Directive No. 38

On 2 December 41 Hitler issued Directive 38, appointing Kesselring to the new post of CiC South. I tried to find it online, but to no avail, so here it is, in German, as a public service. An English translation is provided below.

This is an OCR of a copy reprinted in Germany, emphasis as in the copy, and I presume the original.

Der Führer and Oberste Befehlshaber F. H. Qu., den 2. 12. 1941 der Wehrmacht

OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op)

441980/41 g. Kdos. Chefs.

Geheime Kommandosache

Chefsache! 17 Ausfertigungen

Nur durch Offizier ! 2. Ausfertigung

Weisung Nr. 38

1) Als Grundlage für die Sicherung und Erweiterung der eigenen Mittelmeerstellung und zur Bildung eines Kraftzentrums der Achsenmächte im mittleren Mittemeer befehle ich nach Einvernehmen mit dem Duce, dass Teile der im Osten frei gewordenen Verbände der deutschen Luftwaffe in Stärke etwa eines Fliegerkorps und der erforderlichen Luftverteidigungskräfte in den süditalienischen und nordafrikanischen Raum zu überführen sind.

Neben der unmittelbaren Auswirkung auf die Kriegführung im Mittelmeer und Nordafrika soll dadurch eine wesentliche Einflussnahme auf die gesamte weitere Entwicklung im Mittelmeerraum angestrebt werden.

2) Mit der Führung der für diese Aufgabe einzusetzenden Gesamtkräfte beauftrage ich den Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring unter gleichzeitiger Ernennung zum Oberbefehlshaber Süd (Ob. Bfh. Süd).

Seine Aufgaben sind:

Erzwingen der Luft- und Seeherrschaft im Raum zwischen Süditalien und Nordafrika zur Herstellung gesicherter Verbindungswege nach Libyen und der Cyrenaika, hierzu insbesondere Niederhaltung Maltas,

Zusammenwirken mit den in Nordafrika eingesetzten deutschen und verbündeten Kräften,
Unterbindung des feindlichen Verkehrs durch das Mittelmeer sowie der englischen Versorgung von Tobruk und Malta in enger Zusammenarbeit mit den dafür verfügbaren deutschen und italienischen Seestreitkräften.

3) Der Ob. Bfh. Süd untersteht dem Duce and erhält über das Comando Supremo dessen Richtlinien für die Aufgaben im grossen. In allen luftwaffeneigenen Angelegenheiten verkehrt der Ob. d. L. mit dem Ob. Bfh. Süd unmittelbar, in wesentlichen Fragen unter gleichzeitiger Unterrichtung des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht.

4) Dem Ob. Bfh. sind unterstellt:

sämtliche im Mittelmeerraum und Nordafrika eingesetzten Kräfte der deutschen Luftwaffe, die seitens der italienischen Wehrmacht zur Durchführung seiner Aufgaben zur Verfügung gestellten Flieger- and Flak-Verbände.

5) Die im mittleren Mittelmeergebiet eingesetzten deutschen Seestreitkräfte bleiben dem Ob. d. M. unterstellt.

Der Ob. Bfh. Süd ist befugt, für die Durchführung der ihm zugewiesenen Aufgaben dem Deutschen Admiral beim Oberkommando der italienischen Kriegsmarine, gegebenenfalls auch der Marine-Gruppe Süd (für das östliche Mittelmeer) Weisungen zu erteilen. Den Einsatz befehlen die Marinedienststellen im Einvernehmen mit dem Ob. Bfh. Süd.

Die Wünsche des Ob. Bfh. Süd zur Abstimmung des gemeinsamen Einsatzes der verbündeten Seestreitkräfte sind ausschliesslich an den Deutschen Admiral beim Oberkommando der italienischen Kriegsmarine zu richten.

6) Die Aufgaben des W. B. Südost und des Deutschen Generals beim Hauptquartier der italienischen Wehrmacht bleiben unverändert.

(gez.) Adolf Hitler

English Translation

The Führer and Commander in Chief. Führer HQ, 2nd Dec. 1941, to the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op)

441980/41/ Secret Command Affair

Chiefs Only! 17 Copies

Only by Officer! 2nd Copy

Directive No. 38

1) As basis for securing and broadening our position in the Mediterranean and to create a power centre of Axis forces in the central Mediterranean I hereby order, in agreement with the Duce, that elements of the German air force formations which have been freed up in the east, in strength of about one air corps, and the required air defense forces, are to be transferred into the Southern Italian and North African area. Apart from the immediate effect on the conduct of war in the Mediterranean and North Africa, a major influence on the whole development in the Mediterranean area will be pursued.

2) I charge Field Marshal Kesselring with the command of the totality of forces employed for this task, and appoint him as CIC South at the same time.
His tasks are:
Force command of the air and sea in the area between South Italy and North Africa to establish secure connections to Libya and the Cyrenaica, and in this context especially to suppress Malta, Co-operation with the German and allied forces employed in North Africa, Stopping of enemy traffic through the Mediterranean, as well as the English supply of Tobruk and Malta in close co-operation with the German and Italian naval forces available for this task.

3) The CIC South is subordinated to the Duce and receives his general guidance for the tasks at large through the Comando Supremo. In all internal German air force affairs he deals with the CIC German Air Force directly, in important matters while informing the High Command of the Wehrmacht at the same time.

4) Subordinated to the CIC South are:
All the forces of the German Air Force employed in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the flying and air defense forces made available by the Italian armed forces for the carrying out of his tasks.

5) The German naval forces employed in the central Mediterranean remain under the command of the CIC Navy.
The CIC South is allowed, to carry out the tasks given to him, to issue directives to the German Admiral at the High Command of the Italian Navy, and where necessary to the Naval Group South (for the eastern Mediterranean). The tactical employment is ordered by the naval offices in agreement with the CIC South.
Wishes of the CIC South to co-ordinate the joint employment of the allied naval forces are solely to be directed to the German Admiral at the High Command of the Italian Navy.

6) The tasks of the Armed Forces Commander South East and of the German General at the HQ of the Italian Armed Forces remain unchanged.

(signed) Adolf Hitler

The Impact of War in the Far East

Following the attack on Pearl Harbour, forces destined for or already present in North Africa were diverted to the Far East to deal with the new threat. This stretched Commonwealth forces critically thin at a time when they were ready to exploit the victory won in Cyrenaica.

This post on the AHF discusses the question: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=12&t=132232

I have found the following list of units and formations transferred:

Army

  • 7th Armoured Brigade with two regiments.
  • I Australian Corps HQ with: 6th and 7th Australian Division
  • Transferred while in transit around the Cape: 18th (British) Infantry Division

http://home.adelphia.net/~dryan67/orders/aif41.html

RAF

I have not been able to find similarly detailed info yet. Those I have found:

Gundelach, the German historian of the air war in the Med estimates that 300 planes were withdrawn from the theatre from December 41 to February 42. This is not including planes that were sent directly from the UK or the US to the Far East, instead of North Africa, so it understates the actual effect.  To put this in context, the RAF started Crusader with about 750 planes.

Royal Navy

(same proviso as RAF, but more likely complete at least for transfers up to 1 Jan 42)

  • HMS Abdiel (fast minelayer – she had laid the mines that sank 2. Panzerdivision in May 41)
  • HMAS Hobart (cruiser)
  • HMAS Yarra (sloop)
  • HMAS Nestor, Napier, Nizam (all destroyers)
  • HMS Truant (submarine)
  • HMS Trusty (submarine)
  • HrMs Isaac Sweers (Dutch destroyer), first to Netherlands East Indies, then to Eastern Fleet.
  • Already transferred in November to accompany Prince of Wales and Repulse:
  • HMS Encounter, Jupiter (destroyers)

The Fleet Air Arm

Fleet Air Arm squadrons were quite involved in the Mediterranean battles during Operation Crusader. While no carrier was active in the Med following the sinking of HMS Ark Royal on 13/14 November 1941, FAA squadrons such as No. 828 Squadron FAA (see also Thomas Barker’s diary) operated from Malta against Italian shipping, and several squadrons operated from the western desert in support of ground operations.

In the western desert, the following FAA squadrons were active in supporting naval operations, according to the official history:

Nos. 803, 805, 806 Squadron FAA formed the Western Desert RN Fighter squadron, consisting of 24 Hurricanes in 803 and 806 Squadrons  (taken over from the RAF, presumably Hurricane I) and 12 Grumman Martlets (Wildcats for Americans) in 805 Squadron for 36 fighters in total. This was operating from August 41 from Mersa Matruh for shipping protection between Alexandria and Benghazi (once captured).  They moved to Fort Maddalena on the frontier on 22 November and to Tobruk on 11 December. A short section in the official wartime account of the Fleet Air Arm published by the Ministry of Information in 1943 deals with the desert squadrons of the FAA  (see also here). The Squadron operated under RAF Wings 264, 269 and 234 until disbanded in February 1942.

No. 815 Squadron FAA with 6 Fairey Albacores and 6 A.S.V. Fairey Swordfish (according to the official history A.S.V. was fitted in early December – this was an early form of air-ground radar used to detect ships).  The squadron operated from Sidi Barrani on A/S (anti-submarine) patrols and A/S escort duties for convoys.

No. 826 Squadron FAA with 12 Albacores which could carry out anti-shipping strikes when released from army cooperation duties.  On army cooperation these carried out flare dropping and night bombing of vehicle and tank concentrations. To illuminate targets for night bombardment was a specialty function carried out by the Albacores, which were very well suited for this task, it appears. They also carried out spotting duties for naval bombardments such as occurred at Bardia and Derna during CRUSADER.

805, 806 and 815 Squadrons were disembarked from HMS Illustrious, while 803 and 826 Squadrons were disembarked from HMS Formidable after she was damaged during the evacuation of Crete.

RAF torpedo squadrons did not become active until very late in the battle. As I understand it, No.39 Squadron, operating Bristol Beauforts out of Malta and Cyrenaica, contributed to the sinking of MS Vittoria of the T.18 convoy on 23 January 1942 (she was finished off by Albacores from No.826 Squadron FAA operating out of Malta).

Corrections and additions on this would be very welcome.