05-42   Leading Signalman Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘P/JX 154364’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 66, Column 2. SON OF THOMAS WILLIAM AND ADA DOROTHY LEEKE, OF SCOTTER, LINCOLNSHIRE.

LAMB JAMES WILFRED 24   06-05-42   Leading Stoker Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘P/KX 94635’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 1. SON OF CLARENCE LAMB, AND OF JANE A. LAMB, OF YORK.

MAIDMENT JOHN 22   06-05-42   Leading Telegraphist Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘P/SSX 22031’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 66, Column 3. SON OF JOHN AND ETHEL MARY MAIDMENT, OF DORCHESTER, DORSETSHIRE.

BRYANT ALBERT EDWARD 38   06-05-42   Stoker 1st Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘P/K 61633’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 2. SON OF ALBERT AND ROSE BRYANT; HUSBAND OF ETHEL MARY BRYANT. 

BROWN CYRIL 28   06-05-42   Stoker 1st Class Royal Navy H.M. Submarine Urge. United Kingdom ‘P/KX 84490’ PORTSMOUTH NAVAL MEMORIAL Panel 68, Column 2. SON OF RUFUS AND HILDA ELIZA BROWN, OF COAL ASTON, DERBYSHIRE.

Book Review: Very Special Ships by Arthur Nicholson

Book Review: Very Special Ships by Arthur Nicholson


Five Stars out of Five – Buy


IMG 5843


This book is what Siri should show you when you ask it what a ‘Labour of Love’ is. The author has gone not one, but several extra miles in putting it together, and it is a beautifully produced, highly informative, and well-written book on a small but important sub-class of Royal Navy combat vessels in World War 2.

The author, Seaforth as the original publisher, and the Naval Institute Press for this print run should be congratulated for this work. It’s the kind of book I would love to be able to write. It is well-balanced between engaging narrative and technical detail, with numerous pictures and personal stories that add to the understanding of the history of these very special ships.

Mr. Nicholson has gone through a lot of detail to accomplish what is likely to be the first and last history of this class of vessels, since I doubt there is much more to say on them.



The book covers the detailed service history of all Abdiel-class fast minelayers, including their loss and where applicable peace-time service. Where possible it notes losses suffered by Axis forces on minefields laid by the ships.  

The clear focus of the book is on the history of service of the ships. This is told through a mix of service history from the official records, and very well-placed personnel recollections or letters and personal diaries. It really brings the vessels to life. There is substantial detail, but it never gets too technical, or turns into a dull ‘then she moved here, and then there’ narrative. The writing is engaging, and the book well edited. 

Very helpfully, the book commences with a short history of mine warfare in the Royal Navy, followed by an introduction to the service of the first Abdiels in the First World War, and the considerations that led to the production of this unique, and as I would agree with the author, beautiful class of ships that could outrun any other ship in the Royal Navy, and on occasion did so. This includes a very useful technical discussion of the design decisions that were taken with these ships.

My personal interest is of course the service in the Mediterranean, which is well described, including the circumstances of the loss of HMS Latona on the Tobruk Run, and HMS Abdiel on a magnetic mine in Taranto harbour after the armistice with Italy. 


What would have been a familiar picture in Malta 1941/42: ‘HMS Welshman in the Grand Harbour on her way to her berth in French Creek’, 15 June 1942 (IWM A 10420)


Room for Improvement

I find it hard if not impossible to think of anything. There is the odd repetition, in particular in relation to the loss of HMS Latona on the Tobruk Run, which the author (fairly or unfairly) lays at the feet of the Australian government, and it is here that there is a clear sense of grievance, but nothing serious.



The paper version is coffee-table format, which is great since it allows quite a bit of detail in the pictures to be discerned. It is very well produced, and no doubt will last a long time.

The book is well illustrated with a wide range of pictures that are relevant to the material presented. Photos come from both official and private collections and again I would like to congratulate the author on making the effort to track these down.

There is an extensive colour plate section showing the evolution of the ships’ camouflage over the course of the war, and a detailed plan of HMS Abdiel.

As can be expected in an academic work, the bibliography is extensive and a full index is provided. The research that has gone into this book is clearly extensive, and the bibliography provides ample avenues for further research.



The review is based on the print version of the book. It was not provided for free and I have no commercial interest in the book.


Featured Image


HMS Latona and a flotilla of submarines at Sliema Creek, Malta. (Art.IWM ART 3133)

David Greentree: British Submarine vs. Italian Torpedo Boat (Osprey Duel 74)

David Greentree: British Submarine vs. Italian Torpedo Boat (Osprey Duel 74)

Four Stars out of Five – Buy


Torpdiniera Sagittario – a Spica-class, Perseo-sub class torpedo boat equipped with German ASDIC from early 1942. On 8 February 1942 she detected and rammed HM/Sub Proteus, which did however come off the better (see this link). Sagittario  survived the war and continued to serve until 1964 in the Italian navy. (Wikipedia)


I have to come clean here – there is no way I would not rate a book where my blog is the first item in the bibliography a buy. 🙂 So go out and buy it. I got it in a Kindle sale, and am happy I did.


The book covers the period of the Italo-British war from June 1940 to the Italian armistice in September 1943, with a short post-script covering the continued service of the Italian torpedo boats under the Kriegsmarine flag from 1943 to 1945. 

The clear focus of the book is on the engagements between Italian escort torpedo boats and British submarines. The Italian navy, the Regia Marina, is usually dismissed due to the prevalence of a narrative driven by the Royal Navy memoirs which considered them shy adversaries. Anyone who has looked at the performance of the Italian escorts on the North Africa route knows that this is at best a caricature, and at worst an insult, both to the Italian sailors and to the British sailors in submarines and some surface vessels who fell victim to them. 

The author has gone through a range of secondary sources and relies to a large extent on the official Italian history, which is a great service to those who do not speak Italian and/or would struggle to access this rare and expensive work.

The book is well rounded, and provides a very decent overview of tactics, technology, weaponry, and engagement detail for both sides, given its compact size. I consider it an important reference work and very helpful for anyone researching the naval war in the Mediterranean, which was for the most part a convoy war, the few major fleet actions notwithstanding.

Room for Improvement

Some interesting actions are left off, probably because they did not fit the torpedo boat/submarine engagement, but which are clearly relevant, such as the sinking of Destroyer da Mosto, which had a German ASDIC crew on board (see this older post). My guess is that this is because the other relied on secondary sources, rather than the German original sources in NARA, some of which I have.

So yes, this is not the definitive history of fighting the Royal Navy subs in the Mediterranean, but it is definitely a work that whoever is going to write that history cannot ignore.


The Kindle version is well produced and very readable. There are a few action diagrams which are clear and informative, allowing the reader to follow the sequence of engagements. The book is well illustrated with a wide range of pictures that are relevant to the material presented, many from private collections.

There is a bibliography that is helpful in guiding further research, and more than I would expect in an Osprey work, since these are not normally considered academic works.


The review is based on the Kindle version of the book. It was not provided for free and I have no commercial interest in the book.

Hms p38 submarine

HMS P.38, sunk with all hands by Torpediniera Circe with the use of German ASDIC on 23 February 1942. The detailed report by Commander Palmas of Circe can be found in this older post. Lest we forget. (Wikipedia)



In Memoriam Cdr. Jeremy Nash, DSC, RN

Commander Jeremy Nash DSC, RN, died on 23 November 2018, aged 98. During Operation CRUSADER he was weapons officer on HMS/M Proteus, a Parthian-class submarine, assigned to the 1st Submarine Flotilla in Alexandria.

The Royal Navy during the Second World War A12506

HMSM Proteus underway in the Mediterranean, unknown date (Courtesy IWM)

After the end of CRUSADER, HMS/M Proteus, under command of Lt.Cdr. Francis, had an encounter with a Regia Marina escort vessel, the Spica class corvette RN Sagittario, which led to her being rammed and damaged. The commander of Sagittario presumed her to be sunk. Fortunately enough for Proteus, for some reason Sagittario did not follow up on the ramming with a depth charge attack. She was equipped both with the German ASDIC echolocation system, the S-Geraet (see this link) and also with the more effective German depth charge launch system, which would be used to devastating effect two weeks later by RN Circe in the sinking of HMS/M P.38 (see this link).

Tp Sagittario

Torpediniera Sagittario, 1941 (Courtesy Wikipedia)

Sagittario had a small detachment of German sailors on board, led by a senior NCO (Oberbootsmaat – Royal Navy Petty Officer), who reported to the German command about the incident. The report is below – it also notes that the Italian crew members operating the S-Geraet were trained at the Kriegsmarine school in Gotenhafen, and did good work.

Report about the Sinking of an enemy Submarine by T-Boat Sagittario on 8 February 1942 0450 hours north of Cephalonia.

(as related by Oberbootsmaat Merkel)

Following the release of a convoy Sagittario was on the march from Patras to Argostoli. Sea state 3-4. Speed 14 knots. Ranges were registered at around 1,600m (good echos) up to 2300 hours, when sea state was 1. At 0430 hours the S-Geraet reported a strong noise signal at 320 degrees, which moved out fast. Whether the boat immediately turned was not transmitted to the listening room, but in any case shortly after the report speed was increased to 17 knots. A few minutes later the collision occurred. The enemy submarine was rammed at an acute angle, and went down with a heavy list.

Both vessels suffered damage, HMS/M Proteus to her dive plane, which broke off, and Sagittario to her hull. Interestingly, Lt.Cdr. Francis considered his target a submarine, and attacked with torpedoes, which were not observed at all on Sagittario. In turn, Francis believed that the torpedoes were what gave Proteus away, and did not consider ASDIC detection.

HMS/M Proteus was special in two regards, she was the first Royal Navy submarine to be equipped with Radar, and the only Parthian-class submarine to survive the war. Proteus’ 1st Officer met the CO of Sagittario after the war, abusing him of the notion that he had sunk Proteus that night.

An account by Nash himself of the ramming can be found in this book. Lt.Cdr. Francis, DSO and Bar, RN recounts the incident at this link. Commodore Nash retired from the Royal Navy in 1970.

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Commander Nash, DSC, OBE, RN during the war, (Courtesy, unknown)

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Lt R L Alexander RN, who now commands the Proteus and (right) Lt Cdr P S Francis, DSO, RN, her former commanding officer. (Courtesy IWM)

12 September 1941 – the Tembien Convoy

Update 03-08-2019 – added further info on who attacked and ultimately sank SS Alfredo Oriani off Cape Matapan

Added German Navy AA Report Information – 22 September 2018


The summer of 1941 was primarily spent trying to build up the Axis forces in North Africa to prepare for the assault on Tobruk and the subsequent invasion of Egypt. While the supply route overall was delivering, with the vast majority of supplies reaching their destination, losses were suffered on a regular basis. I have previously written about the quite harrowing experience of the Malta Blenheim IVs of Nos. 105 and 107 Squadrons engaging the Axis supplies at this link.

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Bristol Blenheim Mark IV, V6014 ‘GB-J’, of No. 105 Squadron RAF Detachment in a dispersal at Luqa, Malta. Canvas covers protect the cockpit and glazed nose section from the sun. From July to September 1941, 105 Squadron was detached from the United Kingdom to Malta, to operate against targets in the Mediterranean and North Africa, losing 14 aircraft during the period. Note the modified gun mounting under the nose. Courtesy of the IWM Collection.

Nevertheless, while the loss rate on daytime shipping strikes was brutal, the reward was high, when a fully laden merchant with vital supplies could be sent to the depths of the Mediterranean. This happened on 11-13 September 1941, when the Malta strike forces had a good outing against the 44th convoy with Italian and German supplies, known to the Italians as the TEMBIEN convoy, and also sank the single runner SS Alfredo Oriani. While the loss of three merchant vessels in two days was a remarkable success to the Royal Air Force, it came at a price.

The article below also sets the historic record straight, by providing clarity on who sank what, and addressing the claims made by the Fleet Air Arm Swordfish operating out of Malta.

Air/Sea Battle on the North Africa Route 11-13 September 1941

The period saw heavy anti-shipping operations by the Malta-based British aircraft, covering the 11-13 September, with substantial losses on both sides.

The 12th of September 1941 day saw the heaviest anti-shipping operations, with a total of 22-29 aircraft operating out of Malta according to the Malta War Diary, 7x Wellington of No. 38 Squadron in a night attack, 8x Blenheim of No. 105 Squadron in the afternoon, and 7x Swordfish of No. 830 Squadron F.A.A. operating possibly twice during the night and the afternoon.

Losses were heavy, with 3x Blenheims lost, those of S/Ldr Charney D.F.C. with Observer Sgt. Porteous and Wireless Op./Air Gunner Sgt. Harris, Sgt. Mortimer with Observer Sgt. Reid and Wireless Op./Air Gunner Sgt. Owen, and Sgt. Brandwood. The latter and his crew were rescued by HM/Sub Utmost on 14 September, and the former two crews were all killed. Another Blenheim belly-landed on Malta due to damage from the naval anti-air fire.

Two ships were sunk, SS Caffaro by No.105 and SS Nicoló Odero by No.38 Squadron, both out of the Tembien convoy. Furthermore, on the 13th the  Italian 3,059t steamer SS Alfredo Oriani, a merchant with an identical name to the escort leader of the Tembien convoy, sank halfway to Benghasi following an air attack while on the way to Benghasi, from Patras, on 11 September, probably again by No. 105 Squadron. Thus, the R.A.F. sent a total of over 15,500 tons of shipping carrying thousands of tons of supplies and hundreds of vehicles to the bottom of the sea.

Based on information from Lorenzo Colombo, who runs the excellent Con la Pelle appesa a un Chiodo blog detailing all Italian vessel losses, the butcher’s bill for the three days was amounted to 26 on the Axis side, to which need to be added six R.A.F. crew members in two of the lost Blenheims and the German army officer who died of wounds in Tripoli, for a total of 33 killed:

  • SS Caffaro carried 228 men, including 168 Germans; 224 survived and four were missing (two Italian crew members and two Germans)
  • SS Nicolò Odero had 285 survivors, the victims were about twenty including 4 crew members (the other being troops and AA crews)
  • SS Alfredo Oriani had 50 men aboard, two were missing and 48 survived.

There are substantial discrepancies between the British and the Italian accounts, which I am aiming to clear up below. A big gap is the lack of an operations record book for No.830 Squadron. I have inquired with the Fleet Air Arm Museum in Yeovilton, but to no avail. I will also add a bit more analysis on the issue of who sank SS Alfredo Oriani.

Official Accounts and Memories

The write up in the Malta war diary is below:

An Italian convoy of steamers TEMBIEN, CAFFARO, NIRVO, BAINSIZZA, NICOLO ODERO, and GUILA[1] departed Naples on the 10th, escorted by destroyers ORIANI and FULMINE and torpedo boats PROCIONE, PEGASO, ORSA, and CIRCE from Trapani, and OERSEO[1] which joined at 0600/13th.

Italian steamer CAFFARO (6476grt) was sunk by British Swordfish of 830 Squadron from Malta 105° northwest of Tripoli in 34-14N, 11-54E.

Italian steamer TEMBIEN (5584grt) was damaged by 830 Squadron attack.

Italian steamer NICOLO ODERO (6003grt) was damaged in the attack. She was sunk on the 14th by RAF bombing in 32-51N, 12-18E after the convoy arrived at Tripoli on the 13th.

One of the air crew of No 830 Squadron, Sub-Lt. Campbell describes the attack thus at this link:

12/13.9 – If my memory serves me right this was the night about which the Malta Daily Paper headlined as “Ducks and Drakes in the Med”. The Squadron took off at dusk to attack a large Convoy heavily escorted by Destroyers. We found the Convoy and attacked individualy, splitting it up completely. At least three ships were hit and Destroyers were racing about all over the place. We returned to base and my flight were sent out again to finish off the remaining ships. As we approached the scene of the previous engagement, I saw a Destroyer racing along at high speed. I decided to follow it to see if it would lead me to the remaining ships, this took some doing in a “Stringbag”, if there had been any wind against me I couldn’t have done it. After awhile I saw a large MV and attacked it. There was a bright flash and then it just blew up.

The above two accounts are severely flawed. Fortunately though on the British side, a fairly detailed account by No.105 Squadron has survived, in AIR27/826, the Operations Record Book (ORB) of No. 105 Squadron, and a less detailed account in the ORB of No. 38 Squadron.

11 September

First, the attack that I believe claimed SS Alfredo Oriani on 11 September, even though the timing of the attack reports in the British and Italian accounts diverges by a day, and the British pilots reported another merchant present. Nevertheless, the description of the attack and the location of it and the sinking are so close that I believe No.105 Squadron was responsible for her loss, following a check in the Nos. 11, 14, 55 and 107 Squadron Operations Record Books. This is confirmed by Shores, Cull, and Malizia in Malta: The Hurricane Years, which records that No. 105 Squadron under Smithers went out on 10 September (sic) to attack two vessels off the Greek coast, leaving one in what they believed a sinking condition, although this also utilises the squadron ORB transcribed below. We still need Italian records to be certain what happened and when.

The Malta Admiralty War Diary describes the attack thus:

Italian steamer ALFREDO ORIANI (3059grt) was sunk by British Blenheim bombers in 35-05N, 20-16E.

The steamer which had departed Petrasso on the 11th was escorted by torpedo boat CANTORE.


SS Alfredo Oriani in peacetime, from

No. 105 Squadron ORB states that five Blenheim IV went out on a shipping sweep at 0645am on 11 September. The attacking aircraft returned at 1211pm, while two returned early at 0750am. Crews were S/Ldr Smithers with Sgts. Harford and Green, F/Lt. Duncan with Sgts. Smith and Lyndall, Sgt. Bendall, with Sgts. Hindle and Brown, Sgt. Mortimer, Sgt. Weston, with Sgts. Storey and Kindell.

Five crews were detailed for an offensive sweep of the Ionian Sea.

The aircraft departed in two waves, the first sighting two MERCHANT VESSELS and DESTROYER escort in position 35°33N. 20°35’E.

One aircraft – SQUADRON LEADER SMITHERS – attacked first dropping bombs from stern to bow and registered a hit amidships.

The other aircraft attacking the same ship claim one hit each but not confirmed.

The MERCHANT VESSEL when last see appeared to be settling in the water in a sinking condition.

The second wave – FLIGHT LIEUTENANT DUNCAN and SGT. MORTIMER – returned with engine trouble.

All aircraft landed safely at BASE.

In the Italian official history, her loss is described thus.

11 September 4am from Patras to Benghazi. Steamer A. Oriani. Escort Escort Destroyer Cantore then Altair (from 1700 hours on 13 September). Attacked  and repeatedly hit by bombers at 1400 hours on 12 September, 60 nautical off Cape Matapan, sinks at 1800 hours on the 13th.

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The position of SS Alfredo Oriani’s sinking is not 60nm, but over 100 nautical miles off Cape Matapan. (Map done by me using Google Maps)

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The position is about 186nm out of Patrassos, or about 17 hours steaming at full speed. (Map done by me using Google Maps)

More puzzlingly, at the time of the attack, she would have steamed about 190nm. A solid 17 hours of steaming at 11knots, her top speed. Pretty much impossible in the ten hours since she left port according to the Italian OH. Furthermore, the timing of the No. 105 Squadron operations on that day and the attack timing do not line up. Nevertheless, there is no record of another Blenheim unit attacking a vessel in the Ionian Sea on 11 September 1941.

A strong possibility would be that the Italian OH is wrong here. It is clearly wrong giving the position of Oriani being attacked as 60nm off Cape Matapan (the actual position of the attack is almost on a  straight line from Patras to Benghazi, while 60nm would be too far east), and is also wrong in giving the position of her sinking as 80nm north of Benghazi. It is therefore not impossible that the time or date of her departure and the actual time of the attack are also wrong. For example, an average speed of 7 knots would have put her almost straight into the attack position around 0800 hours on the morning of the 11th, had she departed Patras on 10 September at 0400 hours in the morning, instead of the 11 September. The location is about an hour and a halfs’ flying time in a Blenheim IV from Malta. Given that No. 105’s Blenheim’s left at 0645 hours, they could have been there at 0815 hours.

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RN Generale Alfredo Cantore, an obsolete destroyer, downgraded to Escort Destroyer. She was lost on a mine in 1942. Courtesy Wikipedia.

SS Alfredo Oriani sank two days later on 13 September at 35°05’N 20°16’E, about 80 nautical miles north of Benghazi according to the Italian official history, although this position is more like 180 miles north of Benghazi. That position is 19 nautical miles west and 28 nautical miles south  of the attack position given in the No. 105 ORB, indicating that the vessel drifted about 33 nautical miles, or a speed of less than a knot after the attack. It is also physically impossible for Oriani to have made it to the position of the attack as given by the Italian official history, if her departure date is correct even if steaming at maximum speed of 11.5 knots. Patras is about 14 hours of steaming as the crow flies, given Oriani’s speed, from the location of the attack. My guess is that the Italian official history is not correct when it comes to the time/day of her departure.

12 September

This day was the big one. The first to attack were No. 830 Squadron with their Swordfish, without success.

In the afternoon of the 12th, eight Blenheim IV were despatched by No. 105 Squadron. This time, it did not go so well for them. The crews were S/Ld Smithers with Sgts. Harbord and Fisher, Sd/Ld. Charney with Sgts. Portous and Harris, F/Lt. Ballands, F/O Greenhill, Sgt. Brandwood with Sgts. Miller and See, Sgt. Weston with Sgts. Storey and Kindell, Sgt. Bendall with Sgts. Hindle and Brown, and Sgt. Mortimer with Sgt. Reid and F/O Owen.

Eight crews were detailed to attack a CONVOY attacked by SWORDFISH aircraft the previous night.

The CONVOY was estimated to consist of six MERCHANT VESSELS of 6000 – 12000 tons and six escorting DESTROYERS and was attacked at 1415 hours.

Two aircraft – SQUADRON LEADER SMITHERS and SGT. WESTON – claimed two hits each with 250lb and 500lb bombs respectively. This MERCHANT VESSEL was left a mass of flames and a later reconnaissance report indicated that it had probably sunk.

One aircraft – SGT. BENDALL – attacked a 10000 ton MERCHANT VESSEL and scored two direct hits with 500lb bombs causing a large fire.

Two aircraft – FLIGHT LIEUTENANT BALLANDS and FLYING OFFICER GREENHILL – did not bomb as their approach was obstructed by other aircraft. Anti-aircraft opposition was intense from the DESTROYERS and three MACCHI 200 FIGHTERS and three C.R.42’s were reported diving out of the clouds though no attacks were witnessed.

One aircraft – SQUADRON LEADER CHARNEY – was shot down in flames near the CONVOY with little hope of survivors. One aircraft – SGT. MORTIMER – failed to return and nothing further was heard of the crew.

Another aircraft – SGT. BRANDWOOD – came down into the sea about 12 miles from the convoy but the crew were rescued the next day by a submarine.

Five aircraft landed safely at BASE, one of these – SGT. BENDALL – was forced to execute a belly landing owing to damage to the hydraulic system. The observer – SGT. HINDLE – was slightly wounded.

The British accounts are incorrect in several aspects, and need to be read with the Italian account of the battle. Fortunately, the Italian official history La Difesa del Trafico Vol. I has an account of this convoy battle as well, which would lead to the total loss of two of the five steamers with their important cargo. For example, while there were six merchants and six escorts, none of the merchants came in at 12,000 tons.

An adventurous voyage, albeit marked by painful losses, was that of the TEMBIEN convoy, which left Naples the morning of the 10th for Tripoli. This was the second convoy of cargo vessels bound for Libya in the month of September and, since it was composed of slower vessels, it had orders to follow the route of the Marettimo Channel of Sicily to the Kerkennah Banks, the route called the Ponente [2].

The steamers TEMBIEN, CAFFARO, NIRVO, NICOLO’ ODERO and BAINSIZZA were part of the convoy; the escort[3] consisted of the destroyers ORIANI[4] (Convoy Leader Commander Chinigò[5]) and FULMINE[6] and the torpedo boats PROCIONE, PEGASO, and ORSA[7], with which the torpedo boat CIRCE[8] united in the Sicily Channel.

During the night 11/12 November the convoy was discovered by a nighttime reconnaissance plane south of Pantelleria. Thus at 03.10 hours of the 12th an attack by torpedo bombers followed, avoided  by the maneuvering of the convoy, a smoke screen, and the anti-air reaction of various units.

The following morning the formation navigated without incident or alarm along the Kerkennah following diverse routes. But at 14.00 hours, while under escort of Italian planes, it was again attacked by airplanes, this time by bombers. This was the second air attack during the crossing. Not the last one however, since two more times, between Zuara and Tripoli, during the nights of the 12th and 13th, the convoy was attacked from the air.

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RN Alfredo Oriani underway. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

On the daytime attack of the 12th, and the two following nights, the Escort Commander, Commander Chinigo, referred thus in his report:

The 12th

14.00 hours – Eight enemy planes are sighted[9], coming from the west at low height towards the formation. The escorting units and the steamers open targeted and barrage fire. Numerous water columns are seen close to the escort units and the steamers. Three of the attacking planes hit by the anti-aircraft fire crash in flames.

14.10 hours – The CAFFARO, hit by a bomb, takes fire. I am ordering CIRCE and ORSA and then FULMINE to come to the aid of the unfortunate steamer. I send the standard signal of having been discovered.

15.00 hours – Continued observation of flames from the fire in the direction of CAFFARO, and more and more explosions can be heard.

15.55 hours – I inform Supermarina[10] and Marina Tripoli[11] of the air attack with the reservation that further information cannot be provided yet.

16.05 hours – I observe a strong explosion in the direction of CAFFARO. Immediately after CIRCE signals that the steamer has sunk.

16.50 hours – CIRCE, FULMINE, ORSA report that they have on board 110, 35, and 79 shipwrecked, respectively. CIRCE and ORSA also that they have no-one particularly badly hurt.

18.40 hours – Notify Supermarina and Marina Tripoli of the sinking of CAFFARO and the number of shipwrecked rescued. Communicate furthermore that FULMINE is navigating for Tripoli with one severely wounded.

23.54 hours – At point C of the safe route to Tripoli. Steamers proceed in line astern.

It is worth noting that the German documentation on the downed Blenheims is somewhat more precise. German navy AA crews were on board of at least the steamer Nirvo. They reported that all three Blenheims were downed at 14.35 hours, one directly by the Kriegsmarine AA embarked on Nirvo, one by AA from a destroyer, with support from the Kriegsmarine AA on board Nirvo, and the other downed by AA weapons of embarked troops on Nirvo. Ammunition use was 23, 13, and 62 rounds of 2cm AA, respectively. The weather is described as clear and sunny, with medium visibility.

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Vickers Wellington Mark IC of No. 38 Squadron RAF Detachment, taxying at Luqa, Malta. Seven aircraft of the Squadron were detached to Malta from Shallufa, Egypt, between August and October 1941 for operations over the Mediterranean and Italy. Courtesy of the IWM Collection.

13 September

While the ORB of No. 38 Squadron places this attack on the 12th, I am certain it actually happened in the night 12/13 September, from 0340am to 0455am, seven Wellingtons of No. 38 Squadron bombed the convoy. They suffered no losses. Crews were led by Sgts. Robotham, Brine, Earl, Pottis, Secomb and Hawes, and F/Lt. Davis.

Target – Convoy – proceeding to Tripoli. Convoy was located 25 miles N.W. of Tripoli and was attacked from 03.40 to 04.55 hours.

Bombs dropped 24,500.lbs.

Results: four ships were hit, fires starting on two of them.

Opposition: light flack from escorting destroyers.

The timing of the attack fits exactly with the timing of the aircraft noise report by Tp Circe. The hits reported were then on SS Nicoló Odero. The earlier attack was almost certainly again a torpedo attack, with the standard attack pattern.

The 13th

01.05 hours – Four or five airplanes are seen on a course of 240 degrees with landing lights illuminated. Issue the air alarm signal to all units.

01.20 hours – Numerous flares light up to the left of the formation. Order the escort units to make smoke. The units and the steamers fire targeted and barrage. A total of 18 flares are counted.[12]

02.30 hours – The attack ceases and the formation is reordered, and normal navigation proceeds.

03.33 hours – Marina Tripoli informs me that the PERSEO leaves Zuara and will join the convoy to strengthen the escort. Further informs that at sunrise a MAS will be the pilot for the safe route.

03.45 hours – CIRCE signals aircraft noises to the rear.

03.55 hours – A flare light is seen on the right of the convoy. I issue the standard signal of having been discovered. Escort units and steamers open barrage fire. Smoke is made.

04.00 hours – An explosion on one of the steamers is observed.

04.04 hours – CIRCE signals that the steamer ODERO was hit.

04.24 hours – A bomb hits in our wake at about 100 meters from the stern. Fire is opened with the machine guns.

04.30 hours – CIRCE signals that there are men in the water and requests that another escort is sent. I order ORSA and PERSEO, which during the attack rejoined the formation, to get close to CIRCE and cooperate in the assistance of the hit steamer and to the rescue of the  shipwrecked.

05.00 hours – The attack ceases and the formation is taken up again, and we proceed on the safe route.

05.05 hours – CIRCE signals that the ODERO has fire on board, but that she is not sinking, and requests sending a tug.

The steamer NICOLO’ ODERO, even though in flames, remains afloat for many hours, with the support of the torpedo boats ORSA, CIRCE, and PERSEO which, in the first instance, are engaged in saving the men embarked on the merchant.

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Torpedo boat RN Perseo, lead of her sub-class of Spica torpedo boats.

In support of the steamer, the tugs PRONTA and PORTO PALO leave Tripoli at sunrise,  seeking with any means to extinguish the fire which is still raging on the merchant. The PORTO PALO even goes alongside the ODERO, sending men to fight the fire.

Only when it is clear that the flames cannot be doused do the two tugs take the burning steamer in tow, first trying to reach Tripoli, and then to beach it on the coast. During the whole night, the two tugs and two motor trawlers, also coming from Tripoli, remain close to the steamer with the hope to ultimately save it, but during the afternoon of the 14th September a hold with ammunition blows up, causing the destruction of the NICOLO’ ODERO.

No. 38 Squadron then ‘visited’ Tripoli on the 13th, again I believe this was the night of 13/14, probably to attack during the unloading of the convoy.  The report of Odero having been beached, which only happened on the 14th, is a give-away in this regard.

Numerous bombs on the harbour edge are reported and six  Italian soldiers killed in a direct hit on their MG position near the lighthouse. Seven Wellingtons went out, with the crews of Flight Officer Pascall, Pilot Officer Ridgway, and Sgts. Cooper, Fell, McManus, and Nankivell. None were lost.

Target – Tripoli – shipping alongside Spanish Quay. Attack lasted from 03.00 to 04.35 hours.

Bombs dropped 27,500. lbs.

Bombs fell on or near the Quay.

Aircraft reported a large ship aground 30 miles W. of Tripoli. This M/V presumed to be one of those set on fire during previous night’s attack on convoy.

Opposition: effective smoke-screen. Heavy A.A. aimed at aircraft, not barrage fire. Light A.A. as usual. Eleven searchlights operated.


It is clear from the Italian account that the British accounts were severely mistaken about the impact of their attacks. No ships had been hit in the night attack by No. 830 Squadron on 11/12 September. In the afternoon attack by No. 105 Squadron, only one merchant had been hit, not two. The second attack by the Swordfish is not mentioned at all.

What is also interesting is that the Italian air escort is not mentioned by the Italian report.

Sub-Lt. Campbell of No. 830 Squadron seems to overstate the case of his attack somewhat regarding his hit on what must have been Caffaro.  At this stage I am doubtful regarding his claim, and what could be surmised is that the explosion leading to the end of Caffaro was actually caused by a torpedo hit. But overall his story does not stack up, while the time of the Blenheim attack, the description by the escort commander, and the losses all seem to fit.

The official Italian history claims she was hit by a bomb, which appears the likely reason. The Italian report of eight attacking planes, of which three were shot down, is therefore to be considered an accurate account of the loss of Caffaro.

As for No. 105 Squadron, this was to be one of the last operations it flew in the Mediterranean. It suffered two more losses. Sgt. Bendall and crew on 17 September when attacking a small convoy, and Wing Commander Sciviers and his crew on 22 September, when his plane collided with that of Sgt. Williams during an attack on the barracks at Homs in Libya. The attack on the small convoy on 17 September is again well documented.

First the British side:

Three aircraft took off to attack one small MERCHANT VESSEL, one TUG and two SCHOONERS. One SCHOONER was left a mass of flames and the other was seen to blow up and disintegrate. One aircraft failed to return from this OPERATION. The crew were – SGT. BENDALL – Pilot: Sgt. HILL – Observer. SGT BROWN – W/OP/A.G.

PILOT OFFICER ROBINSON of No. 107 Squadron also proceeded on this operation and failed to return.

From the Italian side:

14 September 2200 hours from Trapani to Tripoli. Steamer Ascianghi, Steam Tug Mirabello del Parco with Minesweeper Pietrino in tow; Motor Schooner Filuccio. Escort Escort Destroyer Clio. At 1600 hours of 17 September, 15 miles north of Zuara, the convoy is attacked by bombers. Three are shot down and one of these crashes on Mv Filuccio, provoking a fire and her sinking. The Ascianghi rescues 10 out of 13 members of the crew. On the 18th at 0900 hours at Tripoli without Mv Filuccio.

The sections show again how easy it was to get things wrong.

In October No. 105 Squadron was withdrawn back to the UK, to convert to Mosquitos. It did maintain a Blenheim I as a ‘hack’ plane. No. 107 Squadron took over operations on Malta, with similarly tragic performance.


According to the German loading lists, Nicoló Odero did not carry any German supplies on this voyage. Caffaro however did. She went down with substantial numbers of vehicles, rations, and ammunition, losses that the German forces could ill afford, and that further delayed the build up to the attack on Tobruk, which in turn enabled the Allied forces to attack first. The full list of her German load is given below. She almost certainly also carried Italian cargo, but I have not been able to find the manifest for this. While Caffaro carried a substantial number of soldiers, primarily drivers for the vehicles of 7./Flak 25, Heeresfunkstelle XVIII and Stab Panzergruppe, most of these are likely to have been rescued, with 224 men being picked up.

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[1] Should be MV Giulia. Orseo should be Perseo, Spica class boat, the staple Regia Marina escort. Displacing 1,020 tons at full load, they were armed with 3x10cm guns, four 450mm torpedo tubes, and a reasonable set of AA and ASW weaponry, running 34 knots top speed.
[2] Western
[3] This was a powerful escort with substantial AA capabilities. Strangely, the report omits to mention the MV Giulia, which was definitely part of the convoy,.
[4] The Orianis were a class of four modern, large destroyers. An improved repeat of the Maestrale class, with 2,470t at full displacement, 4x120mm main guns and six torpedo tubes as main armament, and a claimed top speed of 38 knots. They carried improved anti-air guns compared to the Maestrales. Oriani survived the war and served in the French navy until 1954.
[5]Commander Chinigò survived the war and after the war rose to the rank of Captain and commanded the Italian battleship Littorio, being her last captain.
[6] A Folgore class destroyer, an older ship, she was sunk less than two months later in the Duisburg/Beta convoy battle on 9 November 1941 with the loss of 141 men including her commander, Lt.Cdr. Mario Milano. The Folgores were not a lucky class, with all four ships lost during the war. They displaced 2,096 tons at full load, carried 4x120mm guns and six torpedo tubes as main armament, and had a claimed top speed of 38 knots. A repeat of the Freccia class they had less stability and range than the preceding class due to a reduction in their beam.
[7] Orsa-class torpedo boats, an enlarged version of the Spicas (see below). At 1,575 tons full displacement, they traded one 10cm gun for improved AA and ASW equipment, carrying also 4x 450mm torpedo tubes and only running at up to 28 knots. Pegaso claimed four Royal Navy submarines, which if confirmed would make her one of the top submarine hunters of the Regia Marina. There are however doubts over this record. Pegaso and Procione were scuttled at the armistice in September 1943, while Orsa survived the war and continued to serve until 1964.
[8] Circe was also a Spica-class boat. Circe destroyed four confirmed Royal Navy submarines during the war, making her one of the most successful sub-hunters of the Regia Marina.
[9] This are likely to have been the eight Blenheims of No. 105 Squadron out of Luqa, Malta, on their attack run.
[10] Regia Marina High Command
[11] Naval Command Tripoli
[12] This was standard attacking practice for the torpedo bombers. The lead aircraft which carried radar instead of a torpedo would drop flares behind the convoy, to silhouette it, and enable the attacking planes to approach from the dark.



Operations record books of Nos. 11, 14, 38, 55, 105, 107, and 272 Squadrons R.A.F..
Admiralty War Diary, Malta


Official history: La Difesa del Trafico con l’Africa Settentrionale Vol. I


War diaries Naval Transport Offices Benghazi, Tripolis.

Cargo Manifests, Naval Transport Office Naples


Malta War Diary

Royal Navy Day by Day